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Abstract 
It is accepted that train drivers’ safety performance is affected by numerous 
performance shaping factors (PSF). Design of the physical environment is among 
these factors. Even though the body of knowledge in rail human factors is increasing, 
it is limited as it is often i) reactive, ii) focusing mainly on single type incidents, iii) 
prioritising high profile accidents, iv) not always fully addressing existing risk profiles. 
Railway systems with different design features are usually grouped together for 
research purposes thus disregarding the fact that system design can alter effects of 
the PSFs. This is especially true for urban rail systems. A combination of concurrent 
and sequential research in this mixed methods thesis has investigated PSFs 
associated with metro systems design, using the Tyne & Wear Metro system as its 
application case. The PSFs embedded in everyday operations have been studied on 
different system levels through historic incident analysis, drivers’ surveys, semi-
structured interviews, eye-tracking and simulation experiments. Some of the 
established methodologies have been adapted in order to address the research 
objectives set. Novel approaches have been developed for the deployment of in-
service eye-tracking using dynamic areas of interest and the development of a low-
cost high fidelity simulator using gaming software and hardware. Selected station 
layouts have been assessed through measures of workload, stress and signal 
checking behaviour thus supporting PSF inter-dependence. The results suggest the 
influence on the performance of arrival and departure procedures of the angle 
between a signal, a driver and a mirror. Among the latent conditions potentially 
inducing incident propagation are passenger levels, the platform side, 
informativeness of design elements, openness and lighting conditions of a station, 
and distances from a stopping position to other elements of the station design.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate effects of performance shaping factors 
(PSFs) associated with design aspects of urban rail systems and their influence on 
safety related behaviour of metro train drivers. Tyne & Wear Metro is used as a case 
study to establish the relevant PSFs, their inter-dependency and how they differ from 
those applied to mainline railways.  
1.1 Background 
Railway systems are one of the safest modes of transport, but they are not risk-free 
(European Transport Safety Council, 2003; RSSB, 2016); incidents do occur, in a 
range of magnitude, and sometimes with severe consequences. Despite being the 
safety leader in European railway industry, hundreds of major passenger and 
workforce accidents happen in the United Kingdom annually (RSSB, 2016). The 
majority of incidents lead to passenger minor injuries, but fatalities also happen. 
Nevertheless, there were no train accidents recorded with on-board fatalities 
between 2006 and 2016 (RSSB, 2016). This has been achieved with increased 
attention to collision-related issues. Among those are crashworthiness, track quality 
and Signals Passed at Danger (SPaD). The drive to reduce collisions and 
subsequently SPaDs has its origin in most high-profile rail accidents in the UK in the 
past 25 years being a result of a driver passing on a red aspect, e.g. Ladbroke Grove 
collision in 1999. Since then the SPaD has become an important unit in assessment 
of driver-related safety performance of train operating companies (TOC) and 
railways. There were still 277 SPaDs in 2015/16 in the UK despite introduction of 
train protection and warning system (TPWS), improved SPaD reporting and analysis, 
and a wide range of other SPaD-focused initiatives (RSSB, 2016).  
Railway safety research is rather reactive and is often initiated in response to a high 
profile incident. Numerous casualties and injuries are the main pre-requisites for a 
“high-profile accident” status. However, the UK statistics shows that cumulative risk 
to passengers is higher from “individual accidents”. Masaaki et al. (2015) claim that 
SPaDs and overspeeding are the two most common incidents resulting from human 
error, but Rail Standards and Safety Board (RSSB, 2016) demonstrate that risk from 
platform-train interface (PTI) and on board accidents is more than five times higher 
than from train accidents. Moreover, the PTI accidents have the highest risk of 
fatalities among passengers. Such PTI accidents rarely involve more than one 
passenger so might go unnoticed, especially in smaller networks. Even though there 
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has been an increased research focus on PTI accidents, the existing body of 
knowledge is rather fragmented. Incidents such as wrong-side door activations rarely 
become main research focus. On the other hand, SPADs are well-covered in the 
literature (Multer et al., 2015). Moreover, “SPADs continue to be high priority 
incidents for the GB rail industry” (p. I) (Gibson, 2016). The reactive approach along 
with an increased focus on prevention of “high-profile accidents” led to a lack of 
synergy between research areas and the actual risks in the industry.  
Despite a rich body of knowledge on SPADs, it is not easily transferable across 
countries and requires adaptation nationally, e.g. in Australia and New Zealand 
(Naweed and Rainbird, 2014). Moors et al. (2015) advocated that the existing 
research, if applied to a new system, has to consider individual characteristics of the 
system, e.g. demand on human performance. British railway industry consists of wide 
variety of different systems, including urban rail, mainline passenger and freight 
services, heritage lines. However, most of the UK railway-related research is driven 
by mainline operators through organisations such as RSSB and ATOC (Association 
of Train Operating Companies). This creates a situation of “one size fits all” where 
tools developed on mainline railways are applied to metro railways, e.g. various 
SPAD checklists (RSSB, 2006) are used in Tyne & Wear Metro, or conclusions are 
drawn from generalisation across different systems (RSSB, 2005). Such lack of 
distinction between different systems means that tools and solutions offered are not 
exactly tailored and cannot achieve maximum efficiency, if any. In terms of urban rail, 
the main issue is disregard of considerable differences of such systems and 
subsequent rareness of metro-specific research.  
Even with larger number of signals encountered, collision risks are rather low in 
metro systems due to usual presence of automatic train protection (ATP) systems. 
These systems monitor drivers’ speeds and moving authority at certain locations. If 
violation is spotted, the system applies brakes automatically. With lighter trains and 
lower maximum speeds, the trains can be stopped in very short distances. For 
example, Indusi ATP system used in Tyne & Wear Metro can stop a 2-car train from 
80 km/h in less than 150 metres compared to 2 km for some mainline trains. 
However, significant jerk experienced by passengers in such situations creates 
additional risks in terms of major injuries (Powell and Palacín, 2015). The other 
important factor in SPaD propagation is drivers’ route knowledge (Naweed, 2013; 
Gibson, 2016). Metro drivers operate in closed systems which are more uniform. 
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They do not have to deal with complicated gantry arrangements, variety of rolling 
stock and perplexing junction layouts. Hence metro drivers should be better than 
mainline train drivers in this parameter. The event rate of task and route knowledge 
elements in the urban rail environment is very high, which significantly affects 
strategies employed by drivers (Naweed and Balakrishnan, 2014). Higher 
concentration of station stops further induces risks associated with the PTI. In 
mainline railways, the combination of 4-aspect signalling, longer stopping distances 
and limited signal sighting requires predictive, feed-forward control (Stanton and 
Walker, 2011). It is not the case for the metro systems where simpler 2- or 3-aspect 
signalling is used for capacity reasons. Hence simple “see red aspect – apply brakes” 
models are more often encountered in urban railways.   
All of the above factors combined create a different risk profile to that found in 
mainline railways. Even though signal sighting, PTI risks, route knowledge and other 
aspects of train driving are explored in the literature, it is usually done in the context 
of mainline rather than urban rail. Moreover, the literature which investigates these 
issues from system design point of view started to appear only recently. 
This thesis approaches the issues of drivers’ safety related performance in urban 
railways through the case of Tyne & Wear Metro. This system has features typical to 
both metro and suburban rail systems, including underground running at own 
infrastructure, mixed traffic on Network Rail infrastructure, Driver Only Operations 
(DOO). Many of these features can be encountered in urban rail systems across the 
world. Hence the findings can be extrapolated to those systems.  
1.2 Railway incident propagation 
Modern railways still depend heavily on human operators who are known to make 
errors. Scientists acknowledge a state of zero errors is often non-achievable 
(Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2009) and human operators are often solely blamed for 
incidents (Mackieh and Cilingir, 1998; Stanton and Salmon, 2009). However, there is 
a move to more in-depth investigation of human error through exploration of causal 
factors (Plant and Stanton, 2012; Madigan et al., 2016). Incidents are caused by a 
combination of technical, systematic and human factors (Woods et al., 2010). 
Alignment of many factors, which are not sufficient to cause an incident individually, 
can be required for an incident to happen (Bogner, 2002).  
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The famous “Swiss Cheese Model” introduced by Reason (1997) contains an 
important notion of human errors being a result of latent factors embedded in a 
system. It identifies workplace and organisational factors as both important 
contributors to unsafe acts and latent conditions in failures of system defences 
(Figure 1). The critics of the model claim that it is being too theoretical and does not 
take into account relationships between the planes and causal factors (Shappel and 
Wiegmann, 2000; Reason et al., 2006). However, it represents a simple choice faced 
by the safety-critical industries between adding more defences or addressing the 
latent conditions.  
 
Figure 1. Reason’s accident causation model, version of 1997 (Reason, 1997) 
1.3 Rail human factors 
The railway industry uses automation as the main way of increasing system 
defences. It can eliminate a lot of latent conditions but also create many new causal 
factors. Automation is a costly activity, which becomes even more expensive if retro-
fitting is considered. Only 166 km of total 2335 km of metro lines in the world were 
used for unattended train operations in 2009 (The European Rail Research Advisory 
Council, 2009). Semi-automation through various driver advisory systems is 
becoming popular but possesses similar challenges to full scale automation. 
Moreover, human-centred design is very important in order to actually introduce 
positive effects not create more negative ones. These technologies support the 
downward trends in incident propagation but do not positively influence drivers’ 
performance. Research suggests that train drivers’ safety-related performance has 
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not improved at all between 2004 and 2013 considering only operations with 
technical solutions disabled (Russell et al., 2013). In other words, drivers keep 
making the same amount of mistakes but novel technical solutions prevent some 
errors from becoming incidents. 
De Egea et al. (2013) found out that approximately 80% of the risk in the railway 
industry still can be attributed to front line staff, whereas most investment is streamed 
into the technical domain. Human Factors (HF) is considered a suitable approach to 
address all aspects of safety, in safety-critical industries and systems (Vogt et al., 
2010). Rail human factors discipline had a slower start than HF research in other 
safety-critical industries, but has gained momentum in 21st century (Wilson and 
Norris, 2006; Zeilstra and Van Der Weide, 2013). The growing relevance of this 
discipline is evidenced by the increased involvement of  human factor specialists  in 
the design of railway systems (Crawford et al., 2013).  
Human Reliability Assessments (HRA) extensively use Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSFs) in order to display quantified human factors’ influence on human 
performance. PSFs absorb the organisation and management influences on human 
error probability and are specifically selected for each system (Belamy and Geyer, 
2007). Gibson et al. (2009) define PSFs as “A state which cannot in itself be defined 
as an error but increased the likelihood of one or more errors. They are non-optimal 
states which are accepted features of a task, management system or design” (p. 13). 
This description does not include acknowledgement of potential positive effects of 
these factors. Along with increased use of systematic approach to incident 
investigation (Ryan et al., 2010; Plant and Stanton, 2012), performance shaping 
factors become an important concept in understanding incident causation.  
Due to previously discussed differences of mainline and metro systems, the PSFs 
associated with system design might require more adaptation from mainline railways 
compared to organisational, team and personal factors. Different rail PSF taxonomies 
(Kyriakidis et al., 2012b; Gibson et al., 2013b; Gibson, 2016) include factors 
associated with design of physical environment.  
Gourlay et al. (2013) highlighted the importance of system design related factors to 
drivers’ performance. Gibson (2016) in his assessment of Incident Factors (RSSB 
classification system for causal mechanisms) emphasise equipment and work 
environment design as PSFs. Factors associated with physical and technological 
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environment were found present in approximately a quarter of rail incidents (Madigan 
et al., 2016). Naumann et al. (2016) advocate that system design of drivers’ 
workplace is a central influencing factor in drivers’ performance. Elliott (2010) lists 
areas of particular importance to the rail HF, including anatomy and anthropometry, 
physiology and physiological workload.  
One of the most significant characteristics of using PSFs, is the recognition that 
human error is caused by a mix of different factors, thus acknowledging inter-
dependence (De Ambroggi and Trucco, 2011). However, the complex inter-
dependence of the PSFs is yet to be understood (Basacik et al., 2015; Naumann et 
al., 2016). Discerning the PSFs can help create safety-critical systems that include a 
human operator as an asset, rather than a risk carrier.  It also provides great 
opportunities for system engineers who potentially could “design out” or contain 
adverse PSFs related to the physical environment.  
Some of the work done in this area includes re-design of a mainline train cab to 
reduce harmful low-frequency vibrations (Johnson et al., 2009), relationship between 
infrastructure features and train drivers’ arousal levels (Keun Sang and Ohkubo, 
1994; Yang et al., 2012). It is recognised that elements of immediate physical 
environment, e.g. driver-machine interface (DMI) or a driver desk, are closely 
connected with other negative PSFs such as workload and poor situational 
awareness (RSSB, 2004a; Blanchard, 2013; Hitchcock et al., 2013; Kecklund et al., 
2013; Sumpor et al., 2013; Van Der Weide et al., 2013). Outside the driver’s cab 
signal designs, and how those contribute to signal sighting, have been researched 
(Human Engineering Ltd, 2006; Li et al., 2006; RSSB, 2007b; Elliott, 2012). 
Environmental factors are of great importance to train drivers’ performance too with 
suggestions that effective system design can mitigate those (RSSB, 2008; 2012).  
The literature review (Chapter 2) will expand on many of the above mentioned 
research and how it mostly focuses on mainline railways. The current body of 
knowledge approaches a research problem from task design point of view. For 
example, signal sighting studies do not consider how task demands and priorities 
change with variation in operational environment or design features. Adding an 
additional dispatch tasks in DOO systems might significantly affect drivers’ interaction 
with station signals. In a sense, many studies do not investigate PSFs with inter-
dependencies considered.  
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1.4 Rationale 
The existing body of knowledge clearly identifies risks embedded in railways but 
often fails to address those in urban rail context. However, it can be expected that 
many of the findings from mainline railway are applicable to metro systems but effect 
on other PSFs needs to be understood. Such a combination of known risks and 
potentially transferable knowledge creates an opportunity for a leap forward in 
understanding of urban rail drivers’ performance. Moreover, with many urban rail 
design and operational features potentially transferable to mainline railways, an 
importance of such research is even higher. 
With growing urbanisation and demand for travel among city dwellers, urban railways 
simply cannot afford costs associated with incidents even if safety implications are 
minor (Madigan et al., 2016). The aspiration for shorter headways and better 
reliability of the system means that tolerance of disruptions will continue to decrease. 
According to Naweed and Rainbird (2014), the incidents stemming from human 
errors advocate use of human factors. Previous research in HF and PSF 
demonstrates that performance improvements can be achieved in a cost-effective 
manner. The cost of retrofitting and design alterations leads to situations when 
system engineers and designers have only one attempt to make it right. In the 
context of this thesis, “making it right” means “engineering out” as many adverse 
PSFs as possible through thorough design considerations.  
System design PSFs are often considered from SPaD point of view thus only 
meaning increased focus on signal design and sighting research. However, the risk 
profile demonstrates importance of the PTI related hazards and addressing those. 
When research focuses on certain tasks of train drivers, e.g. signal sighting, this can 
lead to a gap in more holistic understanding of influence of a wider physical 
environment on safety-related performance of front line staff. This thesis investigates 
system design PSFs through a series of experiments with Tyne & Wear Metro. 
However, if successful, the methodology should be applicable to other urban rail 
systems providing operational and design differences are taken into account.  
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1.5 Objectives 
With the above rationale in mind, the thesis addresses the following research 
questions:  
1. Is the existing mainline research applicable to urban rail systems? 
2. What design features act as performance shaping factors in metro driver 
related incident propagation? 
3. What design and procedure modifications to existing urban rail systems can 
mitigate the effects of these PSFs?  
In order to address the research questions, the following objectives are set: 
A. To explore the current body of knowledge on infrastructure design PSFs and 
how it applies to Tyne & Wear Metro; 
B. To identify design features associated with changes in drivers’ performance 
objectively through analysis of the Tyne & Wear Metro past incident data; 
C. To investigate the identified design features subjectively from drivers’ point of 
view and in context of their everyday operations; 
D. To carry out an in-field assessment of the PSF influences on drivers’ 
performance;  
E. To propose a set of measurable actions for mitigations of the identified 
adverse factors; 
F. To assess the effectiveness of the proposed mitigations in the controlled 
environment. 
Objective A is related to research question 1. Objectives B and C address both 
research questions 2 and 3. Finally, research question 3 is further explored through 
objectives D, E and F. 
1.6 Thesis structure 
The thesis consists of the nine chapters as follows:  
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the existing body of knowledge on system design 
PSFs in railway industry. It expands on the introduction statements about necessity 
to investigate urban rail systems in depth. 
Chapter 3 defines research strategy and research design of the thesis through an 
argument about the most applicable research philosophy. The research tools and 
9 
 
methods are presented. The chapter describes how those fit into the selected 
research design.  
Chapter 4 describes the design and operational features of Tyne & Wear Metro. A 
categorisation of station layouts and examples of design deviations are defined. 
Chapter 5 analyses Tyne & Wear Metro historic incident data to identify design 
features potentially affecting drivers’ performance. The objective findings of 
frequency distribution and correlation analyses are enriched with subjective results 
from the semi-structured interviews and workshops. This chapter addresses 
objectives 2 and 3.   
Chapter 6 presents a collection of Tyne & Wear Metro drivers’ perceptions and 
opinions on the influence of the selected design features on their safety related 
performance (objective 3). Both subjective and objective data is collected and 
analysed from the mixed methods questionnaire study. The chapter discusses 
factors influencing drivers’ opinions and assessments of the PSFs.  
Chapter 7 identifies four elements of the system design which can be critical to 
drivers’ performance. The designs of those elements are assessed as PSFs during 
the in-field cognitive data collection (objective 4). Measures of drivers’ workload and 
stress are used to explore the differences in designs of each element. The chapter 
also suggests a set of measurable actions that can influence how effective the 
investigated PSFs are (objective 5).  
Chapter 8 continues investigation of the designs of the four elements in a more 
controlled environment. The experimental design allows testing the measures 
suggested in the previous chapter. The findings provide assessment of efficiency of 
the suggested measures.  
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis and summarises the most important findings. 
Contributions to knowledge and a scope for further research in the area are outlined. 
  
10 
 
1.7 Contribution to the body of knowledge 
The thesis contributes to the body of knowledge as follows: 
• Evidence-based identification of system design PSFs in the context of urban 
rail systems; 
• Validated set of design mitigations for the above PSFs;  
• Validated low-cost methodology for assessment of the PSFs and mitigations 
measures. 
The work described in the thesis contributed to several peer-reviewed international 
conference and journal publications as follows:  
• Rjabovs A., Palacin R., Robinson M. (2014). ‘Cab and system design influence 
on metro drivers' performance: preliminary study’. Transport Research Arena; 
April 2014; Paris. 
• Rjabovs, A. and Palacin, R. (2015) ‘Attitudes of Metro Drivers Towards Design 
of Immediate Physical Environment and System Layout’, Urban Rail Transit, 1 
(2), p. 104-111. 
• Rjabovs, A. and Palacin, R. (2016) 'The influence of system design-related 
factors on the safety performance of metro drivers', Proceedings of the 
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 
(ePub ahead of Print). 
• Rjabovs, A. and Palacin, R. (2016) ‘Design and layout of the physical 
environment in a metro system: appraisal of Tyne and Wear Metro drivers’ 
perceptions’. WCTRS, July 2016; Shanghai;   
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Chapter 2. Literature review 
This chapter introduces the issue of human performance with a focus on railway 
domain and system design as a performance shaping factor. It starts with an 
explanation of a wider human error concept and how it applies to railway industry. 
Then current academic advancements in terms of system design PSFs are reviewed. 
The trends in academic research and gaps in the body of knowledge are identified, 
particularly scarce literature on urban rail systems and PSFs in everyday DOO 
operations.  
2.1 Human error 
Each driver-related incident includes some sort of a human error. Even though the 
thesis approaches these errors from a systematic point of view, it is necessary to 
understand the failure mechanisms involved. The modern concepts of human errors 
claim that there is rather limited number of such mechanisms. Without understanding 
these concepts, investigating causal factors is significantly more complicated as both 
topics are inter-connected.  Front-line staff errors can generally be divided into two 
categories. As train driving depends on drivers’ actions, the categories are based on 
performing wrong actions or not performing correct actions.  
2.1.1 Human actions 
With human actions being a centrepiece of human performance, it is important to 
understand those first.  Norman (1981) outlined a theory of actions that use 
schemas. The modern schema concept was introduced by Neisser (1976), but the 
schema theory can be tracked as far as Ancient Greece (Plant and Stanton, 2012). 
The theory suggests that every action sequence is controlled by schemas – 
organised memory units or sensori-motor knowledge structures (Norman, 1981). 
Norman’s activation – trigger – schema (ATS) system is based on activation and 
selection of these structures where specific conditions are required for triggering. The 
structures are also divided into parent and child ones. Parent schemas correspond to 
intention but a child schema – to a part of an action sequence. In this concept, even 
the simplest action sequences consist of a combination of different level knowledge 
structures and an error can occur at any of the ATS stages. For example, an 
incorrect schema can be activated or a schema is triggered by a wrong set of 
conditions.  
Rasmussen (1983) offered his view on the process by presenting the skill-rule-
knowledge framework. In comparison to the ATS system, the framework is mainly 
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focused on skilled human operators of industrial installations. It consists of three 
levels – skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based. Figure 2 provides a 
visualisation of the framework. 
 
Figure 2. Simplified illustration of the Rasmussen’s (1983) skill-rule-knowledge framework 
The skill-based level is responsible for actions in response to a statement of 
intention. Actions are based on stored patterns of pre-programmed instructions and 
occur without conscious control. The rule-based level is necessary for solving familiar 
problems with actions being controlled by stored rules. Finally, the knowledge-based 
level is responsible for actions in unexpected or novel situations when analytical skills 
and knowledge base are required. Rasmussen’s framework also appreciates multi-
dimensionality of complex tasks, e.g. train driving, which can be carried on all 3 
levels simultaneously. It is similar to the ATS concept but providing more specific 
explanation for different levels of a task.  In terms of train driving, a lot of it happens 
on the rule-based level. The knowledge-based behaviour, according to Rasmussen 
(1983), is mostly applicable to unfamiliar situations where a new plan has to be 
developed based on environment assessment and person’s goals.  
Information perception is also different between the levels of the framework. For 
example, observing a red signal on the rule based level will mean activation of 
braking sequences. The same visual information on the knowledge based level can 
trigger considerations of potential reasons for this signal, development of a forecast 
for a system state ahead and aligning it with, for example, punctuality goals. 
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However, it is a complicated process involving actions on many levels. Work by 
Reason (1990) shows that, in conditions of under-specification, a human cognitive 
system is inclined to choose responses that are most frequent in similar situations. 
Hence if a train driver never before encountered a red signal and never learnt about 
red signals meaning stop, he or she might treat it as a green signal due to missing 
information being substituted with stereotypical assignments for signal sightings.  
2.1.2 Erroneous actions 
Authors of the human performance models also investigate what can hinder this 
performance. According to Neisser (1976) and Norman (1981), an erroneous action 
occurs when a defective schemata is selected or a faulty activation occurs. Typically, 
several types of erroneous actions are distinguished. For example, Norman (1981) 
describes three different categories with many sub-categories based on slips (Table 
1). It is important to note, that the future research seem to substitute the term “slip” 
with “error” when quoting Norman’s work (Stanton and Walker, 2011). In fact, such 
substitution helps understanding this classification better as the more recent work 
specified slips as only one of several error types.  
Error Categories Error Source 
Slips that result from errors in the 
formation of the intention 
Errors in determination of goals, 
decision making and problem solving 
Mode errors 
Description errors 
Slips as a result of faulty activation 
of schema 
Unintentional activation 
Loss of activation 
Slips as a result of from faulty 
triggering of schemas 
Failure to trigger 
False triggering 
Table 1. Classification of errors adapted from Norman (1981) 
Reason (1990) offered his human error classification with 4 categories included. As it 
can be seen from Table 2, Reason’s classification relates these categories to 
planning and execution. Slips and lapses happen when a correct plan is not executed 
due to attention or memory failures. Whereas mistakes occur due to a plan not being 
correct in the first place. The classification also includes intentional (routine) and 
unintentional (exceptional) violations. In his later work, Reason suggests dividing 
mistake into failures of expertise (rule-based level) and lack of expertise (knowledge-
based level) (Reason, 1997). Reason (1990) also categorises failure modes (error 
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types) by performance levels (Figure 3), which are similar to the skill-rule-knowledge 
framework by Rasmussen (1983). 
Basic error types 
Slip (attention 
failure) 
Lapse (memory 
failure) 
Mistake (planning) Violations 
Examples of error types 
Misperception, 
action intrusion, 
omission of action, 
reversal of action, 
misordering of 
action and 
mistiming of action 
Omitting of planned 
actions, losing 
place in action 
sequence, 
forgetting intended 
actions 
Misapplication of 
good procedure, 
application of bad 
procedure, poor 
decision making, 
overconfidence, 
failure to consider 
alternatives 
Intentional and 
unintentional 
Table 2 Basic error types with examples (adapted from Reason, 1990). Source: Stanton and Walker, 2011 
 
Figure 3. Failure modes at different performance levels (adapted from Reason, 1990) 
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The Reason’s and Norman’s models provide general error definition which is 
supposed to fit all situations. However, an increased interest in industry-specific 
understanding of the human error prompted development of many purpose built 
taxonomies across various domains. 
2.1.3 Human error categorisation in safety-critical systems 
Reason’s human error model has been applied to various industries. For example, 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Shappel and 
Wiegmann, 2000), developed for the US Federal Aviation Administration, uses 
Reason’s human error concepts. The HFACS  has been successfully applied to other 
safety-critical industries such as railways (Baysari et al., 2008) and shipping (Celik 
and Cebi, 2009). Zhang et al. (2004) developed their taxonomy of medical errors 
based on Reason’s definition of human errors and Norman’s action theory (Norman, 
1988). The importance of an industry-focused taxonomy was demonstrated by 
Reason et al. (1990) who applied his own model to car driving. The resultant 
categorisation has only one lapse but many mistakes and slips. However, this 
proportion can be different in other industries. As shown by Stanton and Salmon 
(2009), understanding human errors is the first step to grasping causal factors and 
potential mitigations. Hence dedicated human error taxonomies allow building 
customised models of causal factors.  
No universally agreed taxonomy of human errors in the railway industry exists.  
RSSB developed human error identification tool called ‘Technique for the 
Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors (TRACEr-rail)’ (Baysari et 
al., 2009). The TRACEr-rail framework, adapted from air traffic control domain, 
consists of eight different taxonomies on task errors, cognitive domains, and error 
recovery and detection. In their comparison between TRACEr-rail and HFACS, 
Gibson et al. (2009) point out that HFACS categories are too wide and include error 
categories, which normally would be considered as performance shaping factors, e.g. 
system design. However, there is a human error by an engineer or a responsible 
manager behind many design-related or management-related PSFs. By using PSFs 
as a context, it is possible to trace an error to an individual.  
Most taxonomies found in the literature are developed reactively by analysing the 
past incident statistics. This makes state of the art advancements more iterative but 
also more custom made for particular systems. Such process requires significant 
attention to uniformity of a sample as differences in system features should not be 
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disregarded (Moors et al., 2015). According to Dekker (2001), “focus on superficial 
similarities blocks our ability to see deeper relationships, deeper patterns, deeper 
reasons and subtleties” (p.253).  
The retrospective approach depends on quality of past incident analysis reports and 
can vary across incident types (Madigan et al., 2016). Focusing on past 
investigations also leads to exclusion of positive PSFs (Gibson et al., 2009). It is 
important to note that human errors must be distinguishable from PSFs even when 
blame allocation is not an ultimate goal. Using an example by Gibson et al. (2009), 
where signage on gantry is not in line with signal sighting standards and is 
considered a design error. However, under older standards this signage might have 
been acceptable or there was a standard derogation issued for it thus making it a 
performance shaping factor.  
The available human error taxonomies, despite considering causal factors, are still 
criticised for allocating a blame instead of identification of weaknesses in a system. 
Dekker (2001) claims that most taxonomies still follow “blame the human” approach 
without considering latent factors due to the illusion that classification is the same as 
analysis. He claims that only a few have attempted proper systematic review of 
human performance (in aerospace industry) through analyses spanning multiple 
years. Such research accounts for all the complexities between many processes and 
interactions that can contain PSFs.  
It is should be assumed that systems are not safe (Dekker, 2001) and human 
operators are safety creating elements in the systems (Montano, 2011; Zeilstra and 
Van Der Weide, 2013). In this case classifications of past incidents by human error 
types are meaningless without understanding what led to these errors. It is 
investigation of the connections between “tools, tasks, and operating environment” 
(p.248) that is required (Dekker, 2001). Drivers’ everyday behaviour can be indicative 
of performance shaping factors embedded in a system (Salmon et al., 2015). The 
pro-active identification of the PSFs embedded in a system can bring significant 
safety benefits but the reactivity of many taxonomies becomes a limiting factor for 
such studies. However, the existing taxonomies can provide a good starting point for 
this kind of pro-active assessment when those are used in context of unique design, 
driving task and organisational features.  
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With this thesis also envisaging an exploration of the system-embedded PSFs in day-
to-day operations, the existing body of knowledge can contribute to identification of 
areas for analysis. The notion of design related factors (physical/technological 
environment) in HFACS is used for the research. However, the concept of 
performance shaping factors as a context for human errors is adapted from TRACEr-
rail. This combination of concepts should allow examining metro drivers’ performance 
from system point of view and identifying the relevant PSFs. 
2.1.4 Performance Shaping Factors 
PSF taxonomies vary across the safety-critical industries similarly to the human error 
models. A range of PSFs taxonomies have been developed in the past decades for 
general applications (Hollnagel, 1998), nuclear industry (Mackieh and Cilingir, 1998; 
Kim and Jung, 2003), road transport (Stanton and Salmon, 2009), power plants 
(Boring et al., 2007) and power distribution systems (Fereidunian et al., 2010). 
Increased interest in human factors and quantification of human performance led to 
emerging of several PSFs taxonomies for railways. 
Gibson et al. (2013a), in their work on Railway Action Reliability Assessment, 
produced a taxonomy of 27 PSFs named error producing conditions. Kyriakidis et al. 
(2012b) created rail-specific taxonomy of 43 PSFs which are divided in seven 
categories (Table 3).  The taxonomy, called Railway PSFs (R-PSFs), distinguishes 
between dynamic and static factors that do or do not change with time. In 
comparison with other taxonomies, the R-PSF taxonomy takes into account 
interdependence between PSFs. It is also applicable to signallers, controllers and 
other operators within the railway network. To be versatile and reliable 
simultaneously, the taxonomy weights PSFs against each operator’s duties 
(Kyriakidis et al., 2012c). RSSB (2008) created a guide on human factors critical to 
human performance, which can be seen in Figure 4. Another human factors review 
by Gibson (2016) looks specifically into category A SPaDs.  
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PSF category Examples 
Organisational factors Training methods, safety culture 
Team factors Communication, coordination 
Personal factors Experience, motivation 
Dynamic personal factors Stress, fatigue 
Ambient factors Weather conditions, visibility 
System factors System design, HMI, working environment 
Task factors Workload, complexity 
Table 3. R-PSF taxonomy. Adapted from Kyriakidis et al. (2012b) 
 
 
Figure 4 Human Factors areas critical to human performance. Source: RSSB (2008) 
 
All of the taxonomies include design related factors but mainly focus on design 
deviations from accepted standards and misuse. Gibson et al. (2013b) claim that 
equipment “can be a factor if it is not being used as intended, if it is faulty, if its 
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design is not compatible with its use or if the layout is not in the order in which it is 
used” (p.7).  R-PSF research shows “system design” as top 3 contributing PSF in 
incident propagation (Kyriakidis, 2013). However, with SPADs still being high on 
researchers’ agenda, there are concerns that this category solely focuses on signal 
sighting. Even though the taxonomies include design related factors, those are often 
vague (Dekker, 2001). Some design related factors can be logged as personal, e.g. 
misinterpretation of the DMI messages. Such error types might not account for a 
complex relationship between message design, concurrent tasks, workload and time 
pressure in a cab with poor desk layout. It is possible to observe some limited inter-
dependence consideration in the taxonomies, e.g. Kyriakidis (2013) in his model 
does not assume relationship between system and environmental factors. This 
results in many PSFs potentially being left out and shows yet another drawback of 
retrospective approach.  
The R-PSF framework is the most relevant for this research as it puts driver 
performance related incidents into an operational context. This is achieved through a 
notion of the inter-dependence of the PSFs. This is further explored in the follow-up 
work on the R-PSF framework (Kyriakidis et al., 2015), where the authors began to 
investigate (albeit briefly) multi-factor relationships in incident propagation. Although 
the framework followed a standard human factors taxonomy development process (a 
retrospective analysis of past incidents, vague categories), it is significantly more 
advanced in holistically reviewing factors that contribute to train drivers’ errors than 
the research presented above.  
2.2 System design as a performance shaping factor 
Nature and feature of the tools human operators work with can be both detrimental 
and beneficial to the system safety  (Dekker, 2001). These tools create physical 
environment around the drivers in metro systems. Those can be located inside a cab, 
e.g. door controls, or be a part of a wider system design, e.g. platform mirrors. 
Research into influence of system design on train drivers’ performance is often driven 
by high profile incidents or an attempt to understand and mitigate an elevated 
incident rates for a certain incident type. Minor incidents are often disregarded which 
does not allow addressing incident precursors (Madigan et al., 2016). SPAD 
propagation is a research topic which has received a lot of attention in the past 
decades due to both reasons. For example, multiple investigations into Ladbroke 
Grove train crash tried to assess the driver’s error from systematic perspective. In 
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terms of system design, signal visibility (Cullen, 2000), complexity of track and 
signalling layouts combined with challenging environmental conditions (Lawton and 
Ward, 2005) were mentioned as contributing factors. Number of casualties and 
subsequent establishment of RSSB meant that the focus on SPAD incidents would 
continue. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the body of knowledge for other 
driver-related incidents is growing. According to Madigan et al. (2016), the 
contributory factor categories are consistent across the incidents related to train 
driving. However, it is unknown whether this consistency occurs when train dispatch 
tasks are also considered. The following sub-sections describe into research on rail 
incident types. 
2.2.1 Signal Pass at Danger  
A report by RSSB (2004b) concluded that more research should be carried out to 
explore the role of infrastructure in SPaD incidents. According to Railway Industry 
Advisory Committee (2007) poor signal sighting design and layout of a cab are 
among the contributory factors in SPaD propagation. In order to address rising 
number of SPaDs, Naweed and Rainbird (2014) studied causal factors in this type of 
incidents across Australia and New Zealand. Signal sighting had been emphasised 
as the main issue, which is further induced by the density of infrastructure, e.g. 
overbridges can obscure signals.  
Analysis of influencing factors in London Underground SPaDs showed distractors, 
attentional capacity, mental sets, signal sighting and design, sunlight and rail 
adhesion to have the biggest effect (Dray et al, 1999). Multer et al. (2015) stated that 
difference in rolling stock operated means problems with signal sighting from certain 
cabs, especially dwarf signals. They also claim that electric locomotives are at higher 
risk of SPaDs, partially due to more responsive controls and displays (assuming 
those are newer and have more DMIs). These advantages in train handling and in-
cab design lead to train drivers spending more time on gazes inside a cab. For 
example, a more responsive controls (almost immediate acceleration) in electric 
trains means that the drivers should observe speed more carefully in situations with 
tight speed limits. On the other hand, Moors et al. (2015) demonstrated that currently, 
in terms of SPaD risks, train cab design is managed significantly better than workload 
or design of infrastructure, at least in New Zealand. However, they admit that there is 
still room for improvement in terms of the cab design. 
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Gibson (2016) wrote a comprehensive review on HFs in SPaDs across the UK 
railway network, showing knowledge, personal and management related incident 
factors (include human errors and PSFs) as the main causal conditions. Effects of 
work environment incident factors were significantly higher for passenger TOCs, 
whereas equipment incident factors – for freight. However, when a numerical risk 
factor in FWI (fatalities and weighted injuries) is assigned to each incident factor 
group, equipment is accountable for 26% of total risk. This investigation disregards 
differences between routes and systems. Moreover, Gibson’s work, as many other 
SPaD focused research (e.g. Naweed and Rainbird, 2014; Multer et al., 2015), puts 
emphasis on design of signalling when it comes to system design PSFs. Even 
though cab environment is often mentioned, no consideration is given how wider 
design of the physical environment affects signal sighting and interpreting. With PSFs 
being inter-dependent, high workload causing the SPaD could be created by a 
design feature, which has no association with signals.  
2.2.2 Station overruns and failures to call 
Station overrun are described as : “Event in which a train which the driver is 
attempting to bring to a stand at a booked station stop proceeds beyond the 
designated stopping point such that any door intended to be available for public use 
at that station is no longer on the level platform” (Association of Train Operating 
Companies, 2006). Failure to call is “Failure of a train to make a booked station stop 
in cases where the driver has made no attempt to apply the brake” (ATOC, 2006). 
From the definitions it is possible to see that these two incident types are quite similar 
with only difference being whether the brakes were applied or not. ATOC (2006) 
guidance also suggests that in an event of a station overrun, when a red signal was 
passed, to investigate this incident as SPAD. RSSB (2010) found strong correlation 
between drivers with a station overrun history and SPaD occurences. Evans (2005), 
in his paper on railway risks, includes overruns in the same category as derailments 
and collisions because of their particular importance and high profile. 
Station overruns are highly correlated with low rail adhesion (LRA) conditions which 
hinder braking performance. There is significant literature explaining the phenomena 
of the LRA (e.g. Office of the Chief Investigator, 2009; Ward et al., 2012; Zhu et al., 
2012) but in the UK it is mostly a combination of fallen leaves and morning/evening 
dew and fog. Light rain can also contribute to these conditions. In terms of system 
design, track design and geometry were found to have little influence on incident 
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propagation (Office of the Chief Investigator, 2009). However, in case of a new rolling 
stock or newly qualified drivers, unrealistic expectations of braking performance 
based on the “dry running” experience were found to be a causal factor. Another 
similarity between SPaDs and station overruns is that signal disregard can be a 
human error causing both incidents (Railway Group Standards, 2000). Hence many 
PSFs applicable to SPaDs potentially can be transferred to station overruns and 
failure to call incidents. 
RSSB (2010) in their analysis of station overrun and failure to call statistics, 
concluded that memory errors are the main mechanism triggering such incidents. 
The main PSFs are personal factors, e.g. physical health, fatigue etc. The 
environment factors (temperature, lighting) only involved in less than 5% of incidents 
where PSFs were identified. This, however, excludes the LRA. Data quality is 
unknown in this retrospective assessment as it covers the period between 1999 and 
2006 where simply blaming drivers during incident investigation was a norm.  
Research on the international level mostly focused on technical solutions to mitigate 
these incidents. Sato et al. (2010) proposed a system that prevents station overruns 
by supplying a driver with information on a predicted stopping position. The position 
is calculated using vehicle velocity and deceleration. Information can be supplied 
using the DMI (Inoue and Yamamoto, 2006). Train Automatic Stop Control (TASC) 
systems usually are coupled with Automatic Train Operation (ATO). Even when 
automation is not considered, the cost of retro-fitting of such driver advisory systems 
is high. Moreover, taking some of the core options of train drivers away from them 
can cause situations of mental underload and low arousal levels. This can be even 
more harmful to human performance, as shown by some wrong side door activations 
(Connor, 2007). Providing a concurrent advice to drivers on station arrivals is 
associated with other issues. The in-cab DMIs are known to distract from front 
monitoring (Davies et al., 2007), which, in this case, will be combined with a driving 
task already causing increase in mental workload (Myrtek et al., 1994). 
2.2.3 Wrong side doors activations 
Metro systems are usually equipped with passenger-controlled doors on both sides 
of a car, i.e. when a passenger has to press a button to open a set of doors. 
However, the doors on one of the sides have to be first released by a driver. Wrong 
side door activation incidents occur when a driver releases an incorrect side of doors. 
Even though there is an additional defence layer with the passenger activated doors, 
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the risk increases with passenger loadings. In a crowded train there could be some 
passengers leaning on the doors and activating the open buttons involuntary. This 
creates a risk of people falling on a track and being trapped or hit by a train on the 
adjacent tracks. On mainline railways some platforms are shorter than trains. This 
requires a selective door activation procedure complicating the task even further.  
Halliday (1995) investigated the issue in a hope to address these incidents on 
Thames Train Class 165/166 rolling stock. It was found that the problem is wide-
spread among the companies using the DOO trains. Halliday (1995) identified a left-
hand bias in the railway industry, when most of the platforms are to the left from the 
drivers. Hence a door opening procedure becomes an action on the skill-based level 
and a non-routine encounter of a right-hand side platform might not activate a 
different action. It is also noted that the door opening task competes with other 
station stop tasks and design interventions splitting the tasks in time would have the 
biggest positive impact. Basacik and Gibson (2015) claim that “using unofficial cues 
on the non-platform side rather than official stopping markers” (p.444) can lead to the 
wrong side door activations through decision errors. Among the PSFs, equipment 
design and layout were highlighted the most in their analysis, e.g. platform side 
change, a location of in-cab CCTV, poor visibility of stop markers on island platforms, 
platform signals being on opposite side of the track. However, drivers’ door opening 
performance is much better than the one predicted by human reliability assessment 
techniques thus serious improvement more likely to be achieved with technical 
solutions (Basacik and Gibson, 2015). The technical solution offered was Correct 
Side Door Enable (CSDE) technology, used by London Underground. It is a platform-
based system of beams, which blocks activation of an incorrect side of doors.  
Connor (2007), looking back at his experience as a London Underground driver, 
states that the repetitiveness of a train driver job causes a mind drift and lose of 
awareness about the current station. Even though technical solutions exist, e.g. the 
CSDE, drivers still manage to override those and create an incident (Connor, 2007). 
ND BOMEL Ltd (2009), in assessment of a risk of an automatic selective door 
operation system, mostly focus on inadequate system designs and overreliance of 
such systems on a correct stopping position. RSSB (2011a) looked into introducing 
the selective door operation and emphasised the need for consistency across the 
system if this approach is to be introduced safely. This could be also applied to 
consistency in terms of platform sides.  
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Overspeeding 
Although current UK risk estimation models assign relatively low fatality and injury 
risk to such incidents (Monk et al., 2015), overspeeding often is a major cause of 
train derailments around the world. It can lead to very high profile accidents and rail 
crashes. Several high profile overspeeding accidents are summarised in Table 4.  
Where Date Allowed/Actual 
speed 
Casualties Injured 
Spain 24/07/2013 80/190 km/h 79 130 
China 28/04/2008 80/131 km/h 72 416 
Japan 25/04/2005 70/116 km/h 107 562 
Australia 31/01/2003 60/117 km/h 7 No information 
Table 4. Examples of train crashes due to overspeeding in XXI century.  
Baysari et al. (2008) studied two samples of accident investigation reports from the 
UK and Australia. They have found that speeding problem is more acute in Australia 
although not non-existent in the UK. They also discovered that majority of the 
speeding incidents are violations of driving rules, i.e. deliberate human actions. 
Furthermore, 70% of violations are routine to drivers who got used to such style of 
driving. Often drivers will be speeding to make up for a time lost early on route. 
According to the UK mainline train drivers, surveyed by Monk et al. (2015), main 
PSFs are lack of knowledge, fatigue, memory lapses, attention lapses and an 
incorrect design and placing of the speed restriction signage. However, other PSFs 
involved are distractions, layouts and visibility, lighting conditions, late running etc. 
The results also suggest that there is a scope for redesigning speed restriction signs 
to improve their visibility (Monk et al., 2015). Blanchard and Lowel (2009) in their 
incident investigation case study showed that clustering of trackside infrastructure 
causes a higher workload and task demands. Moreover, co-location of signs and 
signals can create conflicts due to divided attention demands and conflicting speed 
information (a signal at caution advises a lower speed, whereas a speed limit allows 
high speed running). According to Clements et al. (2011) distractions such as the 
eco-driving HMIs can lead to overspeeding, but the risk is rather low.  
2.2.4 Passenger entrapments 
The platform-train interface is the most hazardous area in a modern railway system in 
the UK (RSSB, 2016). Majority of the fatal boarding or alighting accidents on UK 
railways happen due to a victim falling in a gap between a train and a platform 
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(RSSB, 2011a; RAIB, 2012). Hence a significant research focus on mitigating the 
risks associated with platform gaps, e.g. Rajkumar et al. (2012). In many cases a 
driver or a dispatcher has no means of preventing an accident (RAIB, 2013). 
However, if a person is entrapped by a door closing sequence, whoever is 
responsible for the safe train dispatch should notice the incident and prevent it. In 
DOO systems it is usually a train driver. Although the modern train doors are 
equipped with anti-entrapment sensors (cycling the doors when an entrapment is 
identified), the drivers sometimes rely too much on the equipment thus only briefly 
check the dispatch equipment (RAIB, 2016a). Even though RAIB (2016b) provides a 
proof for the decreased PTI risk in the UK metro systems, approximately a half of the 
RAIB investigated trap & drag accidents occurred in London Underground or Tyne & 
Wear Metro. Even higher proportion of such investigations involves the DOO stations 
thus strongly suggesting elevated risk levels. However, Cynk et al. (2015) advocate 
that “DOO led dispatch improves performance at the PTI” (p.47) but mention that an 
evidence base for this claim should be improved. On the other hand, in their older 
assessment of the DOO dispatch, Basacik et al. (2009) present the DOO systems as 
prone to SPaDs and additional entrapment risks.  
According to RSSB et al. (2006), a composition of passengers (by age and mobility), 
their behaviour and crowdedness influence risks at the PTI. Moreover, they 
concluded that design-related factors are mitigated well by the UK railway standards. 
Cynk et al. (2015), in their review of 171 PTI incidents, also agree that the passenger 
characteristics are an important causal factors. Their research suggests visibility and 
obstruction issues as contributory factors too but it does not distinguish between 
DOO and train/platform staff dispatch. Cynk et al. (2015) claim that, in terms of the 
DOO dispatch, platform cameras support better PTI performance than mirrors due to 
consistency in picture size. Swanson (2004), in his view on advanced light rail 
communication system, writes that external door cameras are much more effective 
than rear or platform mirrors, especially in a multi-car operation and at curved 
platforms. However, poor design of the CCTV cameras can be a serious risk factor 
not allowing a DOO driver to identify the entrapments (Traub and Fraser, 2013; 
RAIB, 2016b).  
Technical solutions offered to tackle the problem are based on the use of the CCTV 
equipment. RSSB (2014a) explored using image recognition software in order to 
automatically detect hazardous events at the PTI. Traub and Fraser (2013) 
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demonstrated that a zoom option can bring benefits to safe dispatch at CCTV DOO 
locations. CCD Design & Ergonomics Ltd (2005) explored using more in-cab CCTV 
images to extend DOO onto longer trains. The research also indicates a necessity to 
correlate allowed dwell times with passenger levels. No discrepancies were found 
between performance in daytime and night time. RSSB (2007a) investigated human 
factors in context of CCTV monitoring and DOO driving.  
There is not a lot of research done on the DOO platform mirrors even though those 
provide rather cost effective solutions well fit for certain systems. RSSB (2014b), in 
their outline strategy for converting the UK rail network to the DOO, do not consider 
platform mirrors. Instead, the CCTV and on-board rear-view mirrors (for low traffic 
routes) are discussed. Research on the CCTV DMI design does not take into account 
potential negative effects on other tasks, e.g. the correct side door release (Basacik 
and Gibson, 2015). Research on other design-related PSFs is fragmented too. 
According to Cynk et al. (2015), certain platform designs with limited covered area 
cause overcrowding at certain parts of a platform thus increasing the risks.  
2.2.5 Metro-specific research  
The above review of the available literature for each incident type clearly indicates 
scarce nature of studies focusing on urban rail. Although complexity of train driving in 
urban environment is acknowledge in the literature (Naweed and Balakrishnan, 
2014), only rare studies address it. Among the incident types explored in such 
studies are SPaDs (Dray et al., 1999) and wrong side door activations (Basacik and 
Gibson, 2015). The passenger entrapments are often approached from passenger 
composition and behaviour points of view (RSSB et al., 2006; Cynk et al., 2015), 
which can be partially considered relevant to metro systems. It is possible to notice 
that SPaDs are not predominant research area in this sample of studies but this 
could be caused by small sample size.  
2.3 Physical environment factors  
Drivers’ immediate physical environment, i.e. cab environment, is a significant 
contributor to the drivers’ performance (RSSB, 2012).  It is associated with numerous 
environmental factors which can be further induced by inappropriate design of a cab. 
Moreover, the cab has to be designed with the end user in mind in order to be 
ergonomically sound. Van Der Weide et al. (2013) described successful application 
of a user-centred design in procurement of the new Amsterdam Metro rolling stock. 
Early and continuous involvement of the metro drivers led to a better quality and 
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acceptance in this project. The cost of redesigning or making amendments to the 
existing designs is hundred times more than cost of changes during the design phase 
(RSSB, 2008). In spite of that, a growing understanding of the physical environment 
influence and many rolling stock retro-fitting projects have sparked numerous 
projects looking on design of different parts of railway systems in the past decade.  
2.3.1 Noise 
Design of the cab environment was studied by Johnson et al. (2009) in order to 
reduce heavy rail train drivers exposure to noise. They concluded that drivers are 
exposed to a lot of low-frequency noise what is not in line with the current Federal 
Railroad Administration (US) rules. Authors proposed several active and passive 
measures e.g. better door seals, removing air gaps, vibration damping sheets, and 
unwanted sound cancellation using microphones and speakers. Decreasing drivers’ 
exposure to noise is important as it is a causal factor for annoyance, drowsiness, 
stress, tiredness and fatigue (Sümer et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2009; Maguire, 
2009). Besides, the low-frequency noise is known to cause cases of chronic 
insomnia and depression (Mirowska and Mroz, 2000) as well as errors in judgement 
(Maguire, 2009). Background noise has been found an important environmental 
factor in SPaD propagation (RIAC, 2007). European regulations for noise levels do 
not account for harmfulness of the low-frequency noise, which is dominant in a driver 
cab. The proposed using of A-weighting scale means that the low-frequency noise 
conditions are treated as the least harmful (Maguire, 2009).  
2.3.2 Vibrations 
Exposure to vibrations for more than 2 hours increases incident risks due to negative 
effect on train drivers’ arousal levels (Keun Sang and Ohkubo, 1994; Yang et al., 
2012). However, sometimes engineering solutions to issues can be rejected. 
Ahmadian and Vahdati (2006) provided an example of improved vibration levels that 
can cause more discomfort to a driver than the original design due to noise and body 
frequency coinciding. 
2.3.3 Monotony 
Yang et al. (2012) found that train drivers’ working environment is more simplistic 
thus more monotonous. Thiffault and Bergeron (2003) reviewed some proposals to 
the highway design in order to fight monotony of the environment, including design 
inducing mild stress in drivers, addressing a problem of “too good roads”, curves and 
kilometre pegs to induce visual stimulation, and even road-side art. As the mainline 
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railways become more standardised, moving towards closeness of a system 
observed in urban rail, monotony of the task increases (RIAC, 2007). This, along with 
improved comforts offered by cab environment, contributes to reduced concentration 
levels. 
2.3.4 Thermal conditions 
Temperature is one of the most important environmental factors as human operators 
have only a narrow band of tolerance for changes in temperature before it starts 
affecting how they carry out a task (Elliott, 2012). Thermal conditions have been 
found an important environmental factor in SPaD propagation (RIAC, 2007). Heat 
can have adverse effects on human operators causing unbearable and sometimes 
dangerous conditions in the cab (Ružić and Časnji, 2011). In their research on tractor 
driver cabs, Ružić and Časnji (2011) have showed that cab design can have 
competing goals of increasing visibility (increasing glass) and reducing adverse 
effects of solar radiation. The later usually being ignored in favour of improved 
ergonomics and visibility via bigger windshield. Authors have proposed several 
mitigation measures but some of those are not applicable to rail operations. The 
newer rolling stock is usually equipped with air conditioning units.   
2.3.5 Lighting  
Such conditions as fog, rain, snow and direct sunlight are known to cause brightness 
and contrast distortion, and change drivers’ perception of a distance (RIAC, 2007). 
This can significantly affect observational tasks and actions taken by train drivers. 
Glare is very hard to manage and design for but it affects both the lineside and in-cab 
signalling. In case of the lineside signalling the positive fact is fixed location of the 
signal hence it is possible to introduce anti-glare measures to improve signal 
sighting. The in-cab signalling, on the contrary, is always in motion and it is almost 
impossible to model when a screen will be affected by the sunlight. Thus it is 
necessary to increase brightness of the screen to compensate for the sunlight. 
However, too bright screen becomes a problem during night-time or tunnel 
operations when it becomes main source of illumination in a cab. During the trials on 
Cambrian line the DMI screens caused a discomfort among drivers because of 
extreme brightness at night (RSSB, 2012). On the other hand, it is possible to use 
lighting conditions as a positive PSF. Ceci et al. (2013), in their appraisal of a tunnel 
design, showed that introduction of lighting features in the infrastructure design allow 
increasing arousal levels and visual stimulation. 
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2.4 Other factors 
Madigan et al. (2016) showed that different incident types can be propagated by 
similar factor categories. Even though these categories can be broad, there is a 
scope for research of the PSFs which are common across different incidents. 
Previous research on the PSFs not related to design shows similar factors causing 
station overruns and failures to call (Roels and Mills, 2010), SPaD (Gibson, 2016), 
wrong side door activations (Basacik and Gibson, 2015), and overspeeding (Baysari 
et al., 2008; Monk et al., 2015). Among these factors are boredom, workload and 
stress, memory and attention lapses, distractions, various organisational factors. All 
of these PSFs are not unique to railways and are known latent conditions in other 
safety critical industries.  
Some of the other factors mentioned above can be produced by a single design 
feature or a combination of those. Hence addressing a problematic layout, e.g. a 
location of the DOO equipment, might bring significant safety benefits to tasks not 
related to train dispatch. However, it is necessary to identify which incidents have 
similar causal factors in the urban rail systems first.  
2.5 Conclusions 
The body of knowledge related to the effects of system design on train drivers’ 
performance is increasing. However, it is still rather fragmented and disjointed even 
though common PSFs have been identified in various tasks. With researchers 
selecting a certain human error as an avenue for an investigation, complexities of the 
full driving task tend to be not accounted for. Research often favours a categorisation 
approach, meaning that there are still risks for the focus being skewed towards 
human errors rather than latent conditions. Moreover, the available taxonomies can 
oversimplify causal factors to achieve better fit to more systems. Hence deeper 
incident underlying structures are overlooked and inter-dependence of the PSFs is 
often ignored or addressed only partially. Understanding an interface between 
different motivations, pressures, latent conditions and priorities in train driving can be 
a significant step forward towards a systematic approach to train driver errors.  
The discussed research is usually retrospective and is significantly skewed towards 
high profile accidents. This is understandable as those accidents usually have the 
best quality of data when it comes to investigation reports. Hence there are 
significantly more studies into human performance, human factors and PSFs in 
SPaDs than in the passenger entrapments or the wrong side door activations. Both 
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the passenger entrapments and wrong side door activations are highly related to 
urban rail systems and DOO dispatch methods. The incidents associated with station 
procedures have been explored less from human factors point of view despite posing 
significantly higher risk to passengers. This creates a gap between research focus 
and the actual passenger risks.  
An aspiration for bigger and better data samples in a study can lead to grouping of 
incidents from various rail systems. Such grouping does not allow exploring the 
findings in context of a specific train driving process unique to each system. 
However, the incident propagation across the systems can be caused by different 
PSFs. The concerns are about how well these differences are captured in incident 
investigation reports and subsequent studies. Metro systems are rarely featured in 
this research highlighting a certain disregard for the differences with mainline 
railways. Only a small number of urban rail specific research has been identified but 
some PSFs are identified in RAIB case studies. Moreover, metro-specific research 
has not been found for certain incident types, e.g. overspeeding.  
The reactive approach of many studies can also be a limiting factor as the basis for 
research is created by people (incident investigators) with sometimes a limited 
exposure to the state of the art in rail PSFs. Moreover, the data base itself is limited 
when some incident types are considered. Hence opportunities for uncovering latent 
conditions not known before are poor. On the other hand, ever-increasing technical 
complexity of the rail systems creates more design related performance shaping 
factors which are present in everyday operations. However, these factors require 
more complicated structures and alignments to cause incidents due to better system 
defences. This is why more pro-active approach to the train drivers’ safety 
performance issue should explore everyday behaviour of drivers’ population in order 
to uncover unknown PSFs, particularly for urban rail systems where the literature is 
scarce.    
2.5.1 Literature review gaps and research questions 
The presented literature review identified some gaps in the body of knowledge 
related to urban rail systems which contributed to establishing the research questions 
in Section 1.5. The paragraphs below provide a brief overview of how the literature 
review links to each of the research questions.  
1. Is the existing mainline research applicable to urban rail systems? 
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The literature on human performance presented in this chapter clearly defines a 
range of factors or factor categories affecting train drivers’ performance. Although 
urban rail systems can have many elements common to mainline railways, the notion 
of inter-dependence of PSFs implies that a change in one factor might affect how 
other factors interface with drivers. Only a few of the research works presented 
above are focused on urban rail systems thus raising the question whether the 
previous research in rail human factors can be extrapolated to urban rail. It is 
important to understand how (and if) individual characteristics of a system change 
the way how PSFs affect drivers. Chapter 4 shows that there are many 
characteristics of urban rail systems that are different to mainline railways and thus 
need to be taken into consideration before applying the previous research. For 
example, Driver Only Operation is more wide spread in urban rail and station stops 
are far less frequent in mainline railways. 
2. What design features act as performance shaping factors in metro driver 
related incident propagation? 
The existing body of knowledge identifies some design features as PSFs in mainline 
rail, e.g. track and signalling layouts (Lawton and Ward, 2005; Multer et al., 2015) or 
a cab design (Davies et al., 2007). However, a potentially different risk profile in 
urban rail systems (as discussed in Section 1.1) justifies an in-depth exploration of 
other parts of the infrastructure, e.g. station environments, in comparison to the 
SPaD-driven research. Nevertheless, well researched design elements should be 
also explored but in a context of local operational features, e.g. a lower line speed. 
3. What design and procedure modifications to existing urban rail systems can 
mitigate the effects of these PSFs?  
It has been shown that certain design features are managed relatively better than 
other design features (Moors et al., 2015). For example, the adverse factors 
increasing the risks of wrong side door release can be mitigated through certain 
technical interventions (Basacik and Gibson, 2015). Similarly, design and procedure 
modifications can be introduced to limit or remove metro drivers’ exposure to some 
adverse PSFs. However, as with the findings on the effects of PSFs, the 
modifications cannot be simply transferred from mainline railways. For example, 
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improvements to a communication process between a driver and a guard cannot be 
applied in urban rail systems as this factor rarely exists in such systems.   
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Chapter 3. Research methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The prior understanding of the isolated system design factors discovered in railway 
industry up to date has been formed through the literature review in the previous 
chapter. Chapter 2 allowed identifying the avenues for further research and 
formulating research design suitable for addressing the research questions. This 
chapter presents the research methodology in context of philosophical paradigms 
and research tools along with advantages and limitations of those.   
Although previous research establishes that railways are complex socio-economic 
systems (Naweed and Balakrishnan, 2014), it rarely explores the underlying factor 
relationships in-depth. Past research has often resorted to categorisation and 
generalisation in order to improve transferability of findings across the systems and 
countries. However, such approach also leads to focus on the most evident factors 
and human failure mechanisms only.  
This thesis acknowledges the concept of inherit unsafety of systems as presented by 
Dekker (2001). In his “Re-invention of Human Error”, he advocates that human 
operators are tasked with creating safety in systems where design, task and 
operational environment factors inter-connect in ways that can lead to performance 
failures. Dekker (2001) claims that it is important to study how people successfully 
operate the systems along with the factors causing the failures. The importance of 
understanding everyday human actions, albeit in different situations, had received 
support in the literature (Montano, 2011; Zeilstra and Van Der Weide, 2013; Salmon 
et al., 2015). In terms of urban rail, these actions usually focus on visual managing of 
physical environment and the train itself (Naweed and Balakrishnan, 2014).  
3.2 Research philosophy  
In order to truly address the complexity of metro systems, the research methodology 
should satisfy a number of parameters. As an engineering thesis, it should be 
objective in order to investigate causality and create findings transferable to other 
systems. The objective methodologies usually involve quantitative methods that are 
undertaken in unbiased environment (Philips and Burbules, 2000; Creswell, 2014). 
As the body of knowledge predominantly consists of studies employing quantitative 
methods, such tools are important precondition for comparison with the state of the 
art findings.  
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An aspiration of research in everyday metro drivers’ performance calls for more 
naturalistic research design though. The naturalistic research studies subjects in their 
natural setting. For metro drivers such setting is their normal work environment. The 
biases are unavoidable in naturalistic research (Eugene et al., 2015) and those can 
be present in a form of various factors, e.g. operational conditions. It does not 
automatically invalidate the numerical research but the spatial and temporal context 
of drivers’ jobs, operational environments and physical environment needs to be 
understood in order to pinpoint those biases. Moreover, some groups of performance 
shaping factors, e.g. latent conditions associated with safety culture, will have a 
significant subjective side to those. This is why subjective research methods are 
equally important to this thesis. Such methods allow human decisions to be studied 
on a micro level (Mangan et al., 2004) and context to be provided to findings through 
iterative use of various qualitative methods (Crotty, 1998). 
Traditionally, there has been a clear division between quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies in terms of governing paradigms, known as positivism and 
constructivism respectively (Creswell, 2014). These research philosophies or 
organising structures revolve around researchers’ epistemology (theory of 
knowledge) thus often prescribing selection of methods (Mangan et al., 2004; Feilzer, 
2010; Creswell, 2014). This, however, goes against an aspiration for the multi-
dimensional thesis which investigates the research questions through different data 
levels.  
A method-driven pragmatic approach is selected for this thesis. Instead of being 
constrained to methods prescribed by research philosophies, such approach 
addresses a task at hand and selects tools fitting the most. Creswell (2014) indicates 
that pragmatism allows combining qualitative and quantitative techniques without 
committing to any philosophy. Such triangulation “can overcome the potential bias 
and sterility of single methods approach” (p.569) (Mangan et al., 2004). Pragmatic 
view on the investigated world is of the “world with different elements or layers, some 
objective, some subjective, and some mixture of the two” (p.8) (Feilzer, 2010). Hence 
the pragmatism is the only paradigm being able to facilitate research where 
quantitative findings have to be enriched by subjective explanations and contexts.  
3.3 Research design and methodology 
With the research objectives outlined in Section 1.5, the thesis progresses towards 
more detailed and specific findings with each chapter. An iterative strategy of inquiry 
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is selected to support this. The strategy includes combination of deductive and 
inductive elements where each step refines findings of the previous step but also 
generates new theories if necessary (Bryman, 2014). The sequential design 
(Creswell, 2014) allows dividing the research process into several phases as seen in 
Figure 5. Feilzer (2010) praises such sequential design for flexibility to adapt the 
consecutive methods to fit the findings of the previous phase.      
 
Figure 5. Phases of the thesis with research levels and respective methods 
The research design proposed also falls into multilevel mixed data analysis category 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009) with one exception. It mixes the quantitative and 
qualitative techniques within numerous phases adding a concurrent element to the 
design. This allows the methods to supplement each other producing a more holistic 
understanding of each research level. The structure of the thesis is shown in Figure 
6. 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
Phase 4 
•Literature review 
Industry  
•Statistical analysis of the 
historic incidents 
•Semi-structured interviews 
•Workshops 
Tyne & Wear Metro 
System 
•Questionnaire study 
•Eye-tracking  
•Observational visits Design features  
•Simulator study 
•Eye-tracking 
•Questionnaire study Mitigations 
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Figure 6. Structure of the thesis showing the combination of sequential and concurrent designs 
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The literature review is the basis for Phase 1 where the current state of the art 
related to PSFs in railway industry is identified. The predominant methodologies used 
at this level are qualitative methods, including case studies of incident investigations. 
The results of this phase are fed to all the next phases enriching the discussion on 
results and allowing answering the research question 1.  
In Phase 2 the research starts investigating the case of Tyne & Wear Metro through 
the numerical analysis of past incidents statistics. It allows identifying design features 
potentially associated with the design PSFs. However, it is qualitative methods that 
facilitate detailed and in-depth study (Patton, 2002). In Phase 2 such tools as semi-
structured interviews and workshops with Tyne & Wear Metro drivers complement 
the findings of the statistical analysis. Those also ensure that standardised measures 
of quantitative methods do not discard varying perspectives and operational context 
(Patton, 2002). This combination of methods enables progressing the research to a 
more detailed level where individual PSFs are considered.  
Phase 3 is where the majority of the naturalistic research is conducted in this thesis. 
Firstly, the drivers are asked to assess their experiences in a number of real-life 
scenarios focusing on the previously selected design features. The developed 
questionnaire allows quantitative analysis along with open-ended questions which 
give participants an opportunity to explain their perspectives. Secondly, an in-field 
eye-tracking experiment is designed as a naturalistic driving study. The experiment 
measures relative cognitive impact of certain design elements, which has been 
highlighted before as an area requiring in-depth exploration (Naweed and 
Balakrishnan, 2014).  
The eye-tracking experiment provides objective dimension to a more subjective 
questionnaire study. However, the interpretation of the eye-tracking findings is rather 
subjective and uses the experiment observations and the semi-structured interviews 
to generate final results. The flexibility of the sequential design becomes a serious 
advantage in Phase 3 because the methods are designed taking into account the 
previous phases.  
Subjective assessment of the in-field eye-tracking results requires hypotheses to be 
checked with less naturalistic methods in Phase 4. Hence a simulator study is 
conducted in order to test the proposed mitigation measures in a controlled 
environment where tasks can be manipulated according to the research objectives 
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(Eugene et al., 2015). The research in this phase focuses on specific elements of the 
station design, associated PSFs and proposed mitigations. The ultimate goal of this 
stage is to provide a set of measurable actions which can be implemented in other 
similar systems in the future. This phase mixes the methods too but not to the same 
extent as the previous stages. The qualitative techniques are mostly used for the 
simulator validation. However, the objective findings would be questionable without 
this validation.  
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Chapter 4. Tyne & Wear Metro system 
Tyne & Wear Metro is the application case used throughout the entire thesis as most 
of the experiments involve its drivers and their performance. The analysed system 
provides varied operational environments as it uses a combination of a purpose built, 
legacy and mainline infrastructures. The design features encountered in Tyne & 
Wear Metro are typical for both urban and sub-urban railways. Such mix makes this 
system perfect for assessment of the system design PSFs as it can be done through 
comparison within the network.  
4.1 Background to the research 
Motivation for this research emerges from issues, e.g. spikes in driver-related 
incidents, encountered by the operator of Tyne & Wear Metro (DBTW) at a time, 
which could not explain the root causes. Newcastle University was approached to 
assist in exploring the mechanisms triggering these types of incidents. The research 
proposed in this thesis is the result of this collaboration.  
4.2 Overview of Tyne & Wear Metro 
Tyne & Wear Metro is located in the Tyne & Wear conurbation that connects 
Newcastle upon Tyne, Gateshead, South Tyneside, North Tyneside and Sunderland. 
It first opened in 1980 and mostly adapted existing heavy rail infrastructure. Today 
the system spans more than 78 km and has 60 stations. A map of Tyne & Wear 
Metro can be seen in Figure 7. The system has two routes; the South Gosforth to 
Pelaw section of the network is considered the “core” of the system, as both routes 
pass through it, and thus it has the highest daily throughput of trains. The system 
carries more than 40 million passengers per year (Department for Transport, 2016) It 
is publically owned but operations are franchised out for the period between 2010-
2017, which includes this thesis’ time span.   
 
40 
 
Figure 7. Map of Tyne & Wear Metro. 
4.3 Fleet 
The fleet consists of 45 two-car train sets. Tyne & Wear Metro uses the original class 
994 rolling stock, which underwent its ¾ life refurbishment between 2011-2013. The 
cab layout is rather unusual with the cab taking only half of the width of a metrocar. 
The other half is used for passenger seats. The refurbished trains have similar cab 
design with a modernised driver seat and a new driver advisory system (DAS) called 
FASSI. A Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) unit had been installed 
during the refurbishment but was taken out on the later date due to drivers’ 
complaints. More minor changes, which have a potential to influence drivers’ 
performance, are described later in the thesis.  
4.4 Stations  
The majority of the stations in Tyne & Wear Metro system are located overground. 
There are only 8 underground stations in the network (St James, Monument, Manors, 
Jesmond, Haymarket, Central, Gateshead, Sunderland). However, Tyne & Wear 
Metro’s own classification counts built-over (subsurface) stations, such as Regent 
Centre, as underground stations. Using Tyne & Wear Metro’s own classification 
method, 13 stations in the system can be considered underground (the previous 8 
plus North Shields, Four Lane Ends, Park Lane, Regent Centre, Heworth). Many 
overground station are “legacy” station adapted from the older heavy rail system.  
There are 7 line and service terminus stations in Tyne & Wear Metro. Line 
terminuses (Airport, St James, South Shields and South Hylton) have either a single 
platform, or a layout allowing trains to arrive at any of the two available platforms. 
The service terminuses are used for short services and have turn-back facilities at a 
station, or in sidings. Many more stations have turnback facilities, which are used in 
events of disruptions or during line closures. The design of the stations, especially 
the ones purpose-built for Tyne & Wear Metro, is rather standardised.  
The majority of the stations fall into one of the three types of standard designs used 
in Tyne & Wear Metro (Figure 8). Type 1 stations include most overground stations, 
all built-over stations and two underground stations. The underground Type 1 station 
differ by use of monitors instead of mirrors as dispatch equipment. 2 of the line 
terminus stations use Type 1 design but only with 1 platform. Type 2 stations are only 
overground stations with an island platform. These usually include some 
ticketing/waiting canopies on a platform and mirrors as dispatch equipment. 
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However, Airport as a Type 2 terminus station has monitors. Type 3 designs can only 
be encountered at the Newcastle and Sunderland city centre underground stations. 
Table 5 summarises what category is applicable to each station.  
All of the design types include Driver Only Operation dispatch equipment (a mirror or 
a monitor), platforms, and a running signal. There are stopping position indicators on 
platforms, which usually span at least 1 metre to provide some flexibility to the 
drivers. Instead of the stopping position markers, Type 3 stations include a small sign 
on a left hand side wall. Despite a high level of standardisation, some of the stations 
deviate from these designs. For example, Tynemouth (Type 1) and Northumberland 
Park (Type 2) have a running signal on the opposite side of the track to where it 
usually is in respective design types. On the contrary, Cullercoats (Type 1) has no 
running signal at all.  
Apart from the predominant DOO dispatch method for each design type, the stations 
also differ in the platform width. Type 3 stations, due to space constraints and being 
underground, feel more confined whereas the “legacy” stations tend to have very 
wide platforms. Not only the general feel of the stations is affected by this but also 
passenger visibility on the approaches.  
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Figure 8. Three main layouts of Tyne & Wear Metro stations. From left to right: Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3. 
Station type Stations 
Type 1 Bank Foot, Bede, Benton, Brockley Whins, Byker, Callerton Parkway, Chichester, Chillingham Rd, Cullercoats, 
East Boldon, Fawdon, Fellgate, Four Lane Ends, Hadrian Rd, Hebburn, Heworth, Howdon, Ilford Rd, Jarrow, 
Jesmond, Kingston Park, Longbenton, Manors, Meadow Well, Millfield, Monkseaton, North Shields, Pallion, 
Palmersville, Park Lane, Percy Main, Regent Centre, Seaburn, Shiremoor, Simonside, South Gosforth, South 
Hylton (1 platform terminus), South Shields (1 platform terminus), St James (2 platform terminus), St Peters, 
Stadium of Light, Tyne Dock, Tynemouth, University, Walkergate, Wallsend, Wansbeck Road, West Jesmond, 
West Monkseaton, Whitley Bay 
Type 2 Airport, Felling, Gateshead Stadium, Northumberland Park, Pelaw, Sunderland 
Type 3 Central Stations, Gateshead, Haymarket, Monument 
Table 5. Station types by location
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4.5 Command and control 
Tyne & Wear Metro operates on its own infrastructure, as well as some sections 
using Network Rail (mainline) infrastructure; thus there is a variety of signalling used. 
Most of the system has simple 2-aspect signalling, with occasional fixed distants and 
3-aspect signals. However, Pelaw to Sunderland route uses Network Rail 
infrastructure and consequently utilises standard UK mainline 4-aspect signalling, 
with yellow and double yellow signals. This section is shared with both passenger 
and freight mainline trains, which operate at various speeds. The depot and turnback 
locations also have running signals on the ground level – Ground Position Lights 
(GPL). As of 2016, only GPL at the depot use Light-Emitting Diode (LED) technology.  
Tyne & Wear Metro drivers do not benefit from the Automatic Warning System 
(AWS), or the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS), available to mainline 
train drivers at the Network Rail section. A fixed block command & control system is 
used in Tyne & Wear Metro. The Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system controls 
overspeeding and SPaDs at certain locations only. The ATP system used is the 
Indusi system, which is a version of the German mainline railway warning and 
supervision system Induktives Sicherungssystem. The Indusi system is very coupled 
with a very efficient metrocar braking system which allows stopping the train from the 
maximum line speed (80 km/h) in 150 metres. More information on the Tyne & Wear 
Metro technical specifications can be found in the literature (Howard, 1976; Fenner, 
2002; Powell et al., 2014).  
4.6 Tyne & Wear Metro in context of urban rail and mainline systems 
To extrapolate the findings of this thesis to other systems outside of Tyne & Wear 
Metro, it is necessary to understand the operational differences compared to 
common urban rail types. Table 6 below provides a comparison between Tyne & 
Wear Metro and typical urban rail modes. Features of the compared systems are 
based on the data from Profillidis (2000); (Bonnett, 2005); Vuchic (2007); Powell and 
Palacín (2015). 
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Parameter Commuter railway Rail rapid transit system Light rail transit Tyne & Wear Metro 
Right of way Grade-separated with level 
crossing (full signal 
override and gate 
protection).  
Grade-separated Grade separated with 
signal priority at level 
crossings. Street running 
sometimes.  
Grade-separated with level 
crossings (signal override but no 
gate protection). A number of 
uncontrolled pedestrian crossings. 
Traction Typically diesel or electric 
(25kV AC) 
Electric (1500V DC overhead, 750V 
DC conductor) 
Electric (mainly 750V DC) Electric (1500V DC) 
Station spacing (m) 1200 - 4500 500 - 2000 350-1600  400 - 2000 
Maximum speed 80-130 km/h 80-100 km/h 60-100 km/h  80 km/h 
Number of cars 1-10 Typically up to 10 2-4 cars 2 cars (articulated) 
Max Frequency (per hour) 10-30 20-40 Up to 60  18 
Train Control Predominantly 
manual/signals 
Manual/Signals or Automatic Predominantly 
manual/visual  
Manual/Signals 
Signalling 4-aspect  2-aspect (sometimes with 
repeaters) 
Car signalling or 2-aspect 2-aspect (sometimes with 
repeaters) and 4-aspect 
Personnel Driver and a train guard Driver/attendant Driver only Driver only 
Cab layout Full car width Full car width Full/part car width 2/5 car width 
Max acceleration rate 
(m/s2) 
0.75 - 1.0 1.1 - 1.3 1.0 - 1.3 1.0 
Emergency deceleration 
rate (m/s2) 
0.8 – 1.4 1.3 - 1.4 2.5 - 3.0 2.1 
Train dispatch Predominantly train guard 
assistance 
Driver Only Operation (platform 
monitors or mirrors) 
Driver Only Operation (side 
mirrors or in-cab monitors) 
Driver Only Operation (platform 
monitors or mirrors) 
Table 6. Tyne & Wear Metro parameters compared to typical urban rail modes
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Tyne & Wear Metro uses a combination of the features typical to different urban rail 
modes. It uses the signalling common to both rapid transit and commuter railway 
systems whereas its rolling stock is rather typical to light rail systems. Infrastructure-
wise there are similarities with rapid transit systems (station spacing, dispatch 
methods and traction) but the Tyne & Wear Metro’s train control and right of way is 
closer to a commuter railway. Tyne & Wear Metro had become a melting pot of 
technological advancements and legacy railway infrastructure when it was built in 
1970s. In many ways the system falls into the light rail rapid transit classification as 
per Vuchic (2007). It operates on the lines typical to rail rapid transit systems but with 
the rolling stock commonly used for light rail transit. “This mode is used on lines that 
require high performance, but do not have the high passenger numbers to justify long 
trains and large stations” (Vuchic, 2007, p. 72). 
4.7 Operational context 
According to representatives of the operator, several important changes have been 
introduced to company culture since the start of the franchise. A “no blame” approach 
and focus on increased reporting were among those. However, the ATP used in Tyne 
& Wear Metro cannot notice many incident types so random speed checks and On-
Train Monitoring Recorder’s (OTMR) log checks occur. With better incident sample at 
their disposal, the new management started devoting attention to driver-related 
incident types which do not cause ATP activation, e.g. wrong side door releases. 
However, SPaDs are still an important issue for the operator. Despite an overall 
downward trend in those, there are fluctuations present, similarly to national 
statistics. Interest in underlying reasons for these fluctuations initially provided an 
opportunity for this research.  
Tyne & Wear Metro currently uses a series of state of the art developments from 
Human Factors field. Incident investigation from a system point of view is ensured by 
training the investigator to the highest possible level. Non-Technical Skills (NTS) are 
introduced into driver’ training and re-training. The NTS are known to significantly 
improve overall safety-related performance of train drivers (Russell et al., 2013). 
Some aspects of system design have been already assessed by the operator, for 
example signal sighting using tools developed by RSSB. However, these 
assessments were not comprehensive studies and were mostly based on a trial & 
error method.  
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Chapter 5. Tyne and Wear Metro historic incident data analysis 
5.1 Introduction  
The literature review strongly suggests that design-related PSFs can have important 
influence on incident propagation. Hence it is necessary to explore incident trends 
across the investigated system (Tyne & Wear Metro) to address research objective 2. 
The previous research mostly utilises past incident analysis for this exercise thus 
utilising similar methodologies allows comparison of the findings. However, the 
results are assessed in context of the metro system under investigation. For this, the 
chapter combines quantitative assessment of the incident statistics with the semi-
structured interviews and workshops.  
5.2 Methodology 
The methodology for this chapter is designed with the above mentioned objectives in 
mind but from HF and PSF perspective. Thus it is focusing on incidents where 
drivers’ error was a failure mechanism. Historic incident statistics allows identifying 
incident “hot spots” with associated design features. Personal and environmental 
factors are also explored. Inter-dependence and similarities in factors are addressed 
through correlation analysis. The semi-structured interviews provide additional 
dimension to the discussion from drivers’ point of view.  
5.2.1 Input data 
The raw data used in this research was provided by the Tyne & Wear Metro operator. 
1282 incident reports from the 2011/12 and 2012/13 operating years were made 
available. Each operating year is divided into 13, four-week long periods, and Table 7 
shows the dates for each period of 2012/13. 
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Period Dates 
1 1 Apr -29 Apr 
2 30 Apr – 27 May 
3 28 May – 24 Jun 
4 25 Jun – 22 Jul 
5 23 Jul – 19 Aug 
6 20  Aug – 16 Sep 
7 17 Sep – 14 Oct 
8 15 Oct – 11 Nov 
9 12 Nov – 9 Dec 
10 10 Dec – 6 Jan 
11 7 Jan – 3 Feb 
12 4 Feb – 3 Mar 
13 4 Mar – 31 Mar 
Table 7. Dates of the 13 operating periods of 2012/13 
The data is based on the entries contained in an incident reporting system. Each 
incident is logged with a brief description, date, time and location, as well as being 
allocated an incident type. Such incident types are grouped into larger categories, 
e.g. “technical domain incidents”. The data is unanimous thus anthropometric data, 
experience and age cannot be factored in. The current reporting system is focused 
on operational incidents, particularly technical faults. To perform the analysis, a new 
categorisation of the incident reports was required, as well as selecting the incident 
types to be retained. The categorisation, incident types used, and descriptions are 
summarised in Table 8. The categorisation is focused on driver-related incidents, but 
some of the technical and operational domain incidents are also retained. Incident 
reports that did not fit any of the categories are excluded from the study. These 
include mainly incidents associated with pedestrians or vehicles trespassing at level 
crossings. Statistics on dispatch equipment faults is only available for 2012/13 
operational year.  
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Category Incident type Description 
SPaD 
incidents 
Category A SPaD Category A Signal Passed at Danger (SPaD) occurs 
when a driver passes a signal displaying a stop aspect, 
without a permission due to own error 
Other SPaDs Occurs when a driver passes a signal displaying a stop 
aspect, without permission, due to a technical fault 
Driver-
related 
incidents 
Overspeeding A driver exceeds the maximum permitted line speed  
Failure to call A driver skips a scheduled stop, without instruction  
Station overrun Occurs when a train stops beyond the platform end or 
beyond a point allowing to dispatch train safely 
Passenger 
entrapment 
When a passenger is trapped by train doors during door 
closing procedure 
Wrong side doors 
activation 
A driver releases a wrong set of doors 
Wrong route A driver sets an incorrect route code that later affects 
passenger information and route setting. It is also 
possible for the system to set points incorrectly due to 
technical fault. A driver who does not notice the issue, 
and takes the wrong route, is still at fault.  
Technical 
domain 
incidents 
Signal faults Technical faults associated with signalling equipment 
Dispatch equipment 
faults 
Faults of Driver Only Operation (DOO) equipment, e.g. 
misting up or out-of-focus monitors 
Trainfault ATP Technical faults of train-borne ATP equipment 
Trackfault ATP  Technical faults of lineside ATP equipment 
Operational 
incidents 
Doors obstruction Passengers restricting train doors from closing 
Passenger 
overcarried 
Passengers being left on a train when a train is taken out 
of passenger service 
Interface 
incidents 
LRA incidents Low Rail Adhesion (LRA) conditions that did not lead to a 
more serious incident  
Foliage foul of 
infrastructure 
Foliage or vegetation creating risks for safe use of Tyne 
& Wear Metro infrastructure, usually DOO equipment 
Table 8. Categorisation of the incidents used in the study and their descriptions 
It can be seen that some of the incident types are similar in their definitions. For 
example, passenger entrapments and doors obstruction incidents are typically very 
similar in their nature. Almost all door obstructions are reported by drivers due to 
causing some technical faults (doors cycling) or delays. If there was a risk of trap & 
drag accident or an injury, e.g. doors did not cycle, it is reported as passenger 
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entrapment. However, the final category is allocated by a safety manager based on 
driver’s report and other support tools, e.g. CCTV footage.  
Usually incidents are sub-divided into, as per IOSH categorisation (Institution of 
Occupational Safety and Health, 2016), into accidents and near-misses. The main 
difference between those two types is whether any harm was caused or not 
respectively. However, due to lack of details in the incident reports, it was decided to 
treat all of the entries just as incidents. Even if those all are near misses, it indicates 
significant risks and should be treated as precursors.  
Three separate data sets based on time, period, and location were created, after 
assessing the raw data for consistency. This was required due to incident causal 
mechanisms related to time, date and location usually fall into different PSFs groups. 
Time and date-related factors are associated with lighting and climatic conditions, 
patronage numbers and demographics, and seasonality. Furthermore, time-related 
factors also include individual driver factors, e.g. circadian rhythms. On the other 
hand, the location-related data set allows for an investigation of system design 
features influencing Tyne & Wear metro drivers’ performance. Driver-related 
incidents are understood as a combination of different factors affecting a driver. Such 
a combination of factors, happening in a certain order, is capable of bypassing the 
safety mechanisms of a system. 
Several incident types have a relatively small number of cases, e.g. station overrun, 
and failure to call incidents. Locations are understood as an approach station. Most 
of the driver-related incidents in this analysis are associated with station-based 
duties, thus approach station information is considered to be sufficient. All 
timeframes for the time-based data set are one hour long, e.g. 07:00:00 to 07:59:59, 
with the exception of 01:00:00 to 04:59:59, when only maintenance trains operate on 
the system. The Tyne & Wear Metro passenger flow has two peaks: between 8 and 
10 am, and from 4 to 6 pm. To cope with the increased passenger numbers, the 
number of trains in the network is at its highest during these hours.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, category A SPaDs have become a certain benchmark in 
the railway industry. Hence the older data for 2009/10 and 2010/11 operational years 
for this incident type was deemed of good quality and reliability to expand descriptive 
statistics. Concerns for data quality and reliability of it prior to 2011/12 operational 
year were expressed by some Tyne & Wear Metro managers in a preliminary 
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interview. These concerns are also supported by significant difference in incident 
records between 2011/12 and 2012/13, where the number of increases by 43% in 
2012/13 operational year.  
All statistical manipulations are performed in IBM Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS), version 22.  
5.2.2 Normality of the data and other considerations 
All variables in the created data sets are checked for normality as this affects choice 
of statistical analysis tools. Shapiro-Wilk and Smirnov-Kalmogorov tests are chosen 
for these tests. Sample size defines which test result to use in the assessment of 
normality. If a tested sample size is less than 50 then Shapiro-Wilk test is performed, 
otherwise output from Smirnov – Kalmogorov test has to be considered (Marques de 
Sa, 2007).  
The count nature of the data in the samples leads to the zero-inflated data issue. The 
Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics (Gibson, 2016) defines the zero-inflated data as 
“count data with excess zeros” (p.467). Tu (2006) emphasises that “the probability 
mass at the point zero exceeds that allowed under a standard parametric family of 
distributions” (p.1). It is important to mention that all the zeros in the samples are 
genuine zeros. There is a range of opinions on what to do with this kind of data, from 
choosing methods that fit data to transformation of variables to normally distributed 
ones (Vives and Losilla, 2006).  
Conventional transformation techniques, e.g. square root or log transformations, 
cannot be applied to zero-inflated samples. Vives and Losilla (2006) indicated that 
the distributional character of a count variable has to be respected. They quote 
Gardner et al. (1995) who suggested that the statistical methods have to be fitted to 
data not vice versa. Furthermore, transformations make results significantly harder to 
interpret (Vives and Losilla, 2006). For example, using Box-Cox transformation (Box 
and Cox, 1964) yields different transformation formula for each of the variables. This 
raises the question about back-transformation of relationships found between two 
variables with different formulas applied. Huson (2007) showed that standard 
correlation techniques are adequate for analysis of zero-inflated data. However, he 
did not test samples with more than 30% of zeros so cannot be applicable to some of 
the variables in this chapter, e.g. station overruns. Simple transformation utilised by 
Spearman Rank Correlation (SRC), i.e. converting data into ranks, yields similar 
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results to more sophisticated transformations along with Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation (PPMC) (Hazarika, 2013).  
As the majority of statistical manipulations performed in this chapter are correlation 
tests, it is assumed that the data does not require transformation because 
conventional methods provide good validity.  
5.2.3 Frequency distribution analysis 
The frequency distribution of each incident type is studied using bar charts, in order 
to identify peak times, seasonally inflated incident rates, and the worst performing 
locations. The current approach to incident analysis often focuses only on statistics 
from the entire network, whereas there is also a need to analyse local trends and 
risks (Bearfield et al., 2013). The four worst performing stations for certain driver-
related incident types have been selected to carry-out in-depth examination of the 
potential factors inducing incident propagation at these specific locations. 
A preliminary analysis of descriptive statistics led to several hypotheses, which 
required additional data collection.  
5.2.4 Additional indicator data  
Additional data was collected from open-access sources, e.g. Google Maps, and the 
Tyne & Wear Metro operator in order to check how the findings from previous 
research apply to urban rail. The four key areas have been assessed i.e. i) 
passenger composition, ii) driver shift patterns, iii) tunnel exit/entrance, iv) distances 
between the stations.  
Passenger composition is not uniform throughout a typical day and does not fully 
match with number of trains in the system. Certain age groups tend to use Tyne & 
Wear Metro more often during certain time periods. Specifically, school children use 
Tyne & Wear Metro the most from 7.30 to 9 am, and 3 to 5 pm. Elderly people tend 
to use Tyne & Wear Metro between 9.30 am (when concessionary travel time starts) 
and the evening peak. These 2 demographics are potentially at higher risk to be 
involved in certain incidents, e.g. passenger entrapments. According to RSSB et al. 
(2006) presence of mobility equipment, elderly or very young passengers had been a 
contributory factor in approximately 20% of the mainline PTI-related incidents 
between 2001 and 2005. With a demographics breakdown of station patronage 
levels not available, it is assumed that presence of schools and hospitals within 500m 
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radius from a station is an indicator of increased usage of that facility by the above 
mentioned population groups.  
Research from mainline railways shows increased risks of incidents 2 hours into a 
driving portion due to presence of vibrations negatively affecting arousal levels (Keun 
Sang and Ohkubo, 1994; Yang et al., 2012). Similar observations were found in other 
safety-critical industries (Folkard, 1997; Macdonald et al., 1997). Data on the hourly 
number of trains in the system along with data on hourly driver sign-on was sourced 
to check for this.  
Previous research suggests that a drastic change in environment at tunnel 
exit/entrance should positively affect arousal levels (Yang et al., 2012). 24 locations 
associated with tunnel entrance/exit (underbridges are not included) have been 
explored to provide comparison with the rest of the network. Monotonous 
environments are known to cause rapid sensory deprivation, at least among car 
drivers (Thiffault and Bergeron, 2003; Williamson et al., 2011). Assuming that 
negative effects of such deprivation increase with time travelled, distances between 
the stations were collected.  
5.2.5 Bivariate correlation analysis  
A bivariate correlation analysis has been selected to interrogate the data in order to: 
• explore the existence of correlation between statistics, for two operating years, 
for each driver-related incident type, in order to check consistency year-on-
year;  
• uncover potential associations between different incident types in all the data 
sets;  
• explore possible associations between the additional indicators and driver-
related incident types in the respective data sets. 
Consistency year-on-year in a driver-related incident type should suggest a 
connection between the incident type and certain locations, times or periods. 
Associations found between the incident types indicate potential presence of 
common causal factors. Exploring similarities in causal factors can help with 
understanding of the inter-dependency of PSFs in metro systems. It is important to 
note that a correlation found does not always suggest causation.  In many cases the 
relationships will be spurious correlations, meaning that there are common factors 
affecting both variables.  
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PPMC and SRC tests are carried out depending on normality, respectively when both 
variables are normally distributed and when at least one is not normally distributed. 
Use of both methods is required as PPMC is sensitive to non-normality (Kowalski, 
1972). However, SRC does not find statistically significant associations for monotonic 
associations, e.g. when a scatter plot produces a U-shaped graph. Hence the scatter 
plots were checked for all relationships tested with the SRC but no monotonic 
associations were found.  
5.2.6 Category A SPaD review for situational awareness 
Direct observations carried out in the Tyne & Wear Metro control room in 2015 
suggested correlation between disruptions in the system and category A SPaDs. This 
theory elaborates on the previous incident investigations, e.g. SPaD in New South 
Wales in November 2014 (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2015). Train drivers 
sometimes fail to notice red aspects because they do not expect to see those. On the 
other hand, serious disruptions usually lead to trains being re-routed or turned back 
in unusual locations thus causing more red aspects. There are no means of 
communicating an alert about a disruption ahead to a large number of drivers so a 
task of updating each individual driver sits with system desk controllers (SDCs). In 
events of big disruptions, warning a driver about an unexpected signal at danger 
might not be on SDCs’ list of priorities. Decrease in situational awareness can 
become a major risk factor as drivers lose ability to predict future status of the system 
(Parkes and Hooijmeijer, 2001). This is found to contribute to poor driving 
performance in automotive industry. Moreover, disruptions in the system are highly 
associated with increased workload for operators (Balfe et al., 2015).  
An additional Category A SPaD assessment was conducted to check the above 
hypothesis. Category A SPaD investigations are used to determine whether drivers 
could be “caught by surprise” by one of the disruptions prior to SPaD event. Total of 
32 investigations were studied for period between July 2013 and November 2015 
using a train movement replay system available in Tyne & Wear Metro. Consulting 
with experienced SDCs and incident investigators, the incidents were assessed in 
terms of potential contributing factors. The sample of incidents is limited by the train 
movement replay system’s ability to provide archive information.  
5.2.7 Workshop with DB Regio Tyne & Wear  
A workshop with the operator’s key safety staff and drivers’ representatives was 
organised in 2014 to validate preliminary findings of the statistical analysis. This 
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semi-structured workshop was run by the author and allowed complementing the 
findings with spatial and timely context often only available to people with long-term 
experience in the system. Among those attending were Head of Safety & 
Compliance, Head of Operations, Traincrew Manager and a representative of Tyne & 
Wear Metro drivers. Most of the attendees have some metro driving experience and 
are RSSB-certified incident investigators. The workshop started with a presentation 
by the author on results of the data analysis. In the end of the presentation pre-
selected discussion points were given. The pre-selected points were based on the 
results of the statistical analysis which, in author’s opinion, required explanation from 
the participants. Those include differences in depot layouts, differences in SPaDs 
and safety culture, evening peaks in overspeeding, station overruns at Fellgate. The 
discussion was relatively open with only a little moderation required in order to steer 
the direction of it.  
5.2.8 The semi-structured interviews with Tyne & Wear Metro drivers 
Monthly visits were arranged to the Tyne & Wear control centre, where drivers 
usually spend their brakes between driving portions. This presented the author with 
opportunities to explore drivers’ views on findings and developed theories as the 
research progressed through different phases. More than 60 semi-structured 
interviews were carried out. At least three different drivers were interviewed at the 
Tyne & Wear Metro control centre each time. A typical interview lasted for 10 to 15 
minutes and covered 3 questions, which were defined as the data analysis 
progressed.  
With the interviews being a continuous process spanning the entire research, the 
research questions addressed are not exclusive to Chapter 5. The interview results 
are incorporated in discussion sections throughout the thesis.  
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5.3 Results  
The methodology described in Section 5.2 has been applied to analyse the data sets 
produced based on the Tyne & Wear Metro incident statistics.  
5.3.1 Consistency of the driver-related incidents 
Table 9 below shows the consistency in distribution of driver-related incidents over 
the two operating years. The three data sets are presented in different columns. Most 
of the driver-related incidents are localised to certain parts of the network. Only two 
out of seven incident types are consistent in terms of times. Category A SPaDs are 
the only driver-related incident type to show year-on-year correlation in the context of 
periods. However, as the correlation coefficient is negative, the distribution of this 
incident type is not consistent.  
Incident type/Sample type Date-based Time-based Location-based 
Category A SPaDs  -0.565* -0.123 0.283* 
Overspeeding -0.013 0.244 0.400** 
Failure to call 0 0 0 
Station overrun 0.459 0.221 0.281* 
Passenger entrapment -0.065 0.601** 0.353** 
Wrong side doors activation -0.012 0.427* 0.543** 
Wrong route -0.226 0.395 0.374** 
Table 9. Correlation of driver-related incidents, year-on-year; * p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01 
5.3.2 Driver-related incidents 
Table 10 shows a composition of the driver-related incidents in Tyne & Wear Metro. 
For the two years under investigation, overspeeding and wrong side doors incidents 
are the most encountered types, with 26.3% and 26.6% respectively. The incidents 
associated with station procedures (wrong side doors activation, passenger 
entrapment) account for 46.6% of the entire data set.  
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Incident type 2011/12 2012/13 For 2 years 
Category A SPaD 6.3% 10.4% 8.4% 
Overspeeding 27.5% 25% 26.3% 
Failure to call 2.8% 0% 1.2% 
Station overrun 6.3% 4.8% 5.6% 
Passenger entrapment 13.4% 26.4% 20.0% 
Wrong side doors activation 36.7% 16.7% 26.6% 
Wrong route 7.0% 16.7% 11.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Table 10. Proportion of driver-related incidents by year and total. 
When the totality of the driver-related incidents is considered, there are 3 pronounced 
peaks in incident propagation (Figure 9). The morning peak in incidents fully 
coincides with the morning peak in passenger levels (8 to 10 am). The midday peak 
can be observed between 1 and 3 pm. The evening peak also partially coincides with 
the evening peak in passenger level (4 to 6 pm) but lasts until 7pm.  
 
Figure 9. Composition of driver-related incidents by time of occurrence (2011/12 and 2012/13 operational 
years) 
Figure 10 shows that there are more driver-related incidents occurring in the second 
half of the operational year. The rise starts in period 8 (mid-October) and continues 
through the winter. This time is associated with increased passenger loadings due to 
Christmas shoppers and mostly night time driving. Period 6 also demonstrates high 
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incident numbers. The biggest half-marathon in the world, Great North Run, is always 
held during period 6, putting additional pressures on the system.  
Lack of consistency for variables in date-based and time-based samples shows that 
seasonal and time of the day distributions might differ from year to year. The count 
data for all of the driver-related incident types is summarised in appendixes A to C. 
The statistics for four worst performing locations for overspeeding, station overruns, 
passenger entrapments and wrong side door activations can be found in appendixes 
D to G. Category A SPaDs are summarised for four consecutive operational years 
thus providing more reliable sample. Only three stations have ‘failure to call’ 
occurrences in the two years under investigation. For wrong route incidents the 
stations account for 55.9% of the cases with fourth worst station only contributing to 
6%. Table 11 provides a summary of the findings from the frequency distribution 
analysis.  
 
Figure 10. Composition of driver-related incidents by period of occurrence (2011/12 and 2012/13 
operational years) 
Category A SPaDs peak around July and February with relatively lower incident 
levels in-between those. December and mid-August to mid-September also have 
inflated incident levels compared to average values. Two daily peaks are 
distinguishable between 8 and 12 am, and 4 to 7 pm. The worst performing locations 
are Pelaw (Type 2), Regent Centre (Type 1), Jarrow (type 1), Airport (Type 2 
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terminus), and the depot. The types used in the description are the station types 
presented in the Tyne & Wear Metro overview (Section 4.2). All of the SPaDs 
happened at Jarrow in 2009 (Type 1).  
Overspeeding incidents have different distribution throughout the two years. The 
most incidents are observed from April to May, and from mid-October to mid-
November. Apart from the 6 to 7 am timeslot, a steady growth can be seen between 
9 am and 5 pm. The worst performing stations are Airport (Type 2 terminus), 
Sunderland (Type 3), Manors (Type 1), South Hylton (Type 1 terminus with 1 
platform). At these locations incidents mostly happened between periods 1 and 3, 
and in period 6.  Time distribution of the incidents at four worst stations is similar to 
full sample, with the 3 to 5 pm peak being more pronounced.  
There are only four cases of ‘failures to call’, all in 2011/12. Those happened in 
periods 2, 7, 8 and 9 automatically making those peak periods. Two of the incidents 
happened between 1 and 2 pm. Other two are either early morning or late night 
occurrences. As it was mentioned before, the incidents were localised to only three 
areas – Meadow Well (Type 1), Northumberland Park (Type 2) and University (Type 
1).  
Station overruns are most often observed in periods 8 and 9 and in winter months 
after New Year. Three peaks can be seen: 8 to 9 am, 11 am to 12 pm, and 3 to 4 pm. 
The worst performing locations are East Boldon (Type 1), Hadrian Road (Type 1), 
Central Station (Type 3) and Fellgate (Type 1). At these stations the peaks in station 
overruns are periods 9 and 11, but no daily peak times. However, bigger 
concentration of the station overruns can be seen in the morning hours. Considering 
a strong association of overruns with failures to stop (the former is potentially a 
precursor of the latter), it is important to note that Meadow Well and Northumberland 
Park have one overrun incident each.  
The periodic peaks for station overruns match periods when the system is affected 
by LRA issues. However, Fellgate is the only station out of the four worst performing 
locations where the overruns are observed outside of the normal LRA periods. 
Fellgate and East Boldon deviate from the standard Type 1 design due to a running 
signal being located considerably further from platform edges than normally.  
There are significantly more passenger entrapments reported in 2012/13 operational 
year. This incident type becomes more pronounced between late Autumn and early 
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Spring but not in period 12. Daily peaks occur right after midday and inflated incident 
rates can be observed during the peak hours too. The majority of the worst 
performing locations are Type 3 stations with only Monkseaton being Type 1 station. 
When only the four worst performing locations are considered, the daily peaks are 
the same as for the entire sample. On the contrary, the monthly data for the locations 
suggests more spread out distribution of these incidents with only period 11 having a 
considerable peak. Period 11 usually includes four weeks after New Year.  
Wrong side door activation incidents tend to occur more in the second part of an 
operational year with a peak in period 6. However, most of the incidents contributing 
to the peak occurred in 2011/12. For the other year under investigation the incidents 
are more spread out but an increase can be seen in January-March. Similarly to 
passenger entrapments, three peaks are observed. Two of those coincide with 
maximum passenger flows and the third one (the biggest) is between 12 and 3 pm. 
The four worst performing stations for this incident type are Haymarket (Type 3), 
West Jesmond (Type 1), St James (Type 3 terminus) and Northumberland Park 
(Type 2). All of these stations but West Jesmond involve approach routines with 
altering platform sides. For example, approaching Haymarket (57% of all the 
incidents at these locations) from Jesmond means that platform side changes from 
right to left. St James being Type 3 terminus station means that the drivers can arrive 
to any of the two platforms. However, most of the incident at Haymarket happened at 
platform 2 which does not involve platform side change as trains arrive from another 
Type 3 station. When only the four worst performing stations are taken into account, 
the monthly distribution stays the same. On the contrary, the morning peak becomes 
more pronounced for the four stations but there is no evening peak.  
Even if Haymarket is considered as an outlier, 15 out of 25 stations with at least one 
incident have at least one of the approaches where a platform change occurs.  
Wrong route incidents, due to their nature, are confined to locations where a choice 
of routes is present. Pelaw and South Gosforth are locations of two main junctions in 
the system, whereas Regent Centre provides several routes into the depot. All of 
these locations also have turnback facilities, which are actively used for peak 
services. This also affects the usual occurrence time which coincides with the 
passenger flow peaks and presence of additional short peak services using the 
turnback facilities. Periods 6 to 8, 10 and 13 have the highest wrong incident rates. 
However, these peaks are caused significant rise in reporting in 2012/13.  
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5.3.3 Correlation analysis 
The results of the correlation analysis are demonstrated in tables 1 to 3 in Appendix 
H.  In total, 60 associations were found between incident types. 49 of those involved 
driver-related incidents. In terms of such incidents, 53% of the associations were 
discovered in the location-based data set and only 14% in the period-based data set. 
In the time-based sample, Category A SPaDs, passenger entrapments and wrong 
side doors activations have the highest number of associations (4). Majority of 
associations found in that sample have medium to low strength. The majority of 
location-based associations are low in strength, with four statistically significant 
negative correlation coefficients found, mostly with passenger entrapment incidents. 
Category A SPaDs are involved in almost 25% of the correlations with driver-related 
incidents found in the location-based data set. Table 11 provides a summary of the 
findings from correlation analysis.  
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 Peaks Associations (correlation coefficient) 
Incident type Peak 
period(s) 
Peak time(s) By period By time By location 
Category A SPaD 
(4 years of data) 
4, 12 4-7 pm; 
8-12 am 
None Station overrun (.498*); 
Passenger entrapment (.574**); 
Wrong side doors (.601**); 
Trainfault ATP (.524*); 
Overspeed (.256*), Wrong route 
(.334**), Signal faults (.269*), Trainfault 
ATP (.301*), Trackfault ATP (.260*), 
Passenger overcarried (.526**); 
Overspeeding 1-2, 8 2-5 pm None Passenger entrapment (.772*); 
Wrong side doors (.453*); 
Doors obstruction (.472*); 
Category A SPaD (.256*); 
Trackfault ATP (.307*); 
Failure to call 2, 7-9 1-2 pm Trackfault ATP (.600*); 
Dispatch equipment (.566*); 
None Station overrun (.282*); 
Station overrun 8-12 8-9 am; 
11 am – 12 pm, 
3-4pm 
Dispatch equipment (.666*); 
LRA (.718*); 
Category A SPaD (.498*); 
Foliage fouls (.580**); 
Failure to call (.282*), Passenger 
entrapment (.273*), Foliage fouls (-
.407**); 
Passenger 
entrapment 
8-11, 13 12-3 pm Doors obstruction (.578*); 
Dispatch equipment (.633*); 
Category A SPaD (.574*); 
Overspeeding (.772**); 
Wrong side doors (.696**); 
Doors obstruction (.606**) 
Station overrun (.273*), Doors 
obstruction (.280*), Foliage fouls (-
.377**), LRA (-.321*), Passenger 
overcarried (-.257*); 
Wrong side doors  6, 8-9, 11-13 1-3 pm; 
7-10 am; 
4-5 pm 
None Category A SPaDs (.601**); 
Overspeeding (.453*); 
Passenger entrapment (.696**); 
Foliage fouls (.606**); 
Trackfault ATP (.285*); 
Wrong route 6-8, 10, 13 8-9 am; 
6-7 pm 
Dispatch equipment (.579*); LRA (.450*); 
Passenger overcarried (.441*); 
Category A SPaD (.334**), Signal faults 
(.293*), Foliage fouls (.398**), LRA 
(.261*), Passenger overcarried (.475**) 
Table 11. Summary of the results. * p-value < 0.05 (2-tailed); **p-value < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
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5.3.4 Correlation with additional indicators 
Table 12 below displays the correlations found between the additional data collected 
and driver-related incident types. Data on ‘distance between stations’ and ‘schools 
and hospitals nearby’ were analysed for correlations with driver-related incidents 
from the location-based data set. The remaining additional data was checked for 
correlation with driver-related incidents from the time-based data set.  
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Category A SPaDs  0.017 0.008 0.632** 0.068 0.535* 
Overspeeding -0.119 -0.222 0.528* 0.304 0.435* 
Overspeeding (4 worst performing) N/A N/A 0.408 0.292 0.274 
Failure to call -0.111 0.096 0.115 0.176 -0.031 
Station overrun 0.094 -0.026 0.360 0.191 0.438* 
Station overrun (4 worst performing) N/A N/A 0.168 0.016 0.240 
Passenger entrapment -0.224 0.086 0.594** 0.086 0.342 
Passenger entrapment (4 worst 
performing) 
N/A N/A 0.330 -0.023 0.116 
Wrong side doors activations -0.213 -0.195 0.794** 0.224 0.580** 
Wrong side doors activations (4 
worst performing)  
N/A N/A 0.528* 0.247 0.414 
Wrong route 0.167 0.166 0.130 0.012 0.491* 
Table 12. Associations with additional indicators. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value <0.01 
24 locations associated with tunnel exit/entrance on the approach were identified and 
explored, demonstrating 10% higher incident levels compared to the rest of the Tyne 
& Wear Metro network. 
5.3.5 Additional Category A SPaD analysis 
The closed nature of the system means that Tyne & Wear drivers, especially 
experienced ones, can develop very good knowledge of each driving portion. This 
knowledge also involves ability to forecast any red signal aspects because of known 
timetabled conflicting movements. Out of 32 category A SPaDs investigated 16 were 
found to be associated with red aspects, which not encounter routinely by drivers. 
Some examples of what might cause such red aspect include: 
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• Movements of engineering locomotives and rail head treatment trains; 
• Trains held at stations waiting for an ambulance or due to an operational 
incident; 
• Signal and infrastructure failures; 
• Movements of other train operating companies at Network Rail infrastructure; 
• Train failures; 
In 44% of incidents identified as disruption-related, the drivers do not have any 
means of prior warning which would advise them about an unexpected signal aspect. 
This happens due to 2-aspect signalling and no repeaters in certain areas. Network 
Rail part of the system, with its 4-aspect signalling, has only 4.1% category A SPaDs 
even though it accounts for 19% of track-kilometres. However, even more disruption-
related SPaDs happened where advanced warning through the signals is available. 
Hence significant contribution of slips and attention lapses has been pointed out by 
the investigators. For other 50% of category A SPaDs, lack of experience, attention 
lapses and distractions were identified as main failure mechanisms.  
5.4 Discussion 
The year on year increase in the driver-related incidents is relatively small compared 
to 43% rise in overall number of incidents reported. Such rise in the incident reporting 
without a considerable rise in the driver-related incidents demonstrates 
improvements in a safety culture (Hale et al., 2010) as well as positive results from 
Tyne & Wear Metro operator’s efforts to increase reporting rates. After taking the 
Tyne & Wear Metro concession in 2010, the new operator started gradually focusing 
more on other driver-related incidents, which were previously overlooked due to 
prioritising of SPaDs. Composition of different driver-related incident types highlights 
major risks associated with the PTI. According to Basacik et al. (2009) the DOO 
systems carry the second biggest amount of risk to passengers among the different 
dispatch methods.  
The initiatives introduced by the operator can be tracked in composition of driver-
related incidents (Table 10). For example, category A SPaDs, which is the only 
incident type that can be tracked with 100% accuracy, went up after a campaign to 
reduce those. The drivers complained about an overload of SPaD-related information 
at the work place. As soon as this information was taken down, the incident rates 
reduced. The positive behaviour approach of such campaigns can cause negative 
effects, e.g. stress, anxiety (due to assumed peer pressure) and increased 
responsibility, as shown by Karowich et al. (2009). This also highlights importance of 
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top-down initiatives for better reporting meaning that the data (period-based) in this 
study should be treated with caution due to being collected during various 
campaigns.  
Lack of consistency in the period-based sample can be a sign of low importance of 
season-related factors. Even category A SPaDs, deemed to have the best data 
quality, show reverse correlation between the two years. The driver-related incident 
composition demonstrates that almost 50% of these incidents involve station 
procedures, whereas SPaDs only account for less than 10%. With metro drivers 
encountering a lot of stations stops per hour, it means that for a long time research 
and operational performance focus had not been aligned with the actual risk profile.  
The findings from the consistency analysis (Table 9) confirm importance of design-
related PSFs in incident propagation. Even a marginal localisation of each incident 
type provides good opportunity of assessing these locations for design features, 
which might have adverse effect on drivers’ performance. Moreover, the location-
based sample should not be affected by various management initiatives (in theory), 
similarly to the time-based sample. Consistencies of the daily distributions of the 
station-related incidents corroborate the effects of patronage levels, crowding and 
distractions associated with passengers. Moreover, organisational factors, e.g. 
workability of a timetable (ease to stay on time), are relevant.  
5.4.1 Category A SPaDs 
The descriptive statistics for the period between 2009 and 2013 shows similar trends 
to those discovered in the additional category A SPaD analysis (Section 5.3.5). The 
majority of the driver-related SPaDs tend to happen in locations where conflicting 
movements can occur. All of the worst performing locations fall into this category. 
The conflicting movements are often caused by presence of turnback facilities and 
sidings at these locations. Hence the association with passenger overcarried and 
wrong route events. One of the unique features of the sidings and depot is presence 
of ground position lights. As the name suggests, these signals are located on the 
ground level and are often combined with direction indicators, all of which differ from 
the arrangements elsewhere in the system. Furthermore, due to the metrocar design 
visibility of such signals is obstructed from short distances or requires stand-up 
driving. As some of the SPaDs in these locations happened in sidings, the GPL are 
potentially an important causal factor.  
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High proportion of the disruption related SPaDs means that drivers had encountered 
signals they have not expected to see. As drivers do not receive the most up to date 
information about the state of the system, their SA drops. Moreover, prolonged stops 
(waiting for a signal to clear) cause disengagement from a driving task thus 
increasing risk of SPaDs due to lower SA (Naweed and Rainbird, 2014). Madigan et 
al. (2016) discovered that events not encountered in normal operations are important 
contributory factor in rail incidents, especially in SPaDs. Repetitive experience can 
form an expectation bias and cause loss of the SA (O'Connell et al., 2015). The semi-
structured interviews revealed that more experienced drivers know how to interpret 
different signs to build up their situation awareness. For example, not meeting a train 
in opposite direction in a usual spot advices about a disruption further ahead. Dray et 
al. (1999) also found that experience, or lack of it, can be the PSF for metro drivers. 
Research from the automotive industry does not show relationship between 
experience and SA (Underwood et al., 2013), but it does not take into account 
repetitiveness of the task in timetabled driving. The problem is acknowledged in the 
railway industry with work being done on improving drivers’ SA by using emerging 
technologies, e.g. DAS (Roth et al., 2006; Young and Grenier, 2009; Tschirner et al., 
2013). Apart from being low on priority list of SDCs, the reliance on analogue radio 
system can limit communication capabilities (Roth et al., 2006). One of the solutions 
explored by Tyne & Wear Metro is linking the in-cab DAS with the customer services 
twitter account to provide live alerts to Tyne & Wear Metro drivers too.  
Associations found with locations of different ATP and signal faults. Even though the 
semi-structured interviews and workshops did not reveal any associations of these 
incidents with drivers’ performance, there is a bigger concentration of signals and 
ATP equipment at stations with conflicting movements. Hence there is an elevated 
risk of SPaDs but also higher probability of a technical fault.  
Tyne & Wear Metro owned infrastructure has significantly inflated category A SPaD 
rates compared to Network Rail infrastructure. The main difference between two 
parts of the system is use of different design signalling. Tyne & Wear Metro drivers 
receive reduced advanced warning on the Metro infrastructure, which is the busiest 
part of the system. This is not a direct failure mechanism but PSF increasing SPaD 
risk. It contradicts findings from mainline railways, where Li (2004) demonstrated that 
4-aspect signals have more multi-SPaD occurrences. However, these findings do not 
account for levels of service and frequency of red aspects encountered. In mainline 
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railways 2-aspect and 3-aspect signals are used in less busy systems than 4-aspect 
counterparts. On the contrary, the Network Rail part of Tyne & Wear Metro does not 
have so many conflicting movements thus affecting the incident propagation. Such 
relationship is also supported by category A SPaD correlation with number of trains 
in the network (see Table 12). The importance of fatigue and arousal levels is 
demonstrated by statistically significant correlation with proportion of drivers who 
have been on shift for two hours.  
As for non-disruption situations, the causal factors identified in Section 5.3.5 are 
similar to the findings presented by Li (2004) from mainline railways but with less 
emphasis on immediate physical environment PSFs. The daily profile of category A 
SPaDs occurrence in Tyne & Wear Metro is similar to mainline railways except for a 
night peak, which is usually attributed to freight trains. According to Li (2004) these 
peaks are consistent with circadian patterns and thus support importance of personal 
factors. The discussions facilitated during the workshop revealed that many of the 
SPaDs are Start Against Signal SPaDs (SASSPaD), although specific locations were 
not provided. This does not allow making any assumptions on effects of specific 
design features but allows exploring other PSFs. Even though DOO dispatch 
eliminates risks of poor communication between a driver and dispatcher in SASSPaD 
propagation, it increases drivers’ workload (Basacik et al., 2009). Monitoring of the 
platform-train interface is a task which competes with signal checks on departure 
even though a correct sequence is established in the rulebook. The daily incident 
peaks coinciding with the maximum passenger flow times suggest a more 
demanding PTI monitoring task which can in turn distract from the signal checking 
task.  
Frequency distribution of category A SPaDs in mainline railways is also similar to 
Tyne & Wear Metro but for February peak. The peak in summer is assumed to be 
caused by heat, pollen levels, sun height, foliage, operational factors, sociological 
factors and individual factors (Li, 2004).  Assuming direct relationship of these factors 
with human performance, there must be summer peaks in other driver-related 
incidents but none are observed. Hence it is possible to shortlist only seasonal PSFs 
directly affecting interaction with signals, e.g. foliage obstruction, sun height. On the 
other hand, most of the driver-related incidents in Tyne & Wear Metro have a peak in 
period 11 onwards. In the semi-structured interviews, the drivers noted that lower 
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number of daylight hours cause fatigue and drowsiness, whereas sociological factors 
are more acute due to the “financial pressures imposed by Christmas”.  
5.4.2 Overspeeding  
According to Monk et al. (2015), there are on average 39 overspeeding incidents per 
year on the UK mainlines. Hence the statistics from Tyne & Wear Metro is relatively 
high (75 incidents in two years). However, the high concentration of trainstop 
equipment contribute to that where the mainlines mostly depend on occasional on 
train data recorder downloads and speed gun checks. 
Localisation of the overspeeding incidents was expected as not all of the stations are 
equipped with speed control magnets. This is also a reason for location-based 
correlation with category A SPaDs and trackfault ATP incidents. The worst 
performing locations for overspeeding incidents all have low approach speed limits, 
which are between 10 and 20 km/h. However, due to irregularities in speed magnet 
measurements the drivers have been advised to travel 5 km/h under a speed limit in 
control locations from the 2012/13 operational year. The Type 1 terminus station with 
the highest overspeeding incidents stands due to a very steep speed limit drop on 
the approach (from 80 km/h to effective 5 km/h). Moreover, the distance, which 
needs to be travelled at 5 km/h, is rather long. During the semi-structured interviews, 
the drivers complain about frustration, which is caused by some of the incorrect 
trainstop activations. Furthermore, they revealed that it is hard to keep the required 
speed after steep drops in speed limits. This is a known phenomenon in automotive 
industry called ‘speed adaptation’ where drivers tend to underestimate their speed 
after significant reduction in speed limits (Denton, 1976).  
Based on the workshop results, many of the overspeeding incidents were revealed to 
be memory lapses when drivers forget that 30 km/h speed limit is imposed after 
resetting a driver’s desk. The analysis of the additional indicators confirms that the 
overspeeding incidents can be caused by decrease in arousal levels. Such decrease 
is known to lead to decrease in memory performance (Choi et al., 2013). It is 
important to note that very high arousal levels, usually associated with stress, also 
lead to decrease in performance. However, lack of association with two hours into a 
driving portion for the four worst performing locations means that other factors are 
more influential there. The correlation analysis revealed associations with other 
station-related incidents in terms of time. Hence it is possible to assume that common 
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causal factors are present. Passenger flows is the main station characteristic that 
changes throughout the day.  
Necessity to monitor platform-train interface can cause distractions to the speed 
monitoring task. Distraction is a well-known causal factor from other safety-critical 
industries. Overspeeding incidents at Manors are good examples of distraction 
adverse effects. Those only happened during major engineering works in the area. 
This meant a lot of non-routine operations, e.g. interacting with a train dispatcher. 
The workshop discussion revealed that many drivers exceeded the speed limit after 
being distracted by a conversation with the dispatcher.  
5.4.3 Station overruns and failures to call 
The association found between station overruns and failures to call despite only three 
cases of the latter incident type highlights potential influence of zero-inflated samples 
and insufficient number of incident reports for such analysis. However, the failures to 
call happen at locations where station overruns are observed too. In general, station 
overrun is a precursor to failure to call incident or category A SPaD, depending on a 
position and an aspect of a signal. Drivers are instructed to miss a station if they 
realise they will not be able to stop in time without emergency braking. This allows 
avoiding passenger injuries on expense of their convenience. The association 
between two incident types is connected with low rail adhesion season. On the other 
hand, the LRA conditions are usually present during morning and night hours due to 
a combination of a dew and foliage on tracks, whereas 50% of the failures to call 
happen during the day. Day time failures to call are potentially linked to unusual 
station layouts as shown by Northumberland Park. This is Type 2 station with one of 
the running signals on a platform side and platform side change compared to 
previous stations. This is also a location where a failure to call happened outside of 
the normal LRA time. It is possible that design deviations can distract drivers, who 
require time to acquire SA for an unusual layout, thus leaving some individuals 
without enough time to stop safely.  
Station overruns follow similar hourly distribution to failures to call. Having a bigger 
sample of incidents, this category shows correlation with potential decrease in 
drivers’ arousal levels. It is possible to assume that similar correlation would be found 
for the other incident type if not for a small sample size. Weather conditions causing 
LRA and dispatch equipment faults are similar (fog, mist), hence associations found 
with both incident types. More overruns happening in the morning is clearly related to 
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LRA but also could be a case of not sufficient information on rail condition being 
provided to train drivers. The semi-structured interviews revealed that the drivers 
normally know where and when to expect wheelslip but no daily briefs or live 
information is provided. For the worst performing stations, the incidents are spread 
throughout a day. Two of these stations deviate from standard Type 1 design by not 
having a running signal right next to the platform edge but approximately 150-200 
metres down the line. Even though the drivers are not required to check a signal on 
approach, this is one of the mechanisms of building up situational awareness of 
system state (according to the driver interviews). Hence, it is possible for the drivers 
to create associations between a signal and a stopping position. If so, the drivers 
might be using the signals as a reference point with deviations creating serious 
issues. However, the drivers approached during the semi-structured interviews do 
not confirm this relationship. Another feature of these two stations is one of the 
longest and straightest approaches, which are rather monotonous (either wall of 
vegetation or fields). Even though the correlation with this indicator is not statistically 
significant, the coefficient is positive compared to most of the other driver-related 
incidents.  
5.4.4 Passenger entrapments 
Passenger entrapments were one of the targets of the better incident reporting 
campaign hence the increase in the numbers of incidents towards the end of 2012/13 
but it might not be the only cause. The drivers expressed an opinion that most of the 
incidents are actually passengers’ violations who try to board a train after a door 
closing warning tone starts. In 2012/13 a proportion of the refurbished metrocars 
grew significantly in the second half of the operational year. One of the major 
changes introduced in the new metrocar design is related to a door closing 
procedure. Old design required a driver to press a button to sound a warning tone 
and then press it again to start the closing sequence. The refurbished design does 
not require the second step. This leaves the drivers with less control over a situation 
for entire duration of the sequence, which is approximately seven seconds. It is 
possible that it took a few months for drivers to get used to the procedure too.  
Often happening towards the second part of the year, these incidents are potentially 
affected by amount of clothing people are wearing in colder months. Metrocar doors 
are supposed to cycle but might fail to do so if an object trapped is very thin. 
Furthermore, the semi-structured interviews highlighted that passengers are more 
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inclined to ignore the warning tones in order to avoid waiting for a train at a cold 
station. An association with dispatch equipment faults in the period-based data set 
also suggests environmental factors. However, the discussion above should be 
considered in context of potential skews introduced by the design and safety policy 
changes.  
The daily peak in passenger entrapments coincides with many shoppers travelling, 
hence the bags, and school children using Tyne & Wear Metro. The latter are 
renowned for misbehaving at stations and creating dangerous situations while 
boarding or alighting. There are also more entrapments late at night compared to 
early morning, due to alcohol-induced anti-social behaviour by passengers. On the 
other hand, there is no correlation found between number of schools nearby and this 
incident type. It is possible that the chosen additional indicator does not provide a 
good estimate for number of pupils using that station, especially when combined with 
hospital numbers. However, RSSB-funded research showed that children are not a 
major risk factor in not detecting an entrapment (CCD Design & Ergonomics Ltd, 
2005). Traub and Fraser (2013) did not find evidence that children are harder to 
identify on CCTV but the study used cameras located on a train side.  
Statistics suggests poor usability of the monitors used in Tyne & Wear Metro as such 
locations have three times more incidents than an average station. Drawbacks for 
this DOO method identified are the age of the equipment, small screen size, 
occasional poor focus, less flexibility (changing a viewing angle does not help). 
However, it is sometimes the only viable dispatch method for Type 3 stations or 
locations with curved platforms. Another feature of built-over (usually Type 1) and 
underground stations (Type 3) is a rather confined nature of these locations with 
limited platform width. Such platform width combined with passenger approaches not 
visible to the drivers creates situations when a passenger can suddenly emerge from 
a concourse and reach a train within a couple of seconds. Sum of these factors 
explains why most of four worst performing locations are Type 3 stations.  
As one of the few rail systems in the UK solely relying on driver only driving, Tyne & 
Wear Metro shows necessity to focus on this equipment to maintain its usability. In 
the semi-structured interviews the drivers never complained about being the only 
personnel on a train, as long as station features are fit for purpose. The informal 
conversations with the drivers held in 2015 showed that many usability improvements 
had been achieved since 2013 by using heated mirrors, and bigger or better 
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monitors. Apart from weather-related factors, the locations of such incidents correlate 
with stations where foliage obstructions are more pronounced. Associations are 
found with door obstructions in all three data sets. It further shows how thin the line is 
between these two incident types.  
5.4.5 Wrong side door activations 
Statistics from LOROL shows a wrong side door activation every 300000 door 
openings (Basacik and Gibson, 2015). 25 million door openings in Tyne & Wear 
Metro is an estimate figure for the two years under investigation, which was provided 
during the semi-structured interviews. Using this number, it is possible to see that a 
wrong side door release occurs approximately every 550000 door releases. Hence 
metro drivers perform significantly better than sub-urban train drivers in London. It is 
possible that the LOROL drivers have selective door opening procedures as another 
complication or have better reporting culture. On the other hand, shorter station stops 
can contribute to better metro drivers’ performance due to not enough time to fully 
disengage from station procedures. This is not supported by the correlation analysis 
with the additional indicators though.  
One station that clearly stands out in regards to wrong side door activations is 
Haymarket. It has 3.5 times more incidents than the second worst performing station. 
At this location most of the incidents occurred in the second half of 2011/12. Platform 
side change is not the main contributing factor in these incidents as the most 
incidents happened at a platform where no side change occurs. The workshop with 
the safety managers picked up on an interesting detail. As a Type 3 station, 
Haymarket has advertisement panels on the left hand side wall when arriving to the 
station. This is the cab side. The spike in the incidents coincided with installation of a 
new panel right next to a stopping point which many drivers described as having a 
too bright backlight. The decrease in wrong side doors activations was observed after 
the panel was changed to a not so bright one. Moreover, the station, due to recent 
refurbishment, is the brightest underground station in the system.  Potential effects of 
lighting conditions on drivers’ performance need to be assessed. For example, Tyne 
& Wear drivers might expect a platform of an underground station to be the brightest 
one and use this to make a decision on a side of doors to open subconsciously. If 
this relationship is violated, as with Haymarket advertisement platform, then they 
might be struggling to make such decision. Difference in incident rates at Airport 
(Type 2 terminus) and St James (Type 1 underground terminus) supports a theory 
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about influence of lighting conditions due to uniformity of this parameter at Airport 
and not at St James. 
Approximately 40% of all stations had had one or more incidents of this type during 
two years under investigation. When only stations where platform change occurs are 
considered, this proportion rises to 71%. This identifies such design feature as a 
causal factor. Tyne & Wear Metro tried to address this issue by supplying the drivers 
with magnets to proactively anticipate platform side for a next station and cover an 
irrelevant door opening button with it. However, at terminus stations with two 
platforms Tyne & Wear drivers cannot know in advance which platform the train 
control system will assign to them.  Unconventional location of a signal might be a 
causal factor too.  
Even though a period-related data is partially skewed by Haymarket, there is higher 
incident propagation towards the second part of an operational year. Presence of the 
LRA, personal factors associated with circadian rhythms and social factors potentially 
distract drivers or decrease their performance during this time of the year. Importance 
of arousal levels and concentration is further supported by positive medium strength 
correlation with “dangerous” time into a driver’s shift.  
5.4.6 Wrong route incidents 
Setting a correct destination code is a simple task. Losses of concentration, vigilance 
or situational awareness are causal factors for such mistakes. Hence the correlation 
found with two hours on shift. The workshop revealed that increased reporting in 
2012/13 (mostly by SDCs) causes data to be skewed. However, it is possible to 
assume that data for that year is closer to reality due to such reporting change. 
Personal factors similar to wrong side doors come into consideration for wrong route 
incidents due to skew towards autumn/winter months. Finally, for these two incident 
types peaks in periods 6 and 13 can be potentially associated with engineering works 
that are usually timed with school and bank holidays. Such works usually include 
unconventional terminus stations and arriving to a different platform to the one used 
in normal operations. Times and locations of wrong route incidents mostly depend on 
nature of these events.  
5.4.7 Additional indicators 
The increase in incident levels in locations with tunnel exits/entrances on the 
approach is possibly attributed to how human vision reacts on such changes in 
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environment. Even though there is a potential for rise in arousal levels in such 
locations (Yang et al., 2012), human eye also requires up to 10 min to fully adapt 
(Railway Group Standards, 2003), especially when leaving a tunnel on a bright day.  
The results do not confirm better safety of such locations in urban rail systems. 
Distance between the stations is not correlated with any incident types demonstrating 
limited effects of monotony. Potentially this indicator does not provide good estimate 
of decrease of arousal levels due to monotony. The Tyne & Wear Metro physical 
environment is not as monotonous as mainline railways due to a combination of 
urban and countryside landscapes. Short station runs and limited tunnel sections 
might not induce monotony.  
Most of the driver-related incidents correlate with potential decrease in arousal levels 
caused by time spent driving. Many of the incidents discussed above require high 
standard of route knowledge from metro drivers to mitigate against those. As the 
assumed decrease in arousal levels can lead to decrease in memory performance 
(Choi et al., 2013), it subsequently affects route knowledge and drivers’ ability to use 
it.  
The number of trains in the network is an important factor in driver-related incidents 
propagation. However, as many incident types have three peaks, it can be claimed 
that this causal factor only works in a combination with other factors thus inducing the 
adverse effects. For example, there are 7.5% less driver-related incidents per station 
at Network Rail part of the system compare to the central corridor (Pelaw to South 
Gosforth) whereas the number of train is lower by 75% at certain times of day. 
Similar logics can be applied to other additional indicators too. Four worst performing 
stations do not usually show any correlations with the additional indicators 
suggesting that at those locations local factors may play more important role.  
5.5 Conclusions 
Even though the risks associated with each incident type are different, the incident 
composition shows how disproportionate is approach which focuses on category A 
SPaDs. With almost 50% of the incidents associated with station departure and 
arrival procedures, these incident types are typically less covered by current body of 
knowledge even though the extent of PTI-related risks in DOO systems is well-
known. The different initiative carried out by the operator led to better reporting and 
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improvements to safety culture. However, those can potentially skew the data too but 
it has been taken into account during the analysis. 
The importance of design-related factors has been highlighted, especially in context 
of routine timetabled operations and route knowledge. Although the features of metro 
systems suggest better route knowledge and an increased familiarity of drivers with a 
system, the results show that this can lead to the unsatisfactory safety performance. 
One of the recurring topics in the discussion is station design deviation from the 
typical design templates used in Tyne & Wear Metro. This trend, however, has only 
been observed for locations where all station infrastructure elements are retained. 
When those are reduced, number of incidents reduces too implying positive benefits 
of simplified designs. Among design features potentially increasing incident rates are 
sharp drops in speed limits, changing platform sides, locations of a running signal, 
type of DOO equipment and confined nature of stations.  
Loss of situation awareness (be it from a disruption or non-routine operations) is 
another important incident propagation factor. Certain locations have design features 
which would increase probability of depleted SA occurring, e.g. limited advance 
warning or presence of sidings. Many of these occasions can be prevented or at 
least limited with design interventions, and Tyne & Wear Metro has been considering 
some of those already. Other performance shaping factors identified in the analysis 
are decreased arousal levels, seasonal environmental factors, personal factors 
(holidays or financial concerns). Similarly, passenger loading shows an important 
contribution to incident causality through distraction and making PTI-related tasks 
more demanding.  
Drivers were found to lose their alertness and high performance levels approximately 
two hours into the driving portion of a shift. This finding, when used for rostering, 
could improve Tyne & Wear Metro’s safety performance even further. Even though 
the number of trains passing through a station is not directly related to the number of 
incidents at that location, it can induce incident propagation in the problematic parts 
of the network.  
Even though the findings were interpreted in the context of Tyne & Wear Metro 
through the workshop and the semi-structured interviews, those only involved a 
limited number of front line staff at each time. Hence a bigger scale survey of drivers 
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about the PSFs embedded in the system is required to better understand the 
phenomena.  
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Chapter 6. Questionnaire study 
6.1 Introduction 
With the historic incident analysis uncovering trends in driver-related incidents 
propagation, it is necessary to expand on those findings by addressing drivers’ 
perception of system design. The semi-structured interviews proved useful in Chapter 
5 in creating a more systematic understanding of the phenomena.  Tyne & Wear 
Metro drivers have the most experience of interacting with the physical environment 
of the system. Thus they are the most knowledgeable people to assess both negative 
and positive effects of various design features. However, raising a single question 
only with three drivers creates significant biases thus a questionnaire study with a 
bigger sample is required.  
As it is necessary to understand operational context from drivers’ point of view if a 
multi-dimensionality of the research is to be achieved. With the research philosophy 
requiring pragmatic approach to a problem, mixing of the methods was performed on 
the same research level. A mixed methods questionnaire was developed focusing on 
potential issues uncovered in Chapter 5 but also allowing participants to freely 
express their opinions in open-ended questions. Vitale et al. (2008) claim that the 
mixed method design becomes increasingly popular because of the complimentary 
nature of the data it provides. Among the benefits of the mixed method design are 
better insights and an ability to isolate a variable (Borkan, 2004), elaboration of the 
analysis to increase the level of details and starting new lines of thinking (Vitale et al., 
2008).  
Questionnaire surveys are an established method in the railway industry to source 
attitudes from as big as possible sample of drivers. One of the largest questionnaire 
studies in railway industry was conducted by Ryan et al. (2009b) who collected 
opinions of 4686 signalers on a range of human factors. The study addresses some 
of the similar issues as this thesis, including human-machine interface, usability and 
safety culture. However, it does so based on the existing body of knowledge which is 
not supported by more in-depth trends analysis for the same sample. The historic 
incident analysis allows targeting more specific design features. Stevenson et al. 
(2000) used a series of questionnaires to assess ergonomics of train control devices 
in, at that time, the new Tangara train in Australia. Their method was based on 
performing an identical questionnaire experiment before and after re-designing of the 
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cab environment and subsequently comparing the results. This approach can be very 
effective when built around a design change but heavily depends on opportunities.  
The questionnaire surveys have been used to study praise that train drivers receive 
(Horishita et al., 2013), motivations of the train drivers (Fujino et al., 2013) and 
organisational factors influencing decisions to report or not an incident (Clarke, 
1998). Questionnaire studies have also been performed to investigate train drivers’ 
job stress (Chang et al., 2005), physiological reactions to on-the-track accidents 
(Vatshelle and Moen, 1997). The railway industry is using questionnaires not only for 
research purposes but also in train drivers selection process. Most of the companies 
include one or several questionnaire tasks in their assessment of the candidates for 
drivers’ positions. Those mostly focus on psychological evaluation of the candidates. 
Guidelines for psychological assessment of train drivers produced by Community of 
European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (2009) claim that such tests can 
help avoiding employing a person who is not suitable for safety-critical role. 
Furthermore, questionnaire studies have an important role in change management 
giving the front line staff an opportunity to provide feedback on performance of an 
organisation, various work-related issues and changes offered.  For instance, Inoue 
et al. (2015) used questionnaires as a self-assessment tool for train drivers and a 
source of feedback on new training techniques introduced. Self-administered 
questionnaires were used to explore symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder 
among train drivers (Yum et al., 2006). Impact of sleep quality (Jeon et al., 2014) and 
chronotypes (De Araújo Fernandes Jr et al., 2013) on train drivers’ performance has 
been studied.  
The automotive industry has been using questionnaires extensively to evaluate 
current designs and requirements of car drivers. For example, the questionnaire 
study by Herriotts (2005) addresses the issue of the car designs being suited for 
ageing demographics of a driver. In the wider ergonomics field one of the most 
popular usability tools is the System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire developed 
by Brooke (1986). Even though the author refers to the SUS questionnaire as “quick 
and dirty”, (Lewis and Sauro, 2009) find it to be of high consistency.  
There are many commonalities between the questionnaire studies mentioned above. 
The most wide-spread method is a self-administered questionnaire combining 
qualitative and quantitative inquiries. Among the quantitative methods, Likert-type 
questions are popular for sourcing respondents’ attitudes on a scale of “completely 
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agree” to “completely disagree”. However, choosing an optimum number of answers 
on the scale can be critical to the quality of results. Finstad (2010) shows that the 7-
point scale provides the best number of options. Further increase of the scale can 
lead to a reduced response rate (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Additionally, closed 
design questions with pre-selected answers are typically added to the questionnaires 
for categorisation purposes.  
The mixed method questionnaires, similarly to pragmatists’ mixed methods approach, 
aim to expand researchers’ insights in an area of study. Open-ended questions were 
found to be the most popular qualitative technique. Almost each questionnaire 
reviewed has at least one open-ended question in the end asking respondents to 
provide any other comments, concerns or ideas on the research problem. The 
questionnaire surveys reviewed often had a control group in order to source baseline 
results. For example, the study on accident propagation by Cui et al. (2007) targeted 
respondents with previous accident history but also involved some drivers without 
any accident history as a control group.  
The statistical analysis of the results usually explores relationships between 
categories (based on categorical questions) and compares the sub-samples on total 
scores. Most often Pearson’s chi-square and Student’s t-test respectively are used 
for such statistical analysis. Use of non-parametric analogues of the t-test is quite 
rare and no information is provided on distribution of variables. In terms of the 
descriptive statistics, mean and standard deviation are always provided. However, 
Jamieson (2004) reminds that the Likert scale results are ordinal values, essentially 
ranks, and thus cannot be treated as interval values despite it being a common 
practice (Blaikie, 2003). It is incorrect to assume that the interval between the points 
on, for example, the 5-point Likert scale is always the same. To put it in perspective, 
a respondent not necessarily feels the same between Strong disagreement and 
disagreement, and disagreement and no opinion. Hence median and mode values 
should be reported for questionnaire results (Jamieson, 2004), but statistical analysis 
should be carried out using non-parametric tests (Kostoulas, 2013).  
6.2 Methodology 
The questionnaire study was conducted among Tyne & Wear Metro drivers in 
January and February 2015 with an ultimate goal to understand what design features 
drivers believe to have adverse effect on their safety-related performance. 43 
respondents participated in the survey which was almost 30% of the entire Tyne & 
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Wear Metro drivers population. According to the methodology presented by Desu 
(2012), sample size for a finite population of 150 should be at least 35 (23%) to 
achieve 95% confidence level. Design of the questionnaire (Appendix I) is based on 
the review of common practices in railway industry.  
6.2.1 Type 
A roster-based nature of metro drivers’ jobs require significant amount of time to 
organise in-person or telephone interviews. Hence it was decided to conduct a self-
administered questionnaire study which is distributed in person. This method along 
with numerous design iterations allows negotiating potential disadvantages of typical 
self-administered questionnaires, e.g. higher requirements for questionnaire design 
and lack of immediate quality control (Fowler, 2009). Furthermore, high level of 
personal relevance and lack of interaction with an interviewer can induce openness 
and honesty, especially in sensitive questions (Gillham, 2000).  
6.2.2 Structure  
The questionnaire consists of 15 questions. Mixed methods approach is used in 
design (Borkan, 2004; Vitale et al., 2008; Creswell, 2014). Firstly, the metro drivers 
have to assess 27 statements in question 1 on 7-point Likert (Finstad, 2010) scale 
which address potential PSFs discussed in Chapter 5. Presence of “do not know” 
answer in the 7-point Likert questions should discourage people from skipping a 
question. Next, the respondents are asked about usability of different types of signals 
used in Tyne & Wear Metro. The participants also have to mark potential contributory 
factors and name the riskiest locations for wrong side door activations and passenger 
entrapment incidents. In the second part of the questionnaire, they have to assess 
various elements of the cab design, and own arousal and boredom levels at different 
intervals into a driving shift. Finally, the respondents have to provide information on 
previous incident involvement and demographical data. The questionnaire, as it was 
distributed to the participants, can be seen in appendix I.    
The optimum length of the questionnaire is something that much of the literature 
seems to agree on. Four to eight pages is a preferred length of the questionnaire with 
12 pages possible in exceptional cases (Gillham, 2000; Blair et al., 2013). However, 
the time required to complete it also has to be taken into the account with a 
maximum duration being 20 minutes. The questionnaire developed is six pages long 
including the 1-page long introduction. The final version trials conducted before 
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distributing the questionnaire showed that the maximum completion time was 12 
minutes. 
15 version of the questionnaire have been developed prior to selection of the final 
design. Numerous trials were conducted with railway researchers and Tyne & Wear 
Metro personnel to address questions quality and terminology concerns. The final 
version of the questionnaire which had been used in the study can be seen in 
Appendix I. 
The statements in question 1 (see Table 13) are mixed to avoid the respondents 
seeing a grouping pattern. The order of questions follows an advice by Blair et al. 
(2013) with the easiest closed format attitude questions, which are applicable to the 
entire population, in the beginning. The questions had been simplified during the 
design iterations as complex behavioural enquiries are non-advisable (Gillham, 
2000). The demographics questions are located in the end of the survey to avoid the 
respondents being intimidated by those before they start. Finally, the questions are 
kept within 25 words limit and double negatives are avoided. 
6.2.3 Sample 
In total 43 metro drivers participated in the research. Out of 43 respondents, 39 are 
male, two are female and two decided not to state their gender. 42% of the 
participants fall into 26-35 years old category with the second biggest group being 
46-55 (26%). The biggest proportion of the respondents (31%) had been metro 
drivers for less than three years at the moment of the study, highlighting generation 
change in the company. These drivers are considered “inexperienced” by Tyne & 
Wear Metro. Only 40% of the participants had not been involved in any driver-related 
incident in the three years before the survey.  
6.2.4 Data analysis 
Ordinal data (Likert-scale questions) was assessed using mode and median values. 
Mean and standard deviation statistics are produced for interval data (marking 
questions). Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was performed on the data to check whether 
differences in mean and median values are statistically significant. The 
demographics questions allowed categorizing drivers and exploring whether 
involvement in different categories affects drivers’ attitudes. To do this Mann-Whitney 
U-test and Kruskall-Wallis H-tests were performed.  
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Fisher’s exact test (Fisher, 1935) has been selected to test how likely that an 
observed distribution between sets of data is due to a chance. This is normally done 
by Pearson’s chi square (χ2-test) test but the sample size is not big enough for it 
(Yates et al., 1999). It is not the case for Fisher’s exact test, which however assumes 
fixed totals (Howard, 1998). As it was impossible to know totals for each category in 
advance, the results of this test should be treated as more conservative than normal.  
Internal reliability of Likert-scale questions is calculated using Cronbach’s alpha 
(Cronbach, 1951) to check whether it is consistently reflecting a conduct that it is 
measuring (Field, 2013). Literature shows that acceptable value for Cronbach’s alpha 
test is 0.7 and more (Cortina, 1993; Field, 2013). All of the statements in question 1 
demonstrate high level of internal consistency with the lowest value of Cronbach’s 
alpha found to be 0.738.  The statements in question 8 show even higher internal 
consistency (0.836 minimum). 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 13 below provides descriptive statistics for the 27 attitude statements in 
question 1. Drivers tend to assess their performance positively whilst not reporting 
many effects of the design features. 
Statement Mode Median 
1. The safety record of the Tyne & Wear Metro in the past 3 years 
has improved 
Not sure Not sure 
2. Since I joined the Metro, my safety-related performance has 
changed for the better 
Agree Agree 
3. My route knowledge of the Metro is good Strongly agree Strongly agree 
4. My confidence reduces while driving during possessions or 
engineering works 
Agree Just agree 
5. The training provided for operations in degraded mode is 
adequate 
Just agree Just agree 
6. The moment I enter or leave a tunnel, I feel more alert  Disagree Not sure 
7.Running signals between the stations are easy to interact with Agree Agree 
8. Running signals at the stations are easy to interact with Agree Agree 
9. I am less alert if the outside physical environment is 
monotonous  
Just disagree Not sure 
10. I prefer varied outside environment, such as a mix of 
vegetation and buildings 
Agree Just agree 
11. The recent change in door closing procedure from 2 to 1 
button sequence is easier to operate 
Agree Just agree 
12. A 1-button sequence might increase the occurrence of 
passenger entrapment  
Strongly agree Agree 
13. I like mirrors as station dispatch equipment Agree Just agree 
14. I like monitors as station dispatch equipment Agree Agree 
15. When coming to a scheduled stop I pay attention to a running 
signal at the platform end 
Agree Agree 
16. Running signals located far from the platform end can make 
selection of a stopping position difficult 
Disagree Disagree 
17. It is difficult to choose which side doors to open when station 
signals and the platform are on opposite sides 
Disagree Just disagree 
18. Signalling at ground level can be confusing after driving a 
train in passenger service 
Just disagree Just disagree 
19. The change of platform side does not affect my ability to 
select correct side to open the doors 
Agree Just agree 
20. The stations differ a lot in terms of driver visibility of 
passengers on a platform.   
Strongly agree Agree 
21. I prefer the ¾ life refurbished cab to the original one Agree Not sure 
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Statement Mode Median 
22. If the time between two stations is more than 2.5 minutes, 
this improves my alertness 
Not sure Not sure 
23. I feel more alert when the time between stations is less than 
1 minute 
Not sure Not sure 
24. I prefer steep change in speed limits rather than gradual 
change 
Not sure Not sure 
25. My familiarity with operational protocols at sidings is very 
good 
Agree Agree 
26. I have good familiarity with the layout of the depot Agree Agree 
27. I find it harder to keep within higher speed limit than lower 
speed limit 
Disagree Disagree 
Table 13. Drivers’ assessment of attitude statements 
Average marks and standard deviation statistics for different types of signalling are 
summarised in Table 14. The running signals on Network Rail infrastructure are 
easier to interact with than the Tyne & Wear Metro signals (Z=-4.464, p=0.00) and 
the ground position lights (Z=-5.005, p=0.00). The ground position lights got the 
lowest marks out of all the signalling types in question 2. The mean mark for those is 
significantly lower than for the Tyne & Wear Metro signals too (Z=-2.922, p=0.003).  
Signal type Mark/10 St. deviation 
Running signal on Network Rail infrastructure  9.37 1.155 
Running signal on Tyne & Wear Metro infrastructure 8.19 1.694 
Repeater 8.44 1.623 
Advance warning signal 7.88 2.184 
Flashing aspects 8.98 1.520 
Ground position lights 7.28 1.944 
Junction indicators 8.40 1.591 
Table 14. Marks for different signalling types used in the Tyne & Wear Metro (out of 10)  
When asked to expand on the reasons for allocation of the low marks for the 
signalling types the respondents mostly mentioned not enough height, poor 
positioning and overgrowth of the ground position lights. Advance warning signals, 
which are effectively notice boards, were critiqued on not being distinguishable as 
much as signals, especially at night. The Tyne & Wear Metro running signals got 
some critique for being located on bends, in tunnels and having less advance 
warning than mainline signals.  
Table 15 provides similar statistics for drivers’ views on potential causal factors in 
wrong side door activation incidents. The respondents believe that the biggest 
contributing factor to wrong side doors activations is “attention lapse” with “various 
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distractions” being in a close second place. Furthermore, the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks 
test (Z=-1.650, p=0.099) did not find the marks for these two potential causal factors 
significantly different. The respondents feel that “inadequate training” does not have 
much to do with wrong side doors activation propagation. “Lack of reminders for 
drivers” also is deemed to be less important potential causal factor. However, the 
difference between marks for “inadequate training” and “lack of reminders” factors is 
significant (Z=-2.684, p=0.007). The participants did not make much use of the open 
space to add their potential causal factors. “Difference in button layout” and “changes 
of platform side” had been mentioned twice each.  
Potential causal factor Mark/10 St. deviation 
Attention lapse 8.67 2.078 
Lack of reminders for drivers at stations 4.77 2.951 
Layout of the door control 6.79 2.833 
Distractions 8.28 1.956 
Inadequate training 3.37 3.079 
Table 15. Marks for PSFs in wrong side door activation incidents (out of 10) 
In the assessment of potential causal factors, the participants were also asked to 
name three stations that, in their opinion, carry most risk of each incident type and 
reasons for this choice (Table 16). In terms of wrong side doors activations, none of 
the four worst performing stations (Section 5.3.2) is named by more than the third of 
the sample. However, many participants wrote only one or two station names. West 
Jesmond and St James are not mentioned at all. “Change of the platform side” is 
mentioned the most as a reason to consider a station risky for this incident type. In 
terms of “distractions”, only the Living Wall art installation at Sunderland station is 
identified. Furthermore, Northumberland Park is the only station that is specifically 
commented on its design. 
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Station Reason Times 
mentioned 
N.Park Change of platform side 7 
Haymarket Opposite side on inline 6 
Jesmond Platform 2 – change of platform side 5 
N.Park Island platform  4 
Heworth Platform side change from both directions 4 
Sunderland Platform and monitors are on opposite sides 4 
Sunderland Platform 3 (living wall)  3 
Sunderland First change in side for a long time 3 
Pelaw Change of platform side  3 
All stations Same chances everywhere 3 
Underground 
stations 
DOO opposite side to platform  2 
Gateshead No reason stated 2 
Sunderland “Walking passenger” wall – distraction 2 
Felling  Platform 2 (personally) 1 
Manors Platform 1 (inexplicable, could be by chance) 1 
Table 16. Drivers' analysis of the worst performing locations with contributing factors for wrong side 
doors incidents 
Similarly to wrong side door activations, the respondents had assessed a list of 
potential causal factors for passenger entrapment incidents with the descriptive 
statistics summarized in Table 17.  
Potential causal factor Mark/10 St. deviation 
Night time 6.05 3.124 
Snow 3.63 2.664 
Rain 4.60 2.727 
Mist 6.35 2.811 
Direct sunlight 8.21 2.253 
Vegetation overgrowth 4.65 3.085 
Location of station infrastructure, e.g. CCTV 
cameras 
8.09 2.147 
Overcrowding at a platform or in a train 9 1.512 
Winter clothing on passengers 4.60 2.896 
Shopping bags and suitcases 6.37 2.691 
Layout of the stations  6.58 2.684 
Design of passenger approaches 7.49 2.576 
Mobility aid equipment, e.g. walking sticks, crutches 7.33 2.378 
Station dispatch instructions/procedures used in the 
Metro 
5.12 5.72 
Low height passengers, e.g. children 2.72 2.684 
Table 17. Marks for PSFs in passenger entrapment incidents (out of 10) 
The highest marks are given to “overcrowding at a platform or a train”, “direct 
sunlight” and “location of station infrastructure” in this particular order. The Wilcoxon 
Signed-Ranks test returns significant difference between the “overcrowding” factor 
and the other two highly marked factors (Z=-2.682, p=0.07 and -3.925, p=0.00 
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respectively) however no significant difference between the “direct sunlight” and 
“location of station infrastructure” factors (z=-0.426, p=0.67).  “Design of passenger 
approaches” and “use of mobility equipment by passengers” are scored relatively 
high too. The participating drivers do not see “snow”, “rain”, “winter clothing” and 
“vegetation” as major contributing factors to propagation of the passenger 
entrapment incidents. When asked to add other contributing factors, 26% (11 out of 
43) of the metro drivers include “late boarding behaviour from passengers”. 
Moreover, the related behaviour when people are “holding doors for late passengers” 
is mentioned in 14% of the questionnaires.  
For passenger entrapments incidents, the respondents are better aware of the 
historic incident data with one of the worst performing stations (Haymarket) 
mentioned in more than 50% of the questionnaires. On the other hand, the only type 
1 station is not mentioned at all despite having high passenger entrapment incident 
rates. Main issues identified by the drivers are “the age and quality of the DOO 
equipment” at Type 3 stations, using monitors as dispatch equipment. Furthermore, 
“overcrowding” and “lack of passenger visibility on approaches” are named as main 
risk factors for the worst performing stations. Finally, poor lighting at a back of a 
platform and curved platforms were named as potential passenger entrapment 
causes.  The former PSF is mentioned in relation to Byker (Type 1 built-over) station 
as the riskiest location even though no passenger entrapments were registered at 
this location in 2011/12 and 2012/13 operational years (Appendix C). The 
participants mostly do not know what is the season with the highest number of 
passenger entrapments. Of those who believe to know, Summer is the most popular 
answer.  
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The participants are mostly just satisfied with the various elements of the cab 
environment (Table 18). The negative attitudes are observed towards driver’s desk 
and, especially, HVAC unit.  
Component Median Mode 
Driver’s seat Just satisfied Satisfied 
Driver’s desk Just dissatisfied Just satisfied 
FASSI Just satisfied Satisfied 
Driver’s Safety Device (DSD) Just satisfied Satisfied 
Deadman’s Vigilance Device (DVD) Satisfied Satisfied 
Master controller Just satisfied Satisfied 
Heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning (HVAC) unit 
Dissatisfied Strongly dissatisfied 
Table 18. Drivers' assessment of the elements of the cab (7-point Likert) 
The statistics for the drivers’ assessment of their boredom and alertness, and overall 
incident occurrence risk can be seen in Table 19. The questionnaire study 
demonstrates that the majority of the metro drivers believe that they start to get bored 
and become less alert at least after two hours of constant driving. They also think 
that the beginning of the shift has less risks for incident occurrence but driving time of 
more than 3 hours increases incident rates.  
 From the start of the fixed driving 
portion, in minutes 
Statement Mode Median 
My alertness starts to decrease Over 181 151-180 
My boredom starts Over 181 121-150 
Most incidents are likely to happen Over 181 Over 181 
Least incidents are likely to happen <30 30-60 
Table 19. Drivers' assessment of their boredom and alertness levels 
6.3.2 Influence of the respondent’s age and experience on their attitudes  
The only significant age difference is identified in attitudes towards the design of the 
refurbished cab (H = 9.805, p = 0.020). The drivers who fall into 46-55 years old age 
band mostly dislike the new cab whereas the 36-45 and 55+ age groups mostly 
prefer it. In terms of experience, the only significant relationship (at 95% confidence 
level) is related to choosing of a stopping position. More experienced drivers tend to 
disagree less that it is harder to select a stopping position when a running signal is 
far from a platform’s edge (H = 8.903, p = 0.031).  
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6.4 Discussion  
6.4.1 Safety-related performance 
In general, and based on the results described in the previous section, it can be 
concluded that Tyne & Wear Metro drivers have no concerns of any significant 
effects on their safety-related performance produced by various features of 
infrastructure design. The drivers believe that their safety-related performance is 
improving whereas route knowledge is already very good. This is in line with previous 
research reporting great importance of experience and route knowledge in train 
driving process (Naweed, 2013). As Tyne & Wear Metro can be considered a system 
with a low automation level under the model proposed by Parasuraman et al. (2000) 
it is suggested that disturbances in the system can lead to dips in performance (Balfe 
et al., 2015; Madigan et al., 2016). The results support the assumptions of significant 
dips in safety-related performance in non-routine operations (Section 5.5). Drivers do 
not feel as confident in such events, which could be caused by an over-reliance on 
route knowledge. The habituation and expectation bias are developed in repetitive 
experiences and cause loss of the SA (O'Connell et al., 2015). 
The respondents indicate there is a room for improvement in terms of training for 
degraded mode. As of 2015, Tyne & Wear Metro was using a SimKit method for 
simulation of different scenarios. The SimKit itself resembles a board game with a 
map of the system and additional figurines (trains, people, signs and signals) for 
different operational situations. The drivers are presented with a scenario on the map 
and asked to explain their actions in such situation. Looking back on the 
questionnaire results, it could be a case of the SimKit used just not providing enough 
association with a simulated event for Tyne & Wear Metro drivers.  
Even though the past incident statistics demonstrates that safety culture is improving 
in the Tyne & Wear Metro, drivers do not feel improvements in the safety record.  It is 
possible that they do not associate statement 1 and the safety culture of the 
organization but the median scores are similar to the safety culture assessment 
scores of other railway staff in the UK (Ryan et al., 2009a). The results corroborate 
findings of the historic incident analysis about lack of relationship between tunnels 
and arousal levels.  
6.4.2 Signals and the related factors 
Presence of the SASSPaDs in the historic data suggests a complexity of interaction 
with signals from a stopped train. Such interaction usually occurs at a station or in 
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sidings. However, the drivers do not believe the station signals being more complex 
than the signals between the stations (Z = -1.155, p = 0.248).  On the other hand, the 
respondents confirm that the GPL, a signalling type mostly present in the sidings, is 
the least usable by far even though question 1 shows no confusion with such signals 
and the associated areas. It is possible that the respondents cannot associate 
themselves with statement 18 due to the second part of it (“…after driving a train in 
passenger service”) but can discriminate between the signalling types taken out of 
context. Similarly, the fact that the drivers see the difference between the signaling 
types might not mean that the worst scored type is uncomfortable to use. 
Nevertheless, Multer et al. (2015) identified problems with the GPL sighting from 
certain cab. Moreover, this signal type definitely fails comfortable signal height 
parameters outlined by Li (2003).  
The signals at Network Rail part of the network have been assessed to have better 
usability than the Tyne & Wear Metro signals. This supports previously proposed 
hypotheses on such signals providing better advance warning and subsequent 
situational awareness. Moreover, less curved geometry and larger distances 
between the signals potentially add some marks to the mainline 4-aspect signals too.   
6.4.3 Passenger entrapment factors 
Higher localisation of passenger entrapments to underground stations shows 
problems with predominant dispatch equipment at such stations – monitors. 
Moreover, the drivers’ list mostly underground stations as the most entrapment 
prone. Yet the median for mirrors’ assessment is less positive than the median for 
monitors’ assessment. The Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test supports statistically 
significant difference (Z = -3.242, p = 0.001) thus not confirming poorer usability of 
the DOO monitors. The Tyne & Wear Metro operator had dedicated a lot of resources 
to improvements of DOO equipment between 2013 and 2015. Moreover, most of the 
resources were allocated to locations with monitors as DOO equipment. This could 
have caused the discrepancy between the historic data and the questionnaire results. 
Basacik et al. (2009) only list advantages of CCTV in the assessment of DOO 
disregarding mirrors. However, it is possible that their research project means 
individual door cameras with the term CCTV. On the other hand, CCTV-related DOO 
is only one of the design features potentially acting as adverse PSF at underground 
stations.  
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Table 17 demonstrates that passenger levels (overcrowding) associated with the 
underground stations as well as layout of such stations could be the factors 
increasing amount of passenger entrapments. Moreover, the semi-structured 
interviews with drivers showed that at some locations, e.g. Haymarket, monitors are 
not fit for purpose only in combination with crowded platforms as a view of some 
doors is obscured when a platform is full. Poorer usability of the mirrors is reinforced 
by the mark for direct sunlight as most of the overground stations have the mirrors as 
DOO equipment. This also makes direct sunlight the only important environmental 
factor as the rest were marked relatively low. It corroborates the Tyne & Wear Metro 
operator’s risk assessment of some stations with the mirrors where dispatchers had 
to be introduced for the hours of direct sunlight. Drivers commented a lot on 
passenger behaviour as a contributory factor. According to Basacik et al. (2009) lack 
of staff presence in DOO systems encourages unsafe acts.  
Confined nature of the underground stations does not allow good visibility of 
passengers on approach. The car driver study byYoung et al. (2015) demonstrated 
that built environment is not as an important mental workload inducing factor as high 
pedestrian/traffic density. On the other hand, the scenario in that experiment did not 
require drivers to extract safety-critical information from the built environment.  The 
recent change in the door closing procedure leaves Tyne & Wear Metro drivers with 
less control over passenger entrapment risks at locations with poor passenger 
approach visibility. This is supported by the assessment of statements 11 and 20.  
6.4.4 Contributors to station overruns 
Statements 15 and 16 in question 1 represented station overrun incidents. RSSB 
research (Roels and Mills, 2010) claim that errors and performance shaping factor 
can be encountered in 3:1 ratio in station overrun incidents. Environmental factors 
are responsible for approximately 15% of station overruns/failures to call in that 
research. However, that study does not consider any design-related PSFs. Moreover, 
mainline trains are often timetabled to miss certain stations hence importance of 
remembering a correct diagram and personal factors is higher. Based on the station 
overrun statistics (Section 5.4.3) it is possible that a running signal’s position could 
affect the drivers’ train stopping performance. Even though it is not a step in the 
mandatory stopping routine, the participants admitted checking a running signal 
before a station stop.  It is possible that these gazes on a running signal are purely a 
situational awareness exercise. Checking a running signal creates an additional 
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pressure on already limited visual attention, which might hinder drivers’ ability to 
select a correct stopping position on time. However, it is unknown whether ease of 
interaction with other elements of station design is affected by the location of a 
running signal. The drivers do not believe that the position of the signal has any 
effect on their stopping performance. 
6.4.5 Overspeeding-related factors 
Historic overspeeding statistics from Tyne & Wear Metro shows that the stations with 
the lowest speed limits are prone to propagation of overspeeding incidents (Section 
5.4.2). This is corroborated by drivers’ attitudes towards different speed limits. The 
respondents have stated that they find it harder to keep to a lower speed limit than a 
higher one. This potentially corroborates with the lower mark for the GPL, as 
associated areas usually have low speed limits. This assessment also corroborates 
added complexity of procedures employed by Tyne & Wear Metro, especially the “5 
km/h under” initiative. It is important to note that 5 km/h is 50% of the allowed speed 
limit at some of the stations whereas at different locations it could be only 10-15% of 
a speed limit. Moreover, the low speed is perceived even lower after driving at a 
higher speed (Denton, 1976). There has been a spread of opinions when the 
participants were asked to express their attitudes towards gradual versus steep 
change in speed limits, potentially showing that the rate of decrease might not be an 
important PSF.  
6.4.6 Wrong-side doors activations and related factors 
Statements 15, 17 and 19 are addressing wrong side doors activation incidents. The 
respondents disagree that the location of a running signal affects their door opening 
performance. They do not think that the change of platform side does it either. This 
contradicts the previous findings by Basacik and Gibson (2015) and Chapter 5. On 
the other hand, 67% of the stations named to be associated with the wrong side 
doors activations are the stations where a platform side change occurs. It is possible 
that the drivers, similarly to the situation with the GPL, can discriminate between 
different stations but still do not see these locations as risky. Furthermore, the 
wording selected for statements might have caused such controversy. In case of 
statement 17, it is possible that the participants saw it as a question about the 
underground stations with an island platform (type 3) instead of a question about the 
stations deviating from a standardized design, e.g. Tynemouth (type 1) and 
Northumberland Park (type 2).  
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Previous research indicates a possible cause to wrong side door releases the 
transition of door opening skills from rule based to routine based domain over the 
course of a driving portion. This leads to a subsequent failure to notice change of a 
platform side (Halliday, 1995). It is corroborated by drivers’ high marks for attention 
lapse. Distractions have been considered as one of the main causal factors too (table 
3). The unusual cab design means that having people sitting next to the cab is almost 
similar to having someone else in a normal sized mainline cab, and this is known to 
cause distractions (Verstappen, 2015). Immediate (cab) and outside physical 
environment can present many distractions that are known to interfere with a safe 
procedure (Caird et al., 2002; Edquist et al., 2011; Johanning, 2011; Salmon et al., 
2011; Young et al., 2015). Many distractions are caused by the noise from 
passengers sitting next to a cab due to the unusual metrocar design. Lack of 
reminders received low marks showing that the respondents are happy with the 
quality of stopping position markers and a few of platform side indicators.  
6.4.7 Drivers’ assessment of their arousal and alertness levels 
The results do not confirm relationship between tunnel exit/entrance and increase in 
driver’s arousal levels (Yang et al., 2012) thus corroborating previous findings from 
the historic incident data (Section 5.4.7). No effects of distances between stations 
have been noticed by the respondents hence supporting previous findings too. 
Despite found links between monotony and increase in safety risk (Thiffault and 
Bergeron, 2003; Williamson et al., 2011), the drivers did not have a strong opinion on 
effects of monotonous outside environment on alertness levels. There is a possibility 
that the drivers see the entire environment along the routes as monotonous due to 
repetitiveness of their daily task. On the other hand, they still like the varied 
environment more thus showing that they can distinguish several types of the outside 
environment.  
The drivers’ assessment of their boredom and alertness (Table 19) also supports the 
previous work (Keun Sang and Ohkubo, 1994; Folkard, 1997; Macdonald et al., 
1997; Yang et al., 2012) as the participants claim to start losing alertness and 
developing boredom after two hours of driving. It is important to note that the mode 
answer for the first two statements in Table 19 is “over 181”. Over the course of the 
research, the drivers have been rather vocal about their concerns and dissatisfaction 
with long driving hours hence it could have affected their answers. It is possible that if 
there was an option such as “over 241 minutes” many would have selected it in order 
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to make a point about too long driving portions. The statistics reports that there is no 
difference between the assessment of the most incident-risky time and the 
assessment of the time when the alertness starts to decrease (Z = -0.070, p = 0.944). 
Similarly, no difference has been found with the time the boredom starts (Z = -1.353, 
p = 0.176). Hence, it is possible to state that the metro drivers link the alertness and 
the boredom with the incident propagation.  
6.4.8 Cab design 
The questionnaire results do not clearly indicate whether the refurbished cab is 
accepted more than the original design. Significant differences in attitudes towards 
the cab from various age groups are perplexing as there is no easy explanation apart 
from difference in methods and approaches used to train these various groups of 
drivers. Even though the previous research demonstrates correlation between use of 
DAS and higher workload (Large et al., 2014) the drivers expressed positive views on 
FASSI – the DAS used in Tyne & Wear Metro. The non imposing nature of the DAS 
used in Tyne & Wear Metro potentially contributes to such a positive assessment.  
The main areas of dissatisfaction with the new cab are the driver’s desk and the 
HVAC unit. Ambient temperature in a cab can be an important causal factor for drops 
in performance and vigilance (Human Engineering Ltd, 2005; RSSB, 2008; Ružić and 
Časnji, 2011). The HVAC unit has been taken off the most trainsets at the time of the 
survey to be changed for a simple ventilation system. It happened due to unit’s 
inability to maintain a stable comfortable temperature. Consultations with the drivers 
and safety managers have revealed that the dissatisfaction with the desk can be 
attributed to differences in design of this element of a cab across the train fleet. For 
example, location of door controls can differ from cab to cab, which is mentioned 
several times in the questionnaires in regards to wrong side door activations. 
Moreover, it is not very ergonomically sound as some procedures, e.g. decoupling, 
do not take into account a potential variation of physical parameters across the metro 
train drivers’ population. Basacik et al. (2009) in their assessment of the DOO 
dispatch method emphasise that door controls compete for drivers’ visual attention. 
This is further pronounced in systems where the position of these controls is irregular 
across the fleet.  
6.4.9 Awareness of the incident statistics 
Even though the assessment of the statements and the answers demonstrate 
positivism about training provided to the drivers, poor awareness of the incident 
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statistics transpires through the questionnaires. For example, the lack of knowledge 
about the worst performing stations for passenger entrapments and wrong side door 
activations. Hence, the drivers cannot gain additional safety benefits based on 
experience and knowledge at those locations. On the other hand, excessive focus 
only at certain areas can draw drivers’ attention from other stations thus creating 
additional risks there. This can also result in reverse response as shown in Section 
5.4. Finding a right balance between incident statistics awareness and general safety 
training is very important for improvement of the metro safety.  
It is possible to claim that personal associations and previous experiences affect the 
assessments of the risk of certain stations. Passenger entrapment incidents at Byker 
and Monkseaton (both Type 1) are very good example of this situation. Even though 
both stations had roughly the same amount of incidents (nine and ten respectively) in 
a two-year period (2013-2014) before the questionnaire study, the first station is 
mentioned by 16% of the participants whilst no one comments on the second station. 
This can be explained by the fact that there has been a high profile incident at Byker 
where a driver was prosecuted afterwards. The incidents at Monkseaton did not have 
similar consequences.  
The drivers also struggle to name correctly trends in incident propagation. It is 
possible that trends had changed between 2013 and 2015 but most of the 
respondents do not even attempt to answer this question. Even though the driver 
coaches claim to provide this information to drivers during training, there are doubts 
about consistency of such information due to lack of a structured approach.  
6.4.10 Effects of individual factors 
Age does not have effect to the same extent as only one statistically significant 
relationship was found. Even though train driving is a highly visual task and more 
experienced drivers are known to have more advanced gaze-scanning patterns 
(Underwood, 2007; Young et al., 2015), only one statistically significant relationship 
was found between experience and attitudes to the statements. This is different to 
findings by Ryan et al. (2009a) who showed that railway controllers’ experience has 
significantly more effect on their perception of their job.  
6.4.11 Assessment of the questionnaire results  
The questionnaire results demonstrate that Tyne & Wear Metro drivers do not have 
concerns about effects of design of the physical environment, considering the current 
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operational procedures as sufficiently safe. Nonetheless, the literature advices that 
the next step in state-of-the-art accident causation research will be an in-depth look 
in what is considered “normal” operations and performance (Salmon et al., 2015).  
Something considered safe can be deemed risky under a scrutiny. Furthermore, as 
with most questionnaire studies, there are always concerns about respondents’ 
honesty and openness even though a lot has been done to induce it in this survey.  
Even though the results mostly corroborate the findings of the past incident analysis, 
several unusual results were found. Those can be mostly attributed to the 
participants’ assessments of the statements and their answers in the rest of the 
questionnaire. It is possible that the statements were not worded correctly. The 
attempt to vary wording of similar questions might have introduced a difference in 
ways how the participants perceived a situation described in a statement. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the drivers have failed to associate themselves with 
some statements due to lack of particular experience, survey time constraints and 
other factors. The above expressed concerns about openness also apply here as the 
participants could have been biased in order to show their confidence and good level 
of knowledge. When the questions were non-personal, e.g. marking questions, the 
drivers might be more inclined to give unbiased answers.  
Fisher’s exact test was used to see whether answers in the marking questions 
influence participants’ attitudes towards some of the statements. Even though 
several statistically significant relationships exist none of the expected ones are 
significant, e.g. relationship between the GPL marks and statements 18, 25 and 26. 
This demonstrates that the drivers approach these questions with separate mind-sets 
and see different underlying structure to those.  
It is important to explore ways how to investigate drivers’ interaction with the physical 
environment without biases introduced by drivers’ willingness to express certain 
agenda or lack of it. When assessing the questionnaire, a driver has enough time to 
consider what his/her answers can achieve or what consequences those might have. 
Moreover, a retrospective assessment of a situation can be different to a real-time 
one. Hence methods that would provide insights into drivers’ performance in real time 
should be explored. Moreover, these methods should be non-intrusive and facilitate 
real-time driving process without major alterations in order to avoid different types of 
statistical errors. One of the methods, which suits this description is eye-tracking 
when drivers’ performance is assessed based on their gaze patterns.   
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6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter presents a collection of drivers’ attitudes towards specific design 
features implemented in Tyne & Wear Metro. Many of these elements are used in 
other urban rail systems in one form or another which allows transferability of the 
results and methodology. Some of the elements are considered for implementation, 
e.g. DOO operations. The results provide good overview of drivers’ assessment of 
such features and associated PSFs.  
The approach of providing drivers with specific hypotheses based on previous 
research helps identifying links between different PSFs.  The questionnaire results 
show high level of agreement with the hypotheses set from the historic incident data. 
Moreover, the findings are often in line with wider human factors research 
corroborating similar failure mechanisms to other safety related industries. 
Correlation can be seen between the drivers’ selected causal factors and results of 
previous work in the area. The participants confirm that many features of the 
immediate physical environment in Tyne & Wear Metro have relatively low 
satisfaction levels. The main differences with the previous human factors research 
are found in areas of monotony of a task, effects of experience levels and tunnel 
exit/entrance.  
Even though the drivers generally do not believe that there is a risk associated with 
the offered statements, it is definite that the respondents can discriminate between 
elements of the system design in terms of ergonomics. There are concerns about 
drivers’ being able to answer “personalised” statements with full honesty due to 
discrepancies in assessment of different elements. However, it is possible that even 
the lowest marked elements are still considered safe but not in comparison with other 
elements.  
Researchers in human factors start focusing on “normal operations” in order to reveal 
potentially hidden incident causation factors. Discrepancy between some contextual 
statements and marks demonstrates that drivers might not be able to assess the 
situations offered in the questionnaire due to method limitations. This strongly implies 
that further work should be pursued on a cognitive level, where drivers’ statements 
(from this chapter) are compared to their actions. Such comparison will not only 
provide an additional dimension to the above results but also can reveal hidden 
causal mechanisms which could be overlooked in the questionnaire study. Moreover, 
it is necessary to understand whether drivers’ discrimination between similar 
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locations is driven only by personal and organisational factors, or there are small 
design discrepancies which affect that too.  
The results highlight a number of areas with future research potential. In terms of 
design features and with historic incident composition in mind, station layouts show 
high potential of safety improvements if associated PSFs are investigated. Different 
station types, positions of running signals and DOO equipment are some of the 
areas, which should be prioritised for research on a cognitive level.  Other avenues to 
explore include environmental effects on DOO infrastructure, reduction of noise and 
other distractions in a cab, door controls. Sequence and duration of speed limits 
should be given consideration too. Signalling types need to be studied further in 
terms of usability and ease of use. Passenger levels and associate distraction show 
significant importance on drivers’ performance in different (not only station-related) 
safety-critical tasks.  
The questionnaire demonstrates importance of drivers’ personal experiences in 
assessing different situations. Previous incident involvement often makes drivers 
more critical towards adverse effects posed by the physical environment. It is 
important to learn more about this relationship in order to explore its potential 
inclusion into a driver training process. Furthermore, this work shows that metro 
systems could benefit from raising awareness of the risk-bearing locations among the 
front line staff. Such awareness should improve the existing route knowledge but 
should not be overbearing to avoid shifting a focus of the safety-related performance 
only to certain poorly performing locations. Finally, concerns about drivers’ 
experience and confidence with a degraded system and non-routine operations are 
corroborated. It is clear that route knowledge can be reinforced by driving experience 
in a degraded system as well as improved situational awareness.   
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Chapter 7. Eye-tracking investigation 
7.1 Introduction 
The results of Chapters 5 and 6 have identified potentially hazardous design features 
in Tyne & Wear Metro. However, the discrepancies between the historic incident 
statistics and drivers’ perceptions require assessing some of those results with more 
objective measures. The naturalistic design of the thesis implies the assessment to 
be carried out in the environment as close to the real operational environment as 
possible. Hence, non-intrusive methods providing objective data on drivers’ 
interaction with physical environment, preferably on a cognitive level, have been 
considered.  
In selection of a correct methodology, it is necessary to remember that train driving is 
a highly visual task (Naweed and Balakrishnan, 2013; Naumann et al., 2016). A train 
driver has to scan approaching physical environment for presence of hazards, 
warnings and imposed limits. This visual interaction between the driver and 
infrastructure means that the driver should not only see things but also be able to 
interpret and process those. Hence visual attention with its several domains is very 
important (Sturm et al., 1997). The domains are alertness, vigilance, selective and 
divided attention. Vigilance depends on a person’s ability to sustain alertness for 
prolonged periods of time to detect infrequent but relevant stimuli. However, long 
lasting tasks with frequent stimuli require sustained attention. Some researchers treat 
vigilance and sustained attention as the same domain (Strauss et al., 2006; Cheng et 
al., 2011). Sturm et al. (1997) define selective attention as the ability to focus only on 
certain features of a task while ignoring the rest of the task. Divided attention is an 
ability to spread the focus capacity across several tasks simultaneously.  
Task associated with train driving require the use of all of the attentional domains, i.e. 
monitoring the track for warning stimuli (signals, speed limits), being able to prioritise 
or divide focus based on the route knowledge, a rule book and personal experience. 
However, as indicated by the drivers’ responses, some design features might be 
harder to process hence fixation duration on those is expected to increase. Cheng et 
al. (2011) mention that hazardous situations arise from distractions of the visual 
attention. Such distractions can be internal or external based on variety of factors 
including concurrent tasks, workload, personal factors, experience and physical 
environment. According to Castro (2009), 90% of road traffic accidents happen due 
to issues with extraction of visual information and, in particular „I looked but did not 
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see it” scenario. Castro (2009) also concludes that information on visual behaviour of 
drivers and subsequent analysis provide a powerful tool to quantify attentional 
processes.  
7.1.1 Eye-tracking 
Jang et al. (2014) claim that the data on eye movement can be a window into human 
cognitive processes as such movements are controlled by cognition. This statement 
is based on original eye-mind theories such of Yarbus (1967), and Just and 
Carpenter (1976);  (1980).  According to these influential studies, person’s eye 
fixations on an object mean processing of that object by person’s cognition. As 
humans interact with visual world they are limited with capacity of human cognition 
and perception. Hence selection of most relevant information is happening based on 
current demands of a task. This selection is primarily taking place via the eye 
movements and is driven by top-down factors (Henderson et al., 2013; Borji and Itti, 
2014). Patterns of eye-movements are task-specific and “allow diagnostics of a task 
an observer is trying to perform” (p.788) (Borji et al., 2015). Complex design features 
increase visual demand and subsequent workload thus distracting from other tasks 
and altering visual patterns. The altered visual patterns can lead to train drivers 
neglecting safety-critical elements. Moreover, higher strain on visual attention can 
lead to the drivers being left with less time to extract information from other elements.  
The connection between human gazes and cognition, along with technological 
advancements, created a new field of human factors research that uses eye-tracking 
techniques as a non-intrusive way to study human performance and habits. An 
important advantage of the eye-tracking research methodologies is that fixations are 
involuntary and are not affected by instructions given to participants making the trials 
as close to reality as possible (Martens, 2000). This means opportunities for non-
biased data collection which is not affected by company safety culture, initiatives. 
Portable eye-trackers provide realistic and unencumbered interaction with the 
environment even in hospital emergency rooms (Szulewski and Howes, 2014). Eye-
tracking technique has been used in various safety-critical industries to study human 
behaviour, e.g. risk assessment and hazard identification by motorcycle drivers 
(Pradhan et al., 2005; Hosking et al., 2010), influence of experience in lane changing 
behaviour among car drivers (Underwood et al., 2002), human-computer interaction 
(Jang et al., 2014), path scanning strategies by aircraft pilots (Ottati et al., 1999).  
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Eye-tracking is a rather novel technique for the railway industry. Perhaps, a slow start 
in HF research also caused a lag in novel methodologies intake. Simmons (2015) 
claims that the rail industry had been conservative towards new technology in the 
past due to its “safety first” culture and budget constraints. However, the need to 
increase passenger throughput is changing the industry. Moreover, the technology 
was rather bulky and seemed intrusive at first, which is an obstacle in rather confined 
cab environments.  It became less of an obstacle only in 21st century with increase in 
portability of the devices. In comparison, active research in car drivers’ gaze 
behaviour started from 1970s (Kapitaniak et al., 2015). Nevertheless, several eye-
tracking studies conducted in rail industry. Groeger et al. (2001) and RSSB (2005) 
studied mainline train drivers’ visual strategies and reviewed minimum signal reading 
time through a series of eye-tracking experiments. However, RSSB data was 
summarised for 10 different routes meaning different PSFs were involved. Moreover, 
it only considered in-between stations driving. RSSB (2007b) re-used the previously 
collected eye-tracking data to study design features of 1 signal which had been 
passed at danger on numerous occasions. The study highlights poor sighting 
distance and others elements of physical environment competing for visual attention 
at that stretch of a line. Naghiyev et al. (2014) used eye-tracking to study introduction 
of in-cab signalling on train drivers’ visual strategies but the two experimental groups 
were compared on the basis of different routes.  
The number of eye-tracking studies in railway industry is small. It is nowhere near 
automotive, education and marketing research domains. This comparison clearly 
shows that the potential of eye-tracking has not been fully exploited yet in train 
driving research, particularly in relation to urban rail systems. The existing studies are 
mostly exploratory with many static (in relation to a driver) in-cab elements which is 
not representative of DOO driving. Milleville-Pennel et al. (2010) handled dynamically 
moving environment by utilising wide AOIs covering approximately 50% of a visual 
field and disregarding participants’ ability to move their heads. More driver head 
movements are expected in DOO systems.  
All of the above railway eye-tracking experiments happened in conjunction with other 
experimental methods. For example, Naghiyev et al. (2015) evaluate results of their 
eye-tracking study through a multi-step workshop. De Ceunynck et al. (2015) claim 
that the eye-tracking research has to be supported by other methods. The modern 
approach to eye behaviour assumes that the correlation between processing and 
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fixations is not perfect, and there might be a lag between those (Deubel, 2008; 
Beanland and Pammer, 2010; Holmqvist et al., 2011). Hence the results should be 
supported by other techniques.  
7.1.2 Variety of eye-tracking metrics 
The eye-tracking tools collect a wide variety of different metrics that focus both on 
fixations and saccadic movements (transitions between fixations). These metrics 
include fixation count and duration, time to first fixation, scan paths, pupil sizes and 
many more. Holmqvist et al. (2011) defines fixation as “a time remains still over a 
period of time” (p.21). The metrics related to fixation count and duration are the most 
popular metrics to use in modern studies (Jacob and Karn, 2003; Holmqvist et al., 
2011; Kapitaniak et al., 2015). As the eye-tracking body of knowledge is almost non-
existent in rail industry, it was decided to use the most popular metrics from other 
disciplines. This allows using data from other industries as a starting point for 
designing the experiment. According to previous research, all of the metrics provide 
information on cognitive processes. 
Number of fixations, or total fixation count (TFC), is a sum of fixations recorded on 
the area of interest (AOI) in a set period of time. High number of fixations can 
suggest semantic importance or informativeness of the AOI (Yarbus, 1967; 
Henderson and Hollingworth, 1999; Jacob and Karn, 2003; Poole et al., 2004). High 
TFC can also be a sign of difficulty in interpreting information (Ehmke and Wilson, 
2007; Holmqvist et al., 2011), complexity (Dzeng et al., 2016) and poor search 
efficiency (Goldberg and Kotval, 1999). Experience was found to be important factor 
affecting fixation count statistics. People with previous experience in the area under 
investigation tend to have less fixations (Megaw and Richardson, 1979; Reingold et 
al., 2001). However, there are studies showing that more experienced pilots have 
more fixations in a cockpit than novice pilots (Kasarkis et al., 2001). This does not 
contradict the previous theories about the connection between experience and a 
number of fixation though. It only shows that in some domains more experienced 
users employ more optimised strategies and reduce a number of unrequired fixations 
in non-critical areas or increase it in critical areas to double check the readings. 
Holmqvist et al. (2011) defines fixation duration as “a period of time when the eye is 
relatively still” (p.377). In reality, a human eye is rarely completely still and fixation 
durations are calculated by the fixation detection algorithm provided by developers of 
eye-tracking equipment. In this experiment Tobii I-VT fixation filter was used (Olsen, 
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2012).  It was responsible for detecting fixations and subsequent durations of those. 
Total fixation duration (TFD), also known as total visit duration or total dwell time, is a 
frequently used metric in eye-tracking research. Higher TFD on an object indicates 
object’s higher informativeness and participant’s interest in the object (Holmqvist et 
al., 2011). It also can indicate poorer situational awareness and uncertainty (Ottati et 
al., 1999). In usability studies, longer dwell time suggest difficulties with information 
extraction (Goldberg and Kotval, 1999). Similarly, research in reading domain shows 
that high TFD are indicative of more complex and less frequent words (Rayner, 
1998). Finally, an upcoming conscious choice is indicated by longer dwell times as 
people tend to fixate longer on something they going to pick from other objects 
(Shimojo et al., 2003). Hauland (2008) argues that dwell time is much better unit to 
investigate situational awareness as it represents cognitive meaning compared to a 
single fixation.  
Average fixation duration (AFD) for an area of interest is equal to TFD divided by 
TFC. As with other metrics, AFD statistics can indicate certain cognitive processes. 
Longer durations is a sign of deeper processing (Holmqvist et al., 2011), criticality of 
elements (Shinar et al., 1977; Harris and Christhilf, 1980), a sign of issues with 
information extraction (Holmqvist et al., 2011). At the same time, shorter fixations 
also indicate issues with information extraction due to higher mental workload and 
stress (Miura, 1990; Unema and Rotting, 1990; Van Orden et al., 2001), and usability 
problems. Holmqvist et al. (2011) makes a distinction between higher workload 
associated with higher AFD (which a human can complete without problems) and 
with lower AFD (causing performance issues due to additional stress).  
Researchers differentiate between fixations hence averaging fixation duration could 
mean mixing several types of cognitive processing together (Henderson et al., 1999; 
Holmqvist et al., 2011). Moreover, AFD was found to be the most affected by an 
individual. The AFD tends to remain similar in a repeat task (Andrews and Coppola, 
1999). Hence statistical analysis of the samples is more important than averaging 
across the samples. On the other hand, in the case of matched trials averaging can 
be sufficient as endogenous component is constant across the trials. The eye gaze 
analysis software used in the trial does not account for the recent discoveries on a 
lag between visual attention and a fixation which could be as big as ¼ of a second 
(Deubel, 2008; Holmqvist et al., 2011), where visual attention is moving faster. This 
lag should not however massively skew data for 10/15 seconds average and can 
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only affect fixations recorded in the last 250ms of a timeframe. Watching recordings 
demonstrated that drivers tend to shift their gaze to in-cab (speed, door controls) 
right after full stop or departure. As the study is not analysing sequences and 
patterns of fixations, it is assumed that fixations equal cognitive processing.  
7.2 Methodology 
Section 7.1.2 reports a strong connection between eye-tracking metrics and workload 
and stress. Lindner (2013) claims that infrastructural parameters and constraints can 
influence a set of PSFs contributing to human errors. Hence contributions to 
workload/stress from the physical environment can be studied through the eye-
tracking research. This can be done by direct comparison between locations with 
different design features.  
The results of the previous chapters propose many areas for the eye-tracking 
investigation. However, many of those had to be excluded due to limitations 
presented by available eye-tracking equipment, e.g. underground operations. A 
number of trial runs conducted before the study showed that low resolution 
(640x480) and poor camera quality does not allow good data collection in those parts 
of the system. Hence research locations were chosen based on covering as many 
design features highlighted in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 as possible and fitting with 
eye-tracker parameters.  
  
104 
 
7.2.1 Stations 
Four stations have been selected for the study. Those are Pelaw, Heworth, Felling 
and Gateshead Stadium. Twenty runs were conducted between February and June 
2015. All of the runs were in the same direction from Pelaw to Gateshead Stadium. 
Figure 11Figure 14 below provide outline schemes of the stations under 
investigation. The diagrams are not to scale.  
The exploratory character of the study meant that the stations were selected on the 
basis of:  
• Difference in patronage levels (Heworth and Pelaw – the highest, Felling – the 
lowest), 
• A mix of built-over and overground stations, 
• A mix of open and confined layouts, 
• A mix station types, 
• Different locations of a mirror and a running signal in respect to a stopping 
position,  
• Different location of a stopping position in respect to a platform’s edge. 
Such variety of station designs should be sufficient to explore drivers’ performance in 
different station layouts and draw some hypotheses for further investigation. 
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Figure 11. Layout of Pelaw station (Type 2) 
 
Figure 12. Layout of Heworth station (Type 1) 
106 
 
 
Figure 13. Layout of Felling station (Type 2) 
 
Figure 14. Layout of Gateshead Stadium station (Type 2) 
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7.2.2 Participants 
Four drivers participated in the study. All of the participants are drivers responsible 
for training and were selected for their experience. This was done to avoid 
differences in gaze behaviour based on experience and route knowledge. Personal 
factors such as various health conditions and dysfunctions (Coeckelbergh et al., 
2002), and age (Ho et al., 2001) can also affect fixation patterns. These factors were 
also taken into account during a candidate selection process.  
7.2.3 Areas of interest  
Four elements of stations’ physical environment, which are present at all four of 
stations under investigation, are selected as areas of interest (AOI). Those are: 
• Mirrors, 
• Stopping position markers, 
• Platforms, 
• Running signals 
For departures only the mirrors and the signals are analysed as those are the only 
elements visible to a driver. Holmqvist et al. (2011) report that the best practice is to 
have margins between AOIs and no overlapping AOIs. The latter is achieved by 
carefully specifying AOIs in the analysis software but the former cannot be controlled 
in in-field experiment. The raw data is analysed in Tobii Studio software.  
The timeframe analysed with respect to these AOIs is 15 seconds before a complete 
station stop. A preliminary investigation showed that 15 seconds is approximately the 
time from station entry to the complete stop. Moreover, 15 seconds intervals were 
used by RSSB (2005) before. As in many locations drivers approach a station from a 
curve, it is assumed that participants do not focus on the AOIs prior to this timeframe. 
For the departures 10 seconds timeframe was selected after consultations with 
drivers. The cut-off point used for departures is a moment when a train starts moving.  
When station approaches are considered, the AOIs under investigation are dynamic. 
In other words, the position of the AOIs in respect to a driver’s position changes as a 
train drives forward. As the equipment and software do not have automatic tracking 
of dynamic AOIs, such AOIs can be manually adjusted and analysed (Holmqvist et 
al., 2011). To do so, the 15-seconds timeframe is split into 3-seconds timeframes 
where positions of AOI are adjusted to reflect the change in relative position. Some 
AOIs are not defined until the second or third timeframe as their size is too small to 
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create any meaningful statistics. The TFD measure is the most resilient to the issues 
caused by the chosen analysis method as it is rarely affected by splitting the 
approach timeframe. Such split can create double accounting of fixations (affecting 
AFD) but not TFDs.  
According to Kapitaniak et al. (2015) conspicuity (ability to detect objects) is affected 
by instructions and search targets. The searched object is 3 times more visible than 
an object observed independently (Bremond, 2000). On the other hand, the research 
by Bremond (2000) focused on car driving and roadside environment where visual 
clutter is higher and this can affect gaze performance (Ho et al., 2001). The AOIs 
chosen for this study form physical environment required to carry out arrival and 
departure tasks safely. Hence there should be no discrepancy between the AOIs in 
terms of conspicuity.  
7.2.4 Metrics 
As shown in Section 7.1.2 there is a wide variety of eye-tracking metrics. Some of 
those can suggest completely opposite trends based on the literature review. On the 
other hand, one can note that some measures indicate similar things. High TFC, 
similarly to high AFD, can be a sign of importance or criticality of an object, higher 
semantic value. High TFC can also indicate difficulties in interaction with physical 
environment and information extraction, and inefficient search strategies. These 
usually correlate with additional workload and stress thus causing lower AFD. 
According to Kapitaniak et al. (2015) “overall increase in requirements and 
complexity of the task tends to reduce AFD and increase TFC” (p.950). Crundall et al. 
(1998) conducted a series of eye-tracking experiments on different types of roads to 
show that a busy sub-urban road (going through a village) leads to a higher sampling 
rate (high TFC/low AFD), compared to empty rural roads. They assumed, based on 
previous research, that driving on such suburban roads would increase task 
demands due to a visual clutter, and subsequently increase cognitive demands. 
Crundall et al. (1998) also referred to the research by Beck (1985), who showed that 
anxiety in people leads to more active search strategies. The higher sampling rate 
can be considered a part of such strategies.  
A different experiment with a group of trainee anaesthetists, Schulz et al. (2011) used 
a simulated critical incident to increase mental workload. The results showed that 
fixation durations rise in a routine part of a surgery but start decreasing as an 
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unexpected event progresses. Such events are associated with the highest mental 
workload experienced by participants.  
Based on the above research, drop in TFC and an increase in AFD should indicate 
usability improvements. Lower TFC/higher AFD has been proven to be an indicator 
of expertise. Reingold and Charness (2005) showed that expert chess players 
require fewer fixations of a similar length than novice players. Savelsbergh et al. 
(2002) also demonstrated that more experienced football goalkeepers employ search 
strategies with fewer but longer fixations before a penalty kick. Both studies suggest 
that previous experience helps in developing more sophisticated search strategies 
where the same amount of information is extracted from fewer AOIs (a narrower field 
of search). This can be inferred as supporting reduced workload in the low TFC/high 
AFD, assuming that more sophisticated and efficient search strategies should reduce 
anxiety and workload. In order to avoid the effects of previous expertise, only 
experienced driver coaches were selected for the trials.  
7.2.5 Eye-tracker 
According to Hessels et al. (2015), Tobii manufacture the most popular eye-tracking 
devices in Northwest Europe. “Tobii Glasses” (first generation) eye-tracker was used 
in the experiment.  Figure 15 below shows one of the participants wearing the set. 
The eye-tracking set consists of eye-tracking glasses and a recording device. 
 
Figure 15. One of the participants wearing Tobii glasses in a metrocar cab 
The set has 30 hz sampling frequency and uses a 9-point calibration algorithm which 
is performed before each trial. The sampling frequency provided by the set is not 
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great, compared to 60+ Hz eye-trackers available on the market. Andersson et al. 
(2010) demonstrated a reverse relationship between a sampling frequency and a 
probability of a measurement error. With a frame produced every 33ms, all of the 
differences below this parameter should be treated with caution.  
7.2.6 Various samples and data quality 
Even though in-field eye-tracking studies can provide rich data sets, those also suffer 
from limited controls (De Ceunynck et al., 2015). The trials were designed in a way 
that tried to exclude as many uncertainties as possible. The participants were of 
similar experience, ethnical background, gender and had good eye vision. Even then, 
out of 26 trials only 20 were considered successful upon preliminary inspection of 
recordings. Factors that influenced exclusion of trials were direct sunshine and 
drivers adjusting position of the eye-tracker (without re-calibration) during the 
experiment. According to Holmqvist et al. (2011), loss of up to 32% of the participants 
had been reported previously thus losing 20% of the participants can be considered a 
good result. Moreover, Sodhi et al. (2002) lost 80% of the trials due to data quality 
but the study used even more inferior eye-tracking devices. However, there were 
concerns with data quality of the retained experiments due to two reasons.  
Firstly, the trials returned different sample retention rate. This measure is calculated 
by Tobii Studio software and means percentage of frames recorded with eye-tracking 
data. Three trials were found to have this measure of less than 50%. RSSB (2005) 
had to exclude more 40% of the sample in order to achieve 84% sample retention 
rate. It is important to note that due to risks associated with field trials, a terminus to 
terminus journey was recorded and this metric is presented for the entire recording, 
from the beginning of the trial (at South Hylton or South Shields) to Gateshead 
Stadium part. Secondly, the starting terminus for the trials was different meaning that 
some drivers were driving for 30 minutes before reaching the section of the system 
under investigation whereas other drivers only for one minute.  
The statistical analysis showed that neither of these two factors influenced results as 
different samples (excluding experiments affected by these factors) trialled against 
the whole sample did not show any statistical difference. Moreover, no statistical 
relationship between the variables changed after reducing a sample size. Hence it 
was decided to present only results for the entire sample (20 runs). 
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Upon visual inspection of the recordings, it was noted that some of the eye fixation 
marker is clearly offset from fixation locations. According to Holmqvist et al. (2011), it 
is acceptable to repair this data by offsetting the AOIs in a similar way. The offset 
was found using departure recordings, as the participants are stationary and relative 
position is constant.  
7.2.7 Analysis  
As the data for station arrivals was split into five smaller timeframes, it is first 
summed up to produce statistics for the 15-seconds timeframes. The datasets 
containing 48 and 24 variables are created for arrivals and departures respectively.  
The variety of station layouts allow comparison of the same AOIs at different stations. 
This is done in two stages. Firstly, the data is explored using descriptive statistics for 
all metrics. Next, the uncovered relationships are tested using Paired Samples T-test 
or Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. The tests are selected based on normality of the 
variables. According to Moore et al. (2009) “sample size strongly influences the P-
value of a test” (p.465) when it comes to comparison of means. They claim that 
effects with p-values slightly larger than widely acknowledged 0.05 can become 
statistically significant (at 95% confidence interval) in larger samples. Considering the 
small sample of trials (N=20) and even smaller sample of participants (N=4), it is 
necessary to report p-value of up to 0.1 to minimise probability of Type II error 
(accepting null hypothesis when it is false). Even studies with bigger samples 
reported findings on p-level of 0.1 (Aitchinson and Davies, 2009). Tripathi and 
Borrion (2016) demonstrated through sensitivity analysis how increase in sample size 
can make affect the null hypothesis.  
Additional statistical tests (Kruskal-Wallis H test) are performed using secondary 
factors recorded during the experiments. Those factors are weather and individual 
participant’s ID. The weather is presented by three categories: rainy, cloudy and 
sunny. The ID allows testing whether personal factors affect gaze performance even 
when participants are carefully selected to provide uniformity of a sample. Naghiyev 
et al. (2014) showed that train drivers’ visual strategies are not uniform. However, the 
authors do not mention whether any controls were applied to provide uniformity of the 
participant pool.  
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Arrivals for all elements under investigation 
According to Figure 16 the participants spend more time fixating on the AOIs at 
Heworth and Gateshead stadium. As it is demonstrated further in this chapter, the 
most difference arises from TFD on platforms. Other elements of physical 
environment (in-cab, scenery and track) potentially detract from the AOIs too.  
When paired samples T-Test (all variables are normally distributed) is performed 
(Table 20), the only statistically significant difference is found between Felling and 
Heworth. Another two differences (Felling – Gateshead Stadium and Heworth – 
Pelaw) are close to statistical significance with p-value<.085. The results of the t-test 
show that the drivers definitely spend least time fixating on the AOIs at Felling and 
the most time at Heworth.  
 
Figure 16. TFD for all AOIs at each station (arrivals) 
 
Pe
la
w
 
H
ew
or
th
 
Fe
lli
ng
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Felling -1.104 -2.647**  
G. Stad 1.157 -.986 -2.005* 
Table 20 Paired samples T-Test result for TFD on all AOIs (arrivals). *p<0.1, **p<0.05 
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7.3.2 Mirrors during arrivals 
Figures 17-19 below provide a summary of TFD, TFC and AFD statistics for the 
mirrors across all locations. Drivers spend less time looking on Heworth mirror 
compared to other stations. Gateshead Stadium mirror has slightly higher TFD than 
other locations. Pelaw and Felling show relative reverse proportionality for TFC and 
AFD statistics, effectively showing higher TFC and lower AFD than other stations. 
This is more pronounced for Pelaw than for Felling, both Type 2 stations.  
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Figure 17. TFD on mirrors during arrivals 
 
Figure 18. TFC on mirrors during arrivals 
 
Figure 19. AFD on mirrors during arrivals 
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7.3.3 Platforms during arrivals 
Figures 20-22 below provide a summary of TFD, TFC and AFD statistics for the 
platforms across the locations. A clear difference is demonstrated in terms of TFD 
measures. Heworth and Gateshead have considerably higher gaze durations on the 
platforms than Pelaw and Felling. Relative proportionality is shown by Heworth 
platform having both the highest TFC and AFD. The platform at Felling receives the 
least fixations but has higher AFD than Gateshead Stadium and Pelaw. Compared to 
Felling, Pelaw has higher TFC but marginally lower AFD.  
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Figure 20. TFD on platforms during arrivals 
 
Figure 21. TFC on platforms during arrivals 
 
Figure 22. AFD on platforms during arrivals 
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7.3.4 Signals during arrivals 
Figures 23-25 below provide a summary of TFD, TFC and AFD statistics for the 
running signals under investigation. The participants spend considerably less time 
looking on the signal at Gateshead Stadium compared to other stations. The AFD 
and TFC statistics is mostly proportional but Heworth shows higher TFC and lower 
AFD compared to Felling.  
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Figure 23. TFD on running signals during arrivals 
 
Figure 24. TFC on running signals during arrivals 
 
Figure 25. AFD on running signals during arrivals 
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7.3.5 Stopping position indicators during arrivals 
Figures 26-28 below provide a summary of TFD, TFC and AFD statistics for the 
stopping position indicators under investigation. Heworth shows the highest TFD on 
this element whereas Gateshead Stadium has the lowest. Average fixation durations 
have only minor differences for all stations but Gateshead Stadium, where 
approximately 50% decrease in this metric can be observed. Moreover, the station 
demonstrates the highest TFC on the stopping position indicator among all locations.  
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Figure 26. TFD on stopping position markers during arrivals 
 
Figure 27. TFC on stopping position markers during arrivals 
 
Figure 28. AFD on stopping position markers during arrivals 
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7.3.6 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for AOIs during arrivals 
As Table 21 below shows, only some of the arrival variables showed any statistically 
significant difference between the locations. Out of 24 relationships, 5 are statistically 
different for TFD, 5 – for TFC and 1 – for AFD at 95% confidence interval. When it is 
reduced to 90%, another 6 differences are found. In terms of elements, the majority 
of differences are found for platforms (TFC and TFD). AFD on Gateshead Stadium 
signal is different to signals at all other stations. Heworth mirror demonstrates 
statistically significant difference with all other mirrors in terms of total gaze duration 
on it. The signals do not demonstrate any difference between locations.  
  Metric 
  TFD TFC AFD 
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Heworth -1.979**   -2.235**   -1.008   
Felling -0.093 -1.717*  -.699 -1.463  -.243 -.224  
G.Stad -.448 -1.867* -.635 -.549 -1.225 -.048 -1.941* -.597 -1.792* 
Pl
at
fo
rm
 
Heworth -2.856**   -2.639**   -1.419   
Felling -1.494 -3.173**  -1.820* -3.685**  -.560 -.560  
G.Stad -2.501** -1.568 -2.333** -2.803** -1.431 -2.991** -.597 -1.456 -.560 
Si
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Heworth -.157   -.206   -.235   
Felling -.078 -.157  -.420 -.233  -.471 -.408  
G.Stad -1.479 -.756 -.863 -.863 -.511 -1.026 -1.071 -.979 -1.02 
St
op
.P
os
. 
Heworth -.871   -.477   -.457   
Felling -.149 -.037  -.263 -.177  -.336 -.149  
G.Stad -.610 -1.112 -1.408 -.257 -.810 -.317 -1.917* -2.343** -1.730* 
Table 21. Difference in gaze behaviour at different locations (arrivals). *p<0.1, **p<0.05 
7.3.7 Departures for all elements under investigation 
Figure 29 below shows TFD on all for elements at each location. Heworth shows the 
highest TFD with almost 80% of the analysed departure time spent fixating on either 
the mirror or the signal. In terms of the lowest TFD, Felling and Pelaw show 
comparable results. The TFD value at Gateshead Stadium is between the lowest and 
the highest results.  
122 
 
Results of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (Table 22) confirm the lowest TFD at 
Felling. However, there is no statistically significant difference between Heworth and 
other stations at even p<0.1. The difference between Heworth and Pelaw shows p-
value close to 0.1 but still higher.  
 
Figure 29. TFD for all AOIs at each station (departures) 
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Heworth -1.605   
Felling -1.120 -2.315**  
G. Stad -1.419 -.672 -1.661* 
Table 22. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test result for TFD on all AOIs (departures). *p<0.1, **p<0.05 
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7.3.8 Mirrors during departures 
Figures 30-32 below summarise TFD, TFC and AFD statistics for the mirrors on 
departures. The participants spend the most time looking on the mirror at Heworth, 
and the least looking on the mirror at Felling. Pelaw and Gateshead Stadium mirrors 
had TFD in-between the highest and the lowest results, with the mirror at Gateshead 
Stadium showing slightly higher TFD. The TFC/AFD statistics is proportional at all 
stations but Pelaw, where the second highest TFC and the lowest AFD numbers are 
observed.  
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Figure 30. TFD on mirrors during departures 
 
Figure 31. TFC on mirrors during departures 
 
Figure 32. AFD on mirrors during departures 
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7.3.9 Signals during departures 
Figures 33-35 below summarise TFD, TFC and AFD statistics for the mirrors across 
all locations. In terms of TFD, the signal at Pelaw shows the lowest values with the 
signal at Heworth showing almost double of it. The signal at Felling attracts almost 
similar amount of gaze time to Heworth signal. On contrary to the mirrors results, 
reverse proportionality is observed for all stations but Pelaw, where both metrics 
(TFC/AFD) are the lowest in the sample. Heworth signal demonstrates higher 
TFC/lower AFD scenario. Gateshead Stadium signal shows an opposite trend.  
  
126 
 
 
Figure 33. TFD on signals during departures 
 
Figure 34. TFC on signals during departures 
 
Figure 35. AFD on signals during departures 
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7.3.10 Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for AOI on departure 
Table 23 below provides a summary of Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test results for 
departure elements for all three metrics. Only one statistically significant difference is 
found between TFD on mirrors at Felling and Heworth when p-value < 0.05. 
Relationships for Pelaw-Felling signals TFD and Pelaw-Heworth signals TFC are 
close to statistical significance with p-values slightly higher than 0.05.  
  Metric 
  TFD TFC AFD 
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Heworth -1.475   -.132   -1.307   
Felling -.859 -1.979**  -1.518 -1.507  -.075 -.896  
G. Stad -.709 -1.307 -1.083 -.525 -.787 -.732 -1.120 -.411 -1.568 
Si
gn
al
 
Heworth -1.350   -1.912*   -.631   
Felling -1.670* -.187  -1.260 -1.149  -.704 -.280  
G. Stad -1.006 -.168 -.161 -1.082 -1.391 -.186 -1.408 -1.307 -1.489 
Table 23. Difference in gaze behaviour at different locations (departures). *p<0.1, **p<0.05 
7.3.11 Failure to check signals 
Analysing the descriptive statistics for the departure variables (histograms) as a part 
of normality tests revealed one major risk factors. The histograms for the signals 
show at least one occasion of not fixating at a signal at each of the stations.  
In comparison to arrivals, Tyne & Wear Metro drivers are obliged to check a running 
signal twice before departing from a station – before closing doors and before pulling 
out of a station. The semi-interviews confirm that both of these checks usually 
happen within 10 seconds before the departure. 
In total 11 occasions of no fixations at a signal are registered in 80 recorded 
departure routines. Pelaw has five incidents of this kind, Felling – three, Heworth – 
two and Gateshead Stadium – one. There is no individual offender with all the 
participants registering at least one violation. Taking into account significant 
experience of the participants, it is necessary to check effects of the sampling quality 
on these cases.  
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Even though it was mentioned before that the sampling measure was not found to 
have any effect on neither descriptive statistics nor statistical tests, these factors 
have influence on signal fixations on departure. 15% of trials (with <50% sampling 
measure) have 36% of failures to check a signal on departure. When such trials are 
excluded, the seven failures to check signals are divided this way: Pelaw – three, 
Felling and Heworth – two, Gateshead Stadium – zero. 
7.3.12 Influence of personal and environmental factors 
The results of Kruskal Wallis H test for dependence on personal and environmental 
factors can be seen in Table 24 for TFD variables, Table 25 for TFC variables and 
Table 26 for AFD variables. The proportion of the variables found dependant on 
different factors is presented in Table 27 with respect to different metrics, AOIs and 
locations. Personal factors are found to have more effect on gaze behaviour than 
environmental factors, especially at arrivals. Dependence on environmental factors is 
more pronounced on departures. Expanding p-value to 0.1 increases number of 
significant relationships with personal factors more than with environmental. 
However, the number of new relationships uncovered is relatively small.  
TFD  Arrival Departure 
Factor AOI 
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Mirror 9.000** 8.551** 3.476 2.458 7.037* 8.323* 15.199** 13.740** 
Platf. 8.946** 9.219* 9.857** 12.540**     
Signal 15.506** 1.78 5.175 6.271* 2.244 3.900 2.619 4.633 
StopP. 10.269** 13.632** 11.939** 11.690**     
En
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n.
 
Mirror 1.709 2.161 2.304 3.071 .654 4.789* 5.859* 2.578 
Platf. 4.477 .732 .058 3.369     
Signal .953 1.548 .948 3.507 6.354** 5.616* 1.940 8.354** 
StopP. 1.267 2.779 2.482 3.169     
Table 24. Dependence of TFD variables on personal and environmental factors. *p<0.1; **p<0.05 
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TFC  Arrival Departure 
Factor AOI 
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Mirror 3.665 8.708** 1.279 6.268* 5.305 7.638* 12.629** 4.650 
Platf. 10.426** 10.177** 6.396* 8.591**     
Signal 9.793** .758 6.011 5.382 3.205 4.096 4.078 3.247 
StopP. 15.318** 12.872** 9.948** 11.585**     
En
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n.
 
Mirror 1.833 4.245 .647 .775 4.063 .052 8.112** 3.370 
Platf. 3.112 .838 .670 2.760     
Signal .352 .962 1.275 3.189 1.037 6.044** 1.671 3.153 
StopP. .834 .982 8.205** 1.304     
Table 25. Dependence of TFC variables on personal and environmental factors. *p<0.1; **p<0.05 
 
AFD  Arrival Departure 
Factor AOI 
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Mirror 11.980** 2.161 10.269** 10.226** 4.605 9.405** 8.524** 11.446** 
Platf. 6.682* 4.055 9.103** 6.471*     
Signal 9.654** 1.790 4.083 6.442* 1.887 3.156 .621 1.853 
StopP. 5.002 10.318** 5.049 5.009     
En
vi
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n.
 
Mirror .826 1.011 .857 3.149 .401 1.929 6.354** 1.083 
Platf. 4.557 1.149 .144 1.521     
Signal .811 2.740 .685 3.456 1.016 4.271 2.961 9.311** 
StopP. .756 4.460 .181 3.764     
Table 26. Dependence of AFD variables on personal and environmental factors. *p<0.1; **p<0.05 
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 Personal factors Environmental factors 
 Arrival Departure Arrival  Departure 
All metrics 54% 29% 2% 25% 
TFD 69% 38% 0% 25% 
TFC 56% 13% 4% 25% 
AFD 44% 38% 0% 25% 
Mirror 50% 58% 0% 17% 
Platform 67%  0%  
Signal 25% 0% 0% 33% 
Stopping position 75%  8%  
Pelaw 75% 0% 0% 17% 
Heworth 58% 33% 0% 17% 
Felling 42% 50% 8% 33% 
Gateshead Stad. 42% 33% 0% 33% 
Table 27. Summary of importance of personal and environmental factors by metric, location and AOI 
(p<0.05 only) 
7.4 Discussion  
7.4.1 Drivers’ preferred areas of interest during arrivals 
The mirrors are the main area of visual attention (based on TFD) at all stations but 
Heworth. At Heworth the participants look at the platform for longer times than any 
other AOI. This is the station with the second highest passenger loadings among all 
selected locations. It is also the only station where the mirror is on the same side as 
the platform. Such layout means that the mirror can be obscured by passengers until 
later into an arrival timeframe. It is also possible that the two AOIs receive some error 
fixations due to being very close together. The overall statistics from other stations 
shows that the drivers use mirrors to determine a stopping point otherwise looking on 
those for so long is pointless on arrivals. It is necessary for them to select a stopping 
position that allows carrying out departure procedures safely, e.g. good visibility of 
the platform-train interface.  
The drivers approximately spend 30% of their 15-seconds arrival sequence on either 
saccades or looking outside the AOIs. These outside areas could be a track, scenery 
or in-cab indicators. However, the more built up stations (Heworth and Gateshead 
Stadium) show higher TFD on all four AOIs, showing that the scenery fixations could 
account for up to two seconds at overground locations. Tyne & Wear Metro stations 
differ in terms of openness feel. The results of T-test confirm that there is a difference 
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between open and confined layout stations. More condensed grouping of the AOIs 
influences the TFD due to reduction in saccadic movements and transition time 
between the design elements.  
For open layout stations (Pelaw and Felling) a stopping position marker becomes the 
second most looked at AOI. According to GI/RT7033 (Railway Group Standards, 
2009) the recommended dimensions for platform stop markers is only 300x250mm 
with visibility requirement of only two seconds. The results show the metro drivers 
fixating on all of the markers for more than two seconds and those being visible 
significantly earlier. This shows an important difference between conventional 
mainline railways and DOO systems where it is necessary to provide drivers with 
increased flexibility of stopping positions. Moreover, when the DOO equipment is 
used as a stopping position benchmark, 2-second visibility is too small as it does not 
factor issues of divided attention between the mirrors and the markers.  
In absolute values, the TFD for a stopping position indicator is slightly lower at 
Gateshead Stadium even though the station also has an island platform. The 
confined nature of the station contributes to more gazes at the platform. It was 
observed during the tests that the drivers do not use the marker at Gateshead 
Stadium as a stopping position. They usually stop further down the platform, with the 
first set of doors being next to the marker. It was not the case at other locations. With 
the participants prioritising the mirrors as a stopping aide, the incorrectly positioned 
stopping marker becomes only a general benchmark and loses its informativeness. 
Total fixation duration tends to decrease with loss of informativeness (Afrooz et al., 
2014). Drivers’ attention to the platform at Gateshead Stadium can be caused by a 
passenger access ramp on the right hand side and a retaining wall on a left hand 
side. These design elements along with a bridge in front and a ticketing area on top 
create confined physical environment where the same trends as at Heworth apply.  
The participants fixate the least on running signals which is unexpected as the 
drivers clearly indicated checking the signals on arrival in the questionnaires (Section 
6.3.1). This discrepancy indicates that the drivers might have been trying to answer 
the questionnaire in a way they thought to be correct. Morrel-Samuels (2002) claims 
that such behaviour is not unique and answer favourable skewness can be a sign of 
anonymity concerns. However, in a more demanding environment of an operational 
railway, checking something which is not required can be skipped in order to address 
more critical tasks.  
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The lowest signal TFD is observed at Gateshead stadium. The running signal there is 
located on the longitudinal point as the mirror. As the drivers get closer to a stopping 
point, the angle between the signal, the cab and the mirror becomes wider. The 
concept of such angle is demonstrated in Figure 36, where it is depicted in red. As 
the angle gets wider, the signal and the mirror move further apart in a driver’s field of 
view (FOW). Hence saccadic movements become longer and less time can be 
devoted to fixations. The FOW angle is smaller at Felling than any other station with 
an island platform and it shows in the highest TFD on a running signal.  
The smallest FOW angle can be seen at Heworth where a driver’s cab is on the 
same side as the mirror and the signal, but it does not result in the highest TFD. It is 
possible that the total distance of the signal from the stopping position is simply too 
big at Heworth making this AOI less relevant for the drivers during the stopping 
procedure. Groeger et al. (2001) showed that mainline train drivers fixate on a signal 
8 seconds before reaching it, which means at least 250 m (at 100 km/h). On entering 
Heworth station (from a curve) drivers are never more than 150 m away from a 
signal. However, the research in mainline railways only considers between station 
signals which do not have to compete with the PTI-related tasks. Hence it is possible 
to assume that signal sighting distance on station approaches, especially in DOO 
systems, reduces significantly.  
It is also important to note that due to relatively low values for TFD on running 
signals, these results should be taken with caution. The eye-tracker’s low sampling 
frequency can cause an error of up to 33ms which is more than 15% in case of 
Gateshead Stadium signal. The results are not supported by statistical tests too. It 
was also expected for the drivers to fixate more frequently on Pelaw signal due to 
convergence of 3 lines (including sidings) right before the station thus higher 
informativeness of this signal. However, the results report that drivers treat all of the 
signals similarly in terms of SA building.  
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Figure 36. FOW Angle between a signal, a driver and a mirror (in red) 
7.4.2 Elements inducing additional stress and workload during arrivals 
The methodology to test for stress-inducing physical environment is largely 
undeveloped in human factors domain. The high TFC/low AFD method used in this 
study is based on a collection of previous work which sometimes suggested 
controversial results. However, the author believes that this method is sufficient for 
exploratory study where only relative changes in usability are considered. This 
research area will definitely benefit from large scale testing which aims at 
establishing baseline values for eye-tracking metrics in usability studies. Moreover, 
agreeing the baseline values for “normal” operations will open endless possibilities 
for assessments of drivers using the eye-tracking devices (Milleville-Pennel et al., 
2010).  
In terms of mirrors, the open stations show signs of poorer usability. As other two 
stations in the study have the mirrors either under a structure or protected from direct 
sunlight or side wind, it is possible to assume that environmental factors are rather 
important. Even though the environmental factor assessment does not support these 
assumptions, there are fundamental flaws with the assessment as described below. 
The second PSF differentiating between the mirrors at open and confined stations is 
the slightly higher distance to the mirror at the former locations. With the mirrors of 
the same size, it can be expected for shorter distances to provide better views. On 
the other hand, it is unknown why the drivers do not ignore pre-defined stopping 
locations at the open stations similarly to Gateshead Stadium.  
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As drivers constantly switch their attention between the stopping position markers 
and the mirrors on arrival, usability of one should affect another. However, this 
relationship might not be as straightforward or proportional as one can expect. For 
example, the stopping indicator with poor informativeness at Gateshead Stadium 
allows drivers to interact easier with the mirror. On the other hand, the lower TFD at 
Heworth mirror (as the result of more attention attribution to the platform) means 
relatively better usability of the stopping position indicator. The stations, where TFD 
is high (compared to other stations) on both mirrors and the indicators, suffer from 
reduced usability of the main stopping-related element – the mirror. These 
observations suggest that low informativeness (and subsequent lower TFD) of one of 
the 2 AOIs responsible for safe stopping actually results in drivers prioritising their 
attention on only one of the elements. This helps avoiding a divided attention issue 
which is known to significantly increase stress and workload (Davies et al., 2013; 
Prottengeier et al., 2016). It is important to note that station arrival encompasses 
more than 2 concurrent monitoring tasks. Metro drivers also need to observe the PTI, 
control train’s motion, monitor the track for objects. Furthermore, stopping a train is 
also associated with increase in emotional workload (Myrtek et al., 1994). Even 
though Basacik et al. (2015) claim that station stop associated tasks can cause 
underload, neither of their “underload” scenarios is applicable to DOO systems.  
In terms of platforms, only Pelaw demonstrates signs of poor usability. These are 
based on only a marginal difference in AFD with Felling. The literature does not 
specify whether it is necessary to compare TFC/AFD ratios in situations when one of 
the metrics produces the same values. However, as discussed in the methodology 
(Section 7.2.4), both metrics can report the same in certain scenarios. For example, 
high TFC can be a sign of difficulty in information extraction (Ehmke and Wilson, 
2007; Holmqvist et al., 2011) but is more controversial when not supported by low 
AFD value. One factor which might have affected the results at Pelaw is location of 
the waiting area and consequent higher concentration of the passengers towards the 
back of the train. Concertation of passengers in only one part of a platform is a 
known risk which can be caused by station design (Cynk et al., 2015). At Pelaw, this 
leads to the drivers needing to scan large volumes of passengers on higher speeds. 
Fitzpatrick et al. (2010) showed that multi-tasking on higher speeds causes decline in 
car drivers’ performance. However, this is only applicable to the situation at Pelaw if 
observing each individual passenger is considered as a separate task.   
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The relationship between the signals at Heworth and Felling needs to be considered 
with caution due to factors described above. If the signal at Felling is in fact easier to 
interact with than Heworth signal, the distance between a stopping position and a 
signal becomes important PSF. However, the adverse effects are not directly 
proportional to the distance and only become pronounced after certain distance. 
Based on other locations, it is possible to note that distances in excess of 33m 
(Felling) are where this process starts.  
7.4.3 Trends in fixations during departures  
The statistical tests confirm the highest TFD on the AOIs at Heworth and the lowest 
TFD on the AOIs at Felling. The tests also show Gateshead Stadium having the 
second highest TFD on the AOIs. Once again, more confined stations get the highest 
gaze durations. For these stations increased TFD comes from longer fixations on the 
mirrors. Both Heworth and Gateshead Stadium have shorter distances between the 
mirrors and the stopping points.  
The drivers fixate on the mirrors for significantly longer than on the signals. It is 
possible that the drivers assume signals as a static element. If it is green (checked 
on approach or before the last 10 seconds) it normally will stay green. The area 
under investigation has no converging lines and turnback facilities only at Heworth. 
The mirrors represent dynamic environment which requires significantly more 
monitoring.  
Visual attention allocated to the AOIs is strongly associated with the FOW angle. The 
wide angle layouts primarily cause a drop in TFD on signals, which is shown by 
Gateshead Stadium and Pelaw. It is clear that drivers are willing to sacrifice signal 
checks to some extent in layouts requiring longer saccadic movements. In 
comparison to the indicator-mirror relationship on arrivals, the two AOIs on 
departures are both safety-critical and, in theory, cannot be skipped. Hence the issue 
of divided attention is further prompted by certain layouts and PSFs. This can 
manifest itself in more stressful interaction with one of the AOIs, as demonstrated by 
Pelaw mirror.  
7.4.4 Elements inducing additional stress and workload during departures 
The mirror at Pelaw has been highlighted as a problematic area before due to 
potential environmental factors. Similar layouts are used at Felling and Gateshead 
Stadium albeit a narrower FOW angle, and do not demonstrate mirror usability 
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issues. This corroborates importance of the FOW angle as PSF. Other factors, e.g. 
crowding at the back of the train and a closely located mirror can contribute to 
workload increase too. However, it is unknown to what extent each of these factors 
influence the usability of the mirror.  
Similarly to the arrivals, results for the running signal at Heworth are indicative of 
stress-inducing PSFs. Compared to other stations, it is located the furthest from the 
drivers. Assuming that the low TFC/high AFD suggests better usability of an element, 
there is a negative correlation between the distance to a running signal and signal’s 
usability.  
7.4.5 Failures to check signals during departures 
As it was mentioned before, start against a signal SPaDs are rather common in 
railway industry, especially on DOO commuter routes, and Tyne & Wear Metro is no 
exception. According to RSSB (2013), there were at least 39 SASSPaDs with 
passenger trains in the UK between 2010 and 2013. Moreover, SASSPaD risk is 
higher in DOO systems according to Basacik et al. (2009). As presented in Precursor 
Incident Model by  RSSB (2011b), many of driver-related accidents stem from 
smaller incident acting as precursors. In this particular situation, failures to check a 
signal aspect before departure can lead to SASSPaD under certain circumstances. 
However, it is necessary to assess how real is such proportion of violations on 
departure.    
The percentage of the violations found in trials with less than 50% sampling measure 
is out of proportion. All of the registered violations in those trials are recorded at 
stations with an island platform. Hence it is possible that the drivers were using side 
gazes to check a signal due to mainly focusing on a mirror. Such side gazes are 
rarely recorded, especially if an eye-tracking set is a little bit disturbed on a 
participant’s head. The same issue was observed by RSSB (2005) who reported a lot 
of lost data due to glares, equipment failures and side gazes. Drivers’ main areas of 
attention are located on the same side on arrivals. Hence no difference in descriptive 
statistics has been found when the 3 trials with low sampling quality are excluded 
from the analysis. This could be a reason for low TFC on arrival signals. However, 
this theory would mean Heworth having significantly higher signal metrics on arrivals, 
which is not the case.   
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Apart from technical issues embedded in methodology, it is known for people visual 
attention to travel ahead of fixations by about 0.25 seconds (Deubel, 2008; Holmqvist 
et al., 2011). Hence if participants wanted to fixate on a signal right before departure, 
the actual fixation could have happened after a train started moving (not analysed). 
Considering that there is a slight lag between applying a power and start of motion, it 
is possible to claim that the lag between visual attention and fixations is negligible for 
this experiment.  
Most importantly, whatever the reason for equipment not registering a fixation on a 
signal, even if one of these cases is a genuine violation or a lapse, this creates a 
significant risk factor for metro operations. This is especially important when lack of 
fixations on a running signal on arrival is taken into account. Even checking a signal 
10 seconds before departing, if other tasks are done in-between, cannot be safe.  
O'Connell et al. (2015) claim that dynamic occurrence of task demands can impact 
on individual’s ability to recall previous observation.  
Furthermore, the participants do not differ in ways how they interacted with the 
signals, especially on departure, meaning that if there is a problem, it is wide-spread.  
After the questionable violations are removed, the seven violations left are at stations 
where a running signal is located at least 30 metres away from a stopping position. It 
takes 7 to 10 seconds to cover 32m and 45m respectively metres from a complete 
stop. Hence the drivers, especially experienced drivers, might believe that they have 
time to check a signal and react even if they do it only after departure. However, 
Multer et al. (2015) claim that very responsive controls of electric trains mean more 
in-cab gazes for speed information monitoring and subsequent higher risk of SPaDs. 
If the drivers decide to divide the two tasks (safe dispatch and signal checking), they 
might find themselves in situations when other driving tasks draw their attention when 
a train is already in motion. It is also possible that the station stops and concurrent 
PTI demands simply cause a memory lapse, as station stops can cause 
disengagement from a driving task (Naweed and Rainbird, 2014). 
RSSB (2005) found that drivers’ experience does not affect visual behaviour on 
signals but only between station signals were checked. Tripathi and Borrion (2016) 
discovered that emphasising on-time performance affects metro drivers’ safety and 
security related performance. It also means that other competing goals can have 
similar effect on metro drivers’ performance. RSSB (2007b) claim that drivers are 
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highly motivated to check signals on departure and non-compliance is highly unlikely. 
On the other hand, another RSSB report highlights a risk of drivers departing a 
station without fully checking all doors closed due to time pressures (Basacik et al., 
2009). In DOO systems, where most risks are related to the PTI, the drivers might 
prioritise DOO equipment and skip signals due to other pressures. This demonstrates 
why same findings cannot always be applied to mainline railways and metro systems 
as a combination of design features and risk profiles can significantly affect drivers’ 
priorities. This is further supported by five out seven violations happening at the 
stations with significantly higher passenger loadings.  
As bigger distances do not correlate with increased number of failures to check a 
signal, it is possible that another design-related factor can have influence on failure 
propagation. This factor is the FOW angle. Felling and Pelaw, which have relatively 
high angles and distances, show the highest proportion of violations. In comparison, 
Heworth, where the distance is also high but the angle is significantly lower, does not 
have as many failures to check a signal.  
7.4.6 Personal and environmental factors 
The personal factors show considerably higher effect on drivers’ gaze performance 
compared to environmental factors, which are almost negligible. Each individual 
participant has different strategy looking on the most dynamic AOIs – platforms on 
arrival and mirrors on departure. Varied passenger levels might have contributed to 
this. This is supported by the fact that during arrivals the variability is mostly observed 
at the two most crowded stations – Pelaw and Heworth. The statistics also shows 
that number of passengers on platforms can influence interaction with other 
elements, namely stopping position indicators and potentially mirrors. The 
participants who are more cautious about the platform crowding might spend more 
time (TFD most varied metric) looking on platforms causing TFD on other AOIs to 
reduce. The results corroborate with previous research emphasising high importance 
of personal factors (Li, 2004; Gibson, 2016). 
AFD and TFC metrics demonstrate significantly lower percentage of statistically 
significant relationships with the personal factors than the TFD values. This is a 
positive result for the methodology taking into account concerns about assessment 
methodology of stress-inducing elements. However, it is important to note that 
different drivers did different number of trial runs which could have affected some of 
the results. Moreover, passenger levels encountered could be very different as this 
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not only depends on time of a trial but also presence of peak services (relieving 
passenger congestion) ahead and disruptions in the system.  
The environmental factors’ influence was rather low implying that sun is not the 
contributory factor at Pelaw for the mirror during departures. However, the drivers’ in 
their questionnaire assessment of contributory factors stated that the direct sunlight 
is the issue, not sun in general. As the trials were conducted in different time and 
different months, it is impossible to say in retrospective whether some of the trials 
had that issue or not. On the other hand, a measure for wind was not recorded. The 
issue of “shaky” mirrors was raised during the semi-structured interviews by the 
drivers. As it can be very windy in Tyne & Wear during any type of weather, the wind 
should be still considered a major contributory factor to poor usability of the mirrors at 
the open stations.  
7.4.7 Lack of statistically significant differences in mean values 
Some of the relationships discussed above are not statistically significant, i.e. for 
signals and stopping position indicators. The results were double-checked using Sign 
Test, which returned the same statistically significant relationships. Firstly, it is 
possible that the sample size was simply not big enough, which is known to have 
effect on statistical significance (Section 7.2.7). However, the expansion of 
significance parameter allowed unveiling more relationships where difference in 
variables is pronounced. Secondly, the selected eye-tracking device potentially 
created a lot of deviation in the results making harder to find statistical significance. 
This could have been caused by the necessity to explore dynamic physical 
environment using static AOIs, low sampling rate and lower sampling measures in 
some trials.   
The analysis supported some pronounced differences in descriptive statistics 
reinforcing assumptions. If differences with p<0.1 are taken into account, 25% of 
arrival relationships would be found statistically significant. It cannot be expected that 
all of the AOIs show difference in all metrics. Moreover, the exploratory nature of this 
experiment showed the areas that need to be explored even if those were not 
highlighted as statistically significant at all locations. However, lack of simultaneous 
statistically significant differences in both AFD and TFC variables means that all 
assumptions about increased workload/stress are purely based on descriptive 
statistics. 
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7.5 Conclusions 
The research community does not use eye-tracking to the same extent as other 
safety-critical industries leaving a serious gap in the body of knowledge. The study 
has shown that the eye-tracking research can be conducted safely in metro systems. 
It allows building a basis of the exploratory research in front-line staff interaction with 
the physical environment. Moreover, the more sophisticated eye-tracking tools 
available now and advancements in experiment methodologies should allow 
establishing baseline eye fixation values in future. Such baseline values would 
facilitate assessing the infrastructure and human operators in a non-intrusive way in 
order to explore performance.  
Metro drivers prioritise mirrors as the main AOI for visual attention. This suggests 
bigger semantic value of the PTI risks than SPAD risks to them. Arrivals see the 
drivers’ visual attention divided between the mirrors and the stopping position 
indicators, but gaze duration on platforms depends on passenger levels and 
openness of a station. When one of the elements in this relationship exhibits poor 
informativeness, the issue of divided attention is not as acute as the drivers focus on 
the associated AOI.  
In terms of workload and stress inducing PSFs, several design features are proposed 
by the data. Firstly, a wide angle between a mirror, a driver and a signal (FOW Angle) 
creates situations when drivers need to produce longer saccadic movements to shift 
their attention from one AOI to another. Secondly, the distance between a signal and 
a stopping position affects drivers’ interaction with the signals. Thirdly, the passenger 
levels and distribution on a platform can create additional stress for drivers during 
both arrivals and departures. However, the analysis shows that different drivers 
approach complications caused by crowding differently. Albeit almost negligible 
influence of weather (sunny or rainy) on drivers’ performance, other environmental 
factors, e.g. wind or direct sunlight, can still affect drivers’ visual interaction with the 
physical environment. This is demonstrated by differences between open and built 
over stations as well as drivers’ perceptions.  
The biggest concerns are related to drivers potentially not checking a signal before 
powering up the train. This is a serious precursor in SaSSPaDs and should be 
addressed. Even though the data could have been affected by quality issues, the 
absolute number is too high to be disregarded. In fact, even one occasion in 80 
station departures is alarming as all of the participants are very experienced drivers. 
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With many tasks competing for metro drivers’ visual attention in DOO systems, the 
drivers seem to prioritise monitoring of the PTI over mitigation of SPaD risk. This is 
significantly different from conventional mainline railways, where a train guard or 
platform staff ensure safe dispatch of a train.  
Combination of the distance to a signal, the FOW angle, and passenger loadings 
seem to have effect on propagation of such violations. The drivers have up to 10 
seconds between powering up and passing a signal, which can create a perception 
that there is a room to mitigate an error. Moreover, there is a possibility that such 
perception is developed by more experienced staff who understand better such 
technicalities of the system.  
Due to exploratory character of this experiment, the next step is to confirm the 
influence of the discussed PSFs on metro drivers’ performance. The investigation 
should be carried out in a more controlled environment where several design 
features can be tested against each other. This is hard to accomplish in another in-
field study as it would involve altering infrastructure of a running railway with all the 
associated risks. However, a simulator study is a useful approach to achieve this. 
The simulation must include a more uniform sample with participants doing 
comparable number of trials in order to avoid uncertainties placed by personal factors 
on descriptive statistics.  
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Chapter 8. Simulator study  
8.1 Introduction 
With the conclusions of the in-field experiment in mind (Chapter 7), a simulator study 
has been conducted to validate the findings discussed in the previous chapter. 
Simulators have been evaluated in context of railway industry by various national 
research bodies before (Rushby and Seabrook, 2007; Jolly et al., 2013). Presenting 
a case for simulation, Rushby and Seabrook (2007) list several advantages of this 
method, including cost and operational effectiveness, ethicality of assessment and 
repeatability of environment. In many studies simulator use is the only way how to re-
create certain scenarios without serious disruptions to service. Even though the 
evaluation is focused on training needs, simulator features required for training 
coincide with simulator features required for assessment of performance shaping 
factors. As with eye-tracking and general performance shaping factors research, the 
rail industry is somewhat behind automotive industry in terms of simulator use. This is 
why the next paragraphs have many references of research in car driving. However, 
the use of simulators in railway-related research is gaining momentum and becomes 
more wide-spread.  
According to Jamson and Jamson (2010) each simulator can be assessed on five 
parameters: motivation, physical validity, face validity (visuals and controls), 
perception (auditory, ocular, proprioceptive factors helping to judge distances, 
speeds) and behavioural (perception of environment). Kaiser and Schroeder (2003) 
provide slightly different model of four parameters: physical, visual, motion and 
cognitive fidelities. According to Jolly et al. (2013), the rail simulators can be divided 
into several categories: full simulation (full cab), part-task trainer, PC-based and role 
play. In automotive industry the simulators are usually divided into low, medium and 
high level. This categorisation is based on simulator’s similarity to real-life in 
comparison to function-driven categorisation in the rail industry. The closer the 
simulator is to low level fidelity, the more it compromises on different parameters, e.g. 
face validity or physical characteristics. It is important to note that the literature review 
did not find any certain guidelines on what constitutes low or high level simulator. 
General assumption is that a high level will be a full car simulator with a moving 
base, medium – a full car on a fixed base, whereas a low level simulator will not have 
immediate physical environment re-created.  
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High cost of high fidelity simulators prompted a lot of research into cheaper solutions 
and validity of those. Yates and Sharples (2009) showed that a simulator consisting 
of a laptop and a wide field of view projector produced more realistic results than a 
full-cab trial. In the automotive industry, Jamson and Jamson (2010) and Reed and 
Green (2010)  showed that a simulator built using just a PC (17” screen) with a 
gaming steering wheel reproduced drivers’ speed performance in the same way as a 
high level simulator. However, same was not achieved for lateral performance. One 
of the main differences between the low and high level simulators is usually lack of 
wide field of view in former, which can negatively affect drivers’ performance (Kappé 
et al., 1999). In regards to fixed base simulators, Bella (2014) claims that such 
simulators have proven their reliability in many studies before. It is especially 
applicable to studies which are interested in relative validity Törnros (1998). Lemieux 
et al. (2014) demonstrated that car drivers’ perception of the simulator and 
subsequent performance does not differ between mid- and low-level simulators. 
Knapper et al. (2015), in their comprehensive assessment of the previous research in 
simulator validity, showed that both high and low level car driving simulators can 
show both good and poor absolute and relative validity. According to Jamson and 
Motula (2004), less expensive analogues can be successfully used for certain tasks 
without difference in participants’ response. Interestingly, Jolly et al. (2013) claim that 
the most important benefit of high fidelity simulators is ability to put users under 
realistic workloads stresses.  
Even with high level simulators, there are concerns of lack of motivational pressures 
in extreme situations (Knapper et al., 2015; Tripathi and Borrion, 2016). The research 
from other industries seem to demonstrate no difference in workload between real life 
and simulated environments but concerns are expressed on how to check whether 
this similarity still holds in emergency events (Jolly et al., 2013). Moreover, many 
simulators focus on only a certain drivers’ task thus jeopardising the ability to 
generalise the results. According to Knapper et al. (2015), driving the simulator also 
involves a steep learning curve which can affect the results. Moreover, not many 
drivers are used to drive while being observed thus they might start adjusting their 
behaviour to what they believe is desirable by an observer.  
There are still concerns about validity of results of simulator studies in real world but 
it does not stop the simulators from being used in drivers’ performance studies. In the 
UK simulation studies were conducted on drivers’ interaction with head-up displays 
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(Davies et al., 2007), in-cab signalling (Buksh et al., 2013), effects of risk triggered 
commentaries (Sato and Bowler, 2015), differences in performance between train 
drivers and quickly taught non-driver (Large et al., 2015). Basacik et al. (2015) 
studied what train driving situational factors lead to underload and undemanding 
working conditions. Aitchinson and Davies (2009) used a high fidelity train simulator 
to study drivers’ performance with new junction signalling layouts and designs. 
Outside of the UK, Tripathi and Borrion (2016) studied potential trade-offs made by 
metro drivers who are pressured for on-time performance in a high fidelity metro 
simulator. Train drivers’ fatigue was investigated in simulator studies by Dorrian et al. 
(2007). Verstappen (2015) used medium level simulator to study how a presence of a 
second person in a cab affects train drivers’ performance. Naweed and Balakrishnan 
(2013) looked into different strands of fidelity in an effort to evaluate rail simulator 
fidelities.   
Albeit rarely but the simulation studies have been used to evaluate physical 
environment, namely infrastructure. De Ceunynck et al. (2015) advocates that 
simulators can have an important role in pro-active evaluation of drivers’ physical 
environment and its usability. Their research allowed introducing more than 20 
improvements to road signs and markings used in a highway reconstruction project. 
Van Luipen and Meijer (2009) used their own developed gaming simulator to study 
feasibility of infrastructure alterations and interventions into railway physical 
environment. Rentzsch et al. (2009) asked drivers from different EU countries to drive 
a train simulator in order to explore design of a universal pan-european train driver 
cab design. 
The studies described above used a mix of subjective and objective methods to 
assess drivers’ performance in a simulated environment. Eye-tracking is one of such 
non-intrusive methods. Many researchers collect speed and other measures from the 
simulator. For many a simulation study is only a part of a bigger research project thus 
it is approached as a hypotheses testing experiment. However, most studies do not 
include any work into validation of a simulator even when questions are raised about 
results validity. A cross-industrial literature review is usually used as only means of 
methodology validation.  
With the described complexities in simulator development and costs associated with 
it, it is no surprise that there is a drive for more cost-effective simulators. It is not only 
145 
 
about substituting high level setups with low or medium level installations. Santiago-
Chaparro et al. (2011) outlined how widely available datasets and software packages 
can be used in order to improve efficiency of simulation scenario creations. Even 
though a general assumption of a rail simulator is a high to medium level simulator, 
Rushby and Seabrook (2007) claim that one of the available PC-based gaming train 
simulators (at that time) had potential to be used as part task trainer. For example, 
Rowe (2013) used a gaming engine to build a route learning trainer for Manchester 
Tramlink.  
8.2 Simulator 
8.2.1 The virtual reality 
Swift progress of gaming technologies and open access availability of such gaming 
engines as Unity or Unreal Engine 4, and graphic design tools as Blender allow 
almost everyone to design high detail virtual realities with a limited cost. It was 
decided to explore research potential of ready-made gaming software, i.e. Train 
Simulator 2016 from Kuju Entertainment. The choice of software is based on several 
reasons. Firstly, the game provides a variety of very realistic rolling stock which have 
good physical and face fidelities, fully re-creating train cabs. This can substitute 
building a mock-up of a cab as the virtual reality already has one. Secondly, a built-in 
scenario editor allows developing virtual railway systems quickly. The asset base 
available is large and continues to grow due to a big game fan community. Thirdly, 
the game allows importing own created objects from easy-to-use graphic design 
packages, e.g. Google Sketch Up. With these advantages in mind, the part of the 
system featuring in the in-field experiment (Pelaw to Gateshead Stadium) was built in 
virtual reality in several steps: 
• Tracks laid using Google Maps satellite images, 
• Models of the stations were designed in Google Sketch Up or Blender in 1:1 
scale, 
• The models were textured using real-life photos of the stations in 3dMax 2015 
or Blender, 
• The models imported into the game and positioned using Google Maps 
satellite images for correct location, 
• In-game assets were used for track-side equipment, DOO mirrors, scenery 
and passengers. The locations of assets were determined using site plans and 
real-life cab front-facing cameras’ recordings.  
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Creating 3 km long route using this method can take between one day and one 
month depending on previous experience and availability of drawings, textures and 
other support materials. The use of real-life textures helps avoiding problems 
mentioned by Thomas and Gassel (2009) who claimed that simulators provide 
realistic movements but retain impression of computer-generated environment. The 
simulated scenarios should be filled with real-world objects and scenarios to improve 
the realism (Bella, 2005; Yan et al., 2008; Santiago-Chaparro et al., 2011). Hence 
even posters at virtual stations were from real-life advertisement campaigns.  
Screenshots of the virtual Tyne & Wear Metro can be found in Appendix J.  
8.2.2 Simulator venue and setup 
The decision theatre at Science City in Newcastle upon Tyne was used to conduct 
the study. The facility has a six metres wide screen using two projectors with 
combined resolution of 3208x1200 pixels at 120 Hz, but the picture was upscaled 
from 1920x1080 pixels resolution for better frame rate. The picture is blended with a 
custom software tool to achieve seamless overlap. Participants were seated 
approximately three metres from centre of the screen. The room arrangements can 
be seen in Figure 37. It is important to note that in this picture the simulator is not in 
the full-screen mode for testing purposes. 
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Figure 37. Author's colleague trialling the simulator setup. The head tracking camera is located on the 
chair under the screen.  
One of the main advantages of the high fidelity simulators is immersive surround 
screens which can accommodate for drivers’ head movements. As an alternative to 
that, it was decided to pair the available screen with a head-tracking device 
supported by the software. The device (TrackIR 5 Pro) consists of an infra-red (IR) 
camera fixed under the screen and tracking sensors fitted either on a baseball cap or 
a headset. According to the developer website (NaturalPoint Inc, 2016) the device 
tracks motion in six degrees of freedom. This includes all three axes, yaw, pitch, and 
roll. Using TrackIR 5 Pro allowed realistically recreating situations where drivers have 
to lean sideways in order to see a mirror or a stopping position indicator. Moreover, 
there are several other significant benefits. Firstly, the immediate physical 
environment can be re-created in virtual reality thus saving money and increasing 
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testing flexibility. Secondly, it minimises effects of so-called “simulator sickness”. This 
sickness is caused by a stationary user being exposed to a sense of motion (LaViola, 
2000). Additionally, the IR camera mounted on a chair right below the screen also 
acts as a stationary “anchor” object to reduce the effects of the simulator sickness 
even further (Duh et al., 2004).  
As the virtual reality provides cab environment, which can be observed by a driver, it 
was decided to use a game console controller (Microsoft Xbox 360). Such control 
method has been selected to allow drivers maintaining visual focus on the physical 
environment instead of looking at the controller, e.g. keyboard. The controller has 
trigger buttons on the back which are used to interact with a master controller of a 
train. The controller also allows operating doors, window vipers, horns, AWS even 
though neither of these actions were required from the participants during the tests. 
Use of non-standard desk controls presented the biggest uncertainty in the study. 
Yates and Sharples (2009) report that there is evidence that non-realistic train 
controls could detract participants from performance. However, PC-based simulator 
by Rowe (2013) used keyboard to control tram movements and received positive 
assessment from participants for tram’s controls. As the literature review in Section 
8.1 demonstrates, low level simulators compromising on immediate physical 
environment still show good relative, and sometimes absolute, validity. On the other 
hand, those studies are mostly focused on car driving where even a low level 
simulation can have a cheap gaming steering wheel.  
8.2.3 Limitations  
The selected simulator methodology has several limitations. Firstly, Train Simulator 
2016 does not have Tyne & Wear Metro specific rolling stock so alternatives had to 
be assessed. It was decided against designing design a custom-made cab as this 
would inflate scope. Instead, The Class 170 “TurboStar” train was selected as the 
rolling stock for the simulator. It has a driver’s seat on the left hand side, similarly to a 
metrocar, and with a right hand side blind partially lowered (Figure 38) it provides 
similar visibility through the windscreen. The “TurboStar” also has a master controller 
similar to a metrocar. However, the physics of the selected rolling stock (weight, 
acceleration, braking) were altered in the way to match metrocars’ performance. This 
performance was tested with two Tyne & Wear operations managers who confirmed 
that it is very realistic.  
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Figure 38. View of Heworth station from the cab. Right-hand side windscreen is partially obscured by a 
lowered blind. 
Secondly, the gaming engine used by Train Simulator does not offer reflective DOO 
mirrors. Even though there are models of DOO mirrors in the software, those do not 
provide any information on PTI. One can only assume it is done to improve 
framerate. The in-field eye-tracking experiments demonstrated that the DOO mirrors 
contain the highest informativeness and semantic value for the drivers during arrivals 
and departures. Hence those are being constantly monitored. Jolly et al. (2013) 
showed that as many activities as possible need to be addressed in any level of 
simulation to re-create drivers’ experience as much as possible. In order to maintain 
the same station duties workload and motivational pressures, the DOO mirrors were 
fitted with analogue clock faces of a size that is definitely distinguishable from a 
stopping position (Figure 39). The drivers were then asked to choose a stopping 
position where they clearly can read the time and call it out loud. For departures, the 
drivers were required to wait until a half or a full minute to depart.  
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Figure 39. An example of a DOO mirror fitted with an analogue clock 
8.3 Methodology 
8.3.1 Hypotheses 
With the in-field eye-tracking study in mind, the simulation study was designed to test 
five hypotheses. Namely: 
8a. A shorter distance between a stopping position and a running signal leads to 
drivers fixating on the signal for longer and induces less stress/workload. 
8b. A narrower angle between a mirror, a driver’s cab and a signal (FOW Angle) 
positively affects ease of interaction with the physical environment during 
arrivals and departures. 
8c. The combination of a lower distance to a running signal and a narrower FOW 
angle leads to fewer failures when checking a signal aspect during departures. 
8d. Increased passenger loadings negatively affect workload when interacting with 
the areas of interest not related to platforms. 
8e. Novice drivers (less than two years of experience) have different gaze 
behaviour compared to more experienced colleagues and are less prone to 
missing a signal check on departure. 
8.3.2 Station design and alterations 
To test the hypotheses 8a to 8e in a controlled environment, three scenarios were 
developed re-creating the same part of Tyne & Wear Metro – Pelaw to Gateshead 
Stadium. The versions only differ in one element at each station in order to focus only 
on effects of one change at a time. The scenarios are: 
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1. Baseline system. This VR metro system re-creates the real-life counterpart 
as close as possible and was assumed to be a base level. The layout of the 
stations can be seen in Section 7.2.1.   
2. Amended system. Baseline system with one of the elements of the physical 
environment amended at each station. See Table 28 for the list of 
amendments.  
3. System with higher passenger levels (more PAX). Baseline system with 
increased passenger levels, which represent loadings closer to real world 
peak levels. Appendices J and K show how the stations differ between the 
scenarios 1 and 3.  
Station Element Change from the baseline 
Pelaw (Type 2) Mirror  The element is moved 5 m further away from the 
usual train stop position (stopping position marker 
stays in the same location) 
Heworth (Type 1) Signal The running signal is moved 25m closer to the 
stopping point 
Felling (Type 2) Signal The running signal is moved 18m closer to the 
stopping point 
Gateshead 
Stadium (Type 2) 
Signal The running signal is moved 25m further away 
from the stopping point 
Table 28 List of introduced changes to station layout in scenario 2 
The scenarios were presented to the participating metro drivers in random order to 
avoid learning effect in multi-trial experiment (Yates and Sharples, 2009). The 
experiment lasted for approximately one hour with short brakes between each test in 
order to load the next scenario and diagnose the eye-tracker if necessary. The 
drivers are used to short driving portions as some peak services duties involve only 
25 to 40 minutes long journeys with up to 10 minutes turn-around brakes.  
8.3.3 Participants 
Five drivers took part in the simulation study making a total of 38 runs on the 
simulated part of Tyne & Wear Metro. Most of the studies identified in the literature 
review had less than 10 participants but none actually asked the participants to do 
more than one test. On the other hand, each participant did approximately the same 
number of tests thus creating a more uniform sample than the sample in the in-field 
study. Two participants were experienced driver coaches who also participated in the 
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real-life eye-tracking study. Other three drivers had been driving the metro trains for 
less than two years at the time of the study and had been recruited for the tests on 
the basis of their inexperience.  
8.3.4 Data sample 
It was envisaged that each driver would do an equal number of trials in each 
scenario. This would allow creating a matched sample where drivers’ trials under 
each scenario are matched against each other. In total 42 trial runs were conducted 
with 5 participants creating a sample of 14 tests (three scenarios in each). Each of 
the trial runs consists of 4 successful station stops and departures.  
8.3.5 Data collection and analysis 
The gaze data has been collected using the same eye-tracking methodology as in 
the in-field experiment (Section 7.2.5). The eye-tracking techniques were 
successfully combined with simulator studies before (Dutta et al., 2004). There were 
concerns about interference between the IR head-tracking camera and the eye-
tracking glasses but those devices do not affect each other. It is important to note a 
number of differences between the in-field and simulation studies, which might have 
implications: 
• There is a possibility that the alterations in scenario 2 could introduce changes 
to criticality of AOIs for the drivers. Hence higher TFC/higher AFD situations 
should be considered from higher TFD point of view indicating lack of 
situational awareness with this layout (Ottati et al., 1999).  
• Better expertise (higher TFC/lower AFD) might become a factor in this study 
as there is a mix of experienced and in-experienced drivers. However, testing 
for experience effects of the eye-tracking measures should provide a guideline 
on how to assess such cases.  
• Similarly to the previous point, the experience is not fully controlled in this 
experiment as scenario 2 is novel to both groups of drivers. Hence dwell times 
and fixation counts can be affected by this factor too. 
Descriptive statistics, represented by bar charts of mean values, is used to explore 
the data. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test is used to find statistically significant 
differences between the variables in different scenarios. Concerns about sample size 
and its effect on statistical significance (see Section 7.2.7) still apply so statistical 
significance up until p-value of 0.1 is reported. The descriptive statistics for TFC 
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departure variables is used to assess whether in the simulated environment there are 
still events of drivers not checking a signal aspect before departing from a station.  
For departures, only scenarios 1 and 2 are compared. Scenario 3 is a complete copy 
of scenario 1 from the departure point of view.  
8.3.6 Simulator’s validity 
Albeit the widespread use of simulators in modern driving studies, much research 
(especially in rail industry) does not test the used simulators for real-life validity. 
Shechtman (2010), in his literature review, confirms that validation is necessary for 
simulator studies but there is no consensus on the means of validation between 
researchers. This study combines subjective and objective metrics to assess how the 
results of the experiment can be related to real-world and to explore the case for 
such simulator models.  
The participants were asked to fill in a short questionnaire to assess the simulation. 
Appendix L includes a copy of this questionnaire. They were asked to rate such 
aspects of the simulated environment as visuals, train handling, immersion and 
comfort on 5-point Likert scale (very good to very poor). Moreover, the participating 
drivers were asked to assess the ease of noticing changes in physical environment 
and general validity of the simulation.  
As data collection methodologies are similar for the in-field and simulator 
experiments, it is possible to compare drivers’ performance based on the gaze data. 
Such approach has been used before to validate simulators. For example, Carter and 
Laya (1998) used eye-tracking to validate a fixed base car driving simulator and 
found no difference in spatial distribution of fixations on the visual field. Knapper et al. 
(2015) claim that the validity is affected by a task studied and population similarity. 
This was partially confirmed by significant effect of personal factors on many 
variables (Section 7.3.12). Hence only the data for the 2 drivers who participated in 
both experiments is compared. Moreover, data from scenario 3 is compared against 
the in-field data because the passenger loadings (deemed as major PSF) from that 
scenario better match the passenger volumes experienced during the in-field tests.  
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8.4 Results 
8.4.1 Validity of the simulation environment 
The participants are unanimous in their assessment of the simulator returning five 
identical questionnaires with only comments and a suggestions box having different 
information. Table 29 below provides an overview of drivers’ scores.  
Question Answer 
Please rate visual aspect of the simulation Very good 
Please rate train handling aspect of the simulation Good 
Please rate immersion aspect of the simulation Very good 
Please rate comfort aspect of the simulation Very good 
Was it easy to notice changes introduced in the physical 
environment? 
Yes 
Would you consider this simulation as a good representation of 
driver’s duties in T&W Metro? 
Yes 
Table 29. Summary of participants' opinions on validity of the simulator 
According to the participants, the simulation is a good representation of real-life 
metrocar driving. However, the drivers struggled slightly with controls of the train 
hence the lower score for that question. The drivers state that they did notice 
changes between the scenarios.  
Table 30 below shows results of statistical tests for difference between the real-life 
study and the simulation experiment (scenario 3) in terms of station arrivals.  
 TFC AFD 
 Felling GStad Heworth Pelaw Felling GStad Heworth Pelaw 
Mirror 17.0 9.0 21.5 25.0 14.0 .0** 15.0 21.0 
Platform 24.5 1.0** 5.0** 16.5 16.5 13.0 15.0 19.0 
Signal 15.0 10.5 24.5 20.0 15.0 8.0** 23.0 20.0 
StopPos 22.5 19.0 24.5 23.0 4.0** 11.0 11.0 9.0* 
Table 30. Results of Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test looking into differences between real-life and simulated 
environment (arrivals) *p<0.1, **p<0.05 
88% (28 out of 32) of the variables do not show statistically significant difference 
between real life and simulation. Two differences are found in regards to platforms. 
Signals and mirrors have one significant difference each. When statistical 
significance is assumed at p<0.1 84.4% of the variables do not show statistical 
significance. When tested against scenario 1 (lower passenger levels), the match 
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between variables decreases to 69% with all eight platforms–related variables 
demonstrating statistically significant difference.  
For the departure variables, the match is 89% (14 out of 16).  The only two 
statistically significant differences are found for mirrors at Felling and Heworth (Table 
31). Same match percentage is found for scenario 1. Even though there were 
concerns of how well the mirrors with clocks represent real-life DOO mirrors, the 
validity analysis showed that those provide good alternative.  
 TFC AFD 
 Felling GStad Heworth Pelaw Felling GStad Heworth Pelaw 
Mirror 7.0** 15.5 13.5 6.5** 19.0 15.0 23.0 23.0 
Signal 19.5 24.0 17.0 17.0 22.0 23.0 14.0 14.5 
Table 31.Results of Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test looking into differences between real-life and simulated 
environment (departures) *p<0.1; **p<0.05 
8.4.2 Influence of metro driving experience 
Nine test runs in three different scenarios were carried out by recently qualified 
drivers (under two years of experience) whereas five test runs were done by 
experienced drivers (driver coaches). The test runs are compared for all variables for 
three different metrics for both arrivals and departures. Table 32 below summarises 
results of Mann-Whitney U-test.  
 Arrivals Departures 
 TFD TFC AFD TFD TFC AFD 
Scenario 1 0/16 1/16 0/16 1/8 1/8 1/8 
Scenario 2 3/16 2/16 2/16 0/8 0/8 0/8 
Scenario 3 2/16 1/16 4/16 0/8 1/8 0/8 
Table 32. Number of statistically significant differences in gaze behaviour (experienced vs novice drivers) 
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8.4.3 Influence of design amendments during arrivals 
In order to see patterns in fixation durations, cumulative TFD values are calculated 
for each station for each scenario. Table 33 below summarises mean values of total 
fixation duration at all four design elements at each of the stations under 
investigation.  
 Total fixation duration on 4 AOIs 
 Felling Gateshead Stadium Heworth Pelaw 
Baseline 8.2 7.76 6.45 7.88 
Amended 7.2 7.12 7.12 7.47 
More PAX 7.91 8.02 6.83 7.68 
Table 33. Mean cumulative TFD on all AOIs on arrivals 
According to table 33, the stations where spacing between the elements increased 
are the stations demonstrating a drop in TFD. Even though the signal at Felling is 
moved closer to other elements, its position on the other side of a track means that 
the element moves further apart in a visual field and the FOW angle increases as the 
participants get closer to a stopping point. On the contrary, Heworth, where the 
spacing is decreased and all the elements are on the same side, demonstrate 
increase in cumulative TFD.  
When scenarios 1 and 3 are compared, one can note that more confined stations 
demonstrate higher cumulative TFD in scenario 3 whereas open stations return 
bigger values in scenario 1. As per Chapter 7, the confined stations are Heworth and 
Gateshead Stadium. Open stations are Pelaw and Felling. The only relationship 
which is close to statistical significance (p-value = 0.084) is between Gateshead 
Stadium scenarios 2 and 3.  
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Changes introduced at Pelaw mean that the AOIs are more spaced out, and the 
angle between the signal and the mirror is narrower. These changes result in visual 
attention shift from the elements responsible for stopping a train to the platform and 
the running signal in scenario 2 (Figure 40). Higher TFC/lower AFD cases can be 
observed for the mirror and the stopping position indicator (Figure 41 and Figure 42). 
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Figure 40. TFD statistics for Pelaw arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 41. TFC statistics for Pelaw arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 42. AFD statistics for Pelaw arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
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Changing the signal position at Heworth leads to reduced spacing between the AOIs 
and closer position of those in drivers’ field of view. As all the elements are located 
on the same side of the track, an already narrow FOW angle becomes even smaller. 
As shown by Figure 43, moving a running signal closer to other elements at a side 
platform station increases TFD for a mirror and a signal. Marginal decrease is 
observed for gaze duration on a platform. A stopping position indicator shows more 
substantial decrease in TFD.  
Changing the station layout does not cause any elements to exhibit higher TFC and 
lower AFD in scenario 2 (Figure 44 and Figure 45). However, one can observe that in 
comparison to the amended system, the platform and the stopping position indicator 
in the baseline layout show such trends.  
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Figure 43. TFD statistics for Heworth arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 44. TFC statistics for Heworth arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 45. AFD statistics for Heworth arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
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The amended layout at Felling increases the angle between the signal and the mirror 
by bringing the signal closer to the platform edge. As with other stations, the 
introduced change causes increased TFD on Felling signal (Figure 46). On contrary, 
total fixation duration decreases for all other AOIs. All elements but the mirror 
demonstrate synchronised change in TFC and AFD metrics in the amended system 
(Figure 47 and Figure 48). The participants utilise more fixations, which are shorter, 
to interact with the mirror in scenario 2.   
  
162 
 
 
Figure 46. TFD statistics for Felling arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 47. TFC statistics for Felling arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 48. AFD statistics for Felling arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
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The running signal at Gateshead Stadium is moved further from the stopping position 
in scenario 2 thus reducing the angle between it, a driver, and the mirror. Moreover, 
the signal is located after an underbridge in scenario 2. The drivers look at it through 
a bridge arch. Figure 49 shows increase in TFD on the signal there, similarly to other 
stations. The platform maintains drivers’ attention on the same level whereas the 
mirror and the stopping position marker lose approximately 15%. Other stations 
where TFD on mirrors decreased showed more and shorter fixations on this element. 
However, the mirror at Gateshead Stadium demonstrates fewer and longer fixations 
in scenario 2 compared to the baseline scenario (Figure 50 and Figure 51). Similarly 
to all other locations, Gateshead Stadium signal shows growth in all three metrics. 
The results show higher TFC and lower AFD for the platform in scenario 2.  
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Figure 49. TFD statistics for Gateshead Stadium arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 50. TFC statistics for Gateshead Stadium arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 51. AFD statistics for Gateshead Stadium arrivals. Scenario 1 and 2 
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8.4.4 Influence of increased passenger loadings during arrivals 
Figure 52 below shows that increased passenger levels at Pelaw increase signal and 
platform TFD. The same metric for the mirror changes insignificantly but almost 30% 
decrease can be observed for the stopping position indicator. Figure 53 and Figure 
54 demonstrate that the TFC and AFD for the platform and the signal at Pelaw 
change in line with TFD metrics. Higher TFC and lower AFD trend observed for the 
mirror in scenario 3. For the stopping position indicator, the number of fixations 
decreased but average fixation duration stayed almost the same. Magnitude of 
change between scenario 1 and 3 for TFC variables was considerably higher than for 
AFD variables at Pelaw.  
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Figure 52. TFD statistics for Pelaw arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
 
Figure 53. TFC statistics for Pelaw arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
 
Figure 54. AFD statistics for Pelaw arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
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All the AOIs but the mirror demonstrate significant increase in TFD at Heworth in 
scenario 3 (Figure 55). According to Figure 56 and Figure 57, neither of the elements 
demonstrates trends implying problems with usability in high passenger loadings 
situation. Furthermore, the statistics shows that such trends can be observed for 
platforms in the baseline scenario however the magnitude of change for this element 
is rather small.  
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Figure 55. TFD statistics for Heworth arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
 
Figure 56. TFC statistics for Heworth arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
 
Figure 57. AFD statistics for Heworth arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
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Similarly to other stations, the drivers spend less time fixating on the mirrors (Figure 
58) when there are more passengers at Felling. The platform demonstrates almost 
threefold increase in TFD. Felling is the only station where TFD on the running signal 
decreases in scenario 3. Finally, the stopping position marker also demonstrates a 
drop in total gaze duration on it.  
As with other island stations, the drop in TFD on the mirror causes increase in 
fixation count and decrease in AFD (Figure 59 and Figure 60). The same trend can 
be observed for the stopping position marker. The other two AOIs demonstrate 
trends that are in line with TFD changes. 
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Figure 58. TFD statistics for Felling arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
 
Figure 59. TFC statistics for Felling arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
 
Figure 60. AFD statistics for Felling arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
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According to Figure 61, all of the AOIs but the mirror at Gateshead Stadium show 
increase in total fixation duration. A drop in TFD can be observed for the mirror. 
Figure 62 and Figure 63 highlight higher TFC/lower AFD trend for the mirror at 
Gateshead Stadium when passenger levels increase. The platform and the signal 
showed increase in both metrics whereas the stopping position marker only in TFC. 
Average fixation duration on the stopping position marker was the same in scenarios 
1 and 3.  
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Figure 61. TFD statistics for Gateshead Stadium arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
 
Figure 62. TFC statistics for Gateshead Stadium arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
 
Figure 63. AFD statistics for Gateshead Stadium arrivals. Scenario 1 and 3 
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8.4.5 Influence of amended design during departures 
In order to see patterns in fixation durations, mean values are calculated for each 
station for scenarios 1 and 2. Table 34 below summarises mean values of cumulative 
TFD on all AOIs at each of the stations under investigation.  
 Total fixation duration (mean) 
 Felling Gateshead Stadium Heworth Pelaw 
Scenario 1 7.54 7.52 6.78 7.05 
Scenario 2 7.3 6.9 7.67 6.82 
Table 34. Mean cumulative TFD on all AOIs on departures 
All of the stations except of Heworth demonstrate graduate decrease in total dwell 
time on a signal and a mirror from scenario 1 to scenario 2. No statistically significant 
differences are found even when p-value range is expanded until 0.1.  
As the figures below show (Figure 64, Figure 65, and Figure 66) the slight decrease 
in total fixation durations at Pelaw in scenario 2 is attributable to both AOIs. The 
mirror shows increase in TFC and decrease in AFD. The signal shows a minor 
increase in both metrics.  
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Figure 64. TFD statistics for Pelaw departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 65. TFC statistics for Pelaw departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 66. AFD statistics for Pelaw departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
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Change of the signal position at Heworth causes increased gaze durations on the 
signal and a minor drop for the mirror (Figure 67). This drop, however, is associated 
with a trend, which suggests drivers experiencing higher workload and stress when 
looking on the element (Figure 68 and Figure 69). 
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Figure 67. TFD statistics for Heworth departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 68.TFC statistics for Heworth departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 69. AFD statistics for Heworth departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
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Trends similar to Heworth are observed at Felling, where the running signal is moved 
closer to a stopping position (Figure 70, Figure 71, and Figure 72). However, TFD of 
Felling signal changes considerably less compared to the same metric for Heworth 
signal.   
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Figure 70. TFD statistics for Felling departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 71. TFC statistics for Felling departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 72. AFD statistics for Felling departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
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When Gateshead Stadium signal is moved further away, the observed change in 
gaze performance is similar to Heworth and Felling. The magnitudes of change are 
closer to Heworth than to Felling for TFD on the signal, but TFD on the mirror drops 
considerably more than anywhere else (Figure 73). Similarly, the AFD and TFC 
statistics show that drivers employ more and shorter fixations to interact with the 
mirror at Gateshead Stadium (Figure 74 and Figure 75). 
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Figure 73. TFD statistics for Gateshead Stadium departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 74. TFC statistics for Gateshead Stadium departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
 
Figure 75. AFD statistics for Gateshead Stadium departures. Scenario 1 and 2 
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8.4.6 Failure to check a signal on departure 
The real-life eye-tracking study has highlighted an issue of drivers’ potentially 
violating an established rule book procedure for departures, namely not checking a 
signal (Section 7.4.5). Table 35 provides the results for the simulation study in terms 
of drivers’ failing to check the signals on departure. It is important to note, that only 
one miss was created through the missed values analysis. It happened at Pelaw in 
scenario 3.  
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Real Life 
Number of tests 14 14 14 20 
Pelaw 2 1 2 5 
Heworth 0 0 1 2 
Felling 2 0 1 3 
Gateshead Stadium 1 0 0 1 
Average per test 0.36 0.07 0.29 0.55 
Table 35. Summary of departures where drivers did not check a signal 
8.4.7 Results of the statistical tests 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test was used to perform statistical analysis to reveal 
differences between the variables in different scenarios. Table 36 below provides an 
overview of Z-values for arrival variables based on negative ranks. Only 17% of 
variables are statistically different between scenarios 1 and 2. Majority of the 
differences are for signal-related variables. Same trends are observed in comparison 
between scenarios 1 and 3. Another 9% of the relationships might return statistically 
significant differences in a bigger sample due to having p-value under 0.1. This 
proportion is similar to the in-field experiment.  
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  TFD TFC AFD 
 AOI Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 
Pe
la
w
 
Mirror -.722 -.094 -1.127 -1.030 -.245 -.502 
Platform -.059 -.866 -.866 -.483 -.415 -.357 
Signal -2.293** -1.660* -2.126** -1.414 -1.689* -1.020 
Stop.Pos. -.489 -1.287 -.176 -1.020 -.549 -.157 
H
ew
or
th
 
Mirror -1.664* -1.350 -1.069 -.433 -1.256 -.105 
Platform -.549 -1.350 -1.015 -.356 -.624 -.974 
Signal -2.491** -2.547** -2.877** -1.633* -2.937** -2.197** 
Stop.Pos. -.664 -1.538 -.749 -.282 -.734 -1.351 
Fe
lli
ng
 
Mirror -1.099 -1.244 -2.189** -2.430** -1.852* -1.853* 
Platform -.785 -1.726* -.503 -1.709* -1.020 -.784 
Signal -1.601 -1.400 -1.630* -1.638* -1.157 -1.992** 
Stop.Pos. -.594 -.408 -.155 -1.386 -1.119 -2.544** 
G
. S
ta
d 
Mirror -.157 -.220 -.777 -.672 -.560 -.283 
Platform -.220 -.157 -.914 .000 -.377 .000 
Signal -2.203** -2.188** -1.723* -2.203** -2.316** -2.432** 
Stop.Pos. -1.223 .000 -1.027 -1.513 -.105 -.031 
Table 36. Results of Wilcoxon Signer Ranks Test comparing arrival AOIs in scenario 1 to scenarios 2 and 
3. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 
Table 37 below provides an overview of Z-values for departure variables based on 
negative ranks. Only 21% of variables are statistically different between scenarios 1 
and 2. Majority of the differences are for signal-related variables. One more 
relationship could have returned statistically significant differences in a bigger sample 
due to having p-value under 0.1.  
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  TFD TFC AFD 
 AOI Scenario 2 Scenario 2 Scenario 2 
Pelaw Mirror -.094 -1.316 -.722 
Signal -.384 -.877 -.035 
Heworth Mirror -.722 -.2683** -1.601 
Signal -2.354** -2.520** -.596 
Felling Mirror -1.161 -.994 -1.538 
Signal -.594 -.881 -1.099 
Gateshead Stadium Mirror -1.977** -.358 -1.475 
Signal -1.852* -2.123** -.094 
Table 37. Results of Wilcoxon Signer Ranks Test comparing departure AOIs in scenario 1 to scenarios 2. * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05 
8.5 Discussion 
8.5.1 Categorisation of the developed simulator 
The final product developed to simulate virtual reality combines features of high level 
simulators and trade-offs of low level systems. Albeit having no immediate physical 
environment, the drivers are able to interact with the cab in the virtual world. Lack of 
moving base, as shown by literature review, should not affect drivers’ perceptions of 
proposed scenarios. Similarly, using a flat screen can have a positive effect on the 
validity. In terms of motivational pressures, previous rail simulator studies showed 
that this parameter of a simulation study is rather realistic in virtual environments 
(Van Luipen and Meijer, 2009; Yates and Sharples, 2009). The railway systems 
normally have a small number of simultaneous events happening around a driver 
compared to road network thus addressing an issue of complexity of building a 
realistic environment raised by Shechtman (2010). Taking all of the above into 
account, it is possible to claim that the simulator used in this research is high level. 
This is supported by part-task trainers, for example the one built by Rowe (2013), 
being considered as medium fidelity installations.  
The developed simulator demonstrates that new VR technologies and novel human-
machine interfaces allow building a high level product in short timeframe and with a 
budget of under £1000. However, the validity of it should be assessed too. It is 
important to note that further advancements in VR technologies can make high level 
simulators obsolete due to better cost-benefit ratios and flexibility of the final product. 
Train Simulator 2016 already supports VR glasses, e.g. Oculus Rift, making the need 
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for immediate physical environment irrelevant. This is one of the reasons why the 
current categorisation will have to be reconsidered.  
8.5.2 Simulator validity 
Both subjective and objective measures confirmed high degree of match between the 
real-life and proposed VR train driving. Using eye-tracking measures on key areas of 
interest is a novel approach to validate a rail simulator. Even the previous eye-
tracking validations in automotive industry defined AOIs in the immediate physical 
environment (car interior). Hence this validation approach provides even higher 
degree of confidence in representation of real-life metro driving. Fluctuations in the 
number of statistically significant differences with a change in passenger volumes not 
only confirm significant influence of this factor but also provide an important lesson in 
design of virtual environments. It is necessary to re-create the scenarios as much as 
possible to real-life conditions in order to gain meaningful results, which has been 
demonstrated before (Bella, 2005; Yan et al., 2008; Santiago-Chaparro et al., 2011). 
Moreover, this change also confirms that the simulator creates good motivational 
pressures.  
The simulation methodology chosen shows how modern technologies allow building 
cheap high fidelity simulators. Additional advantage of this approach is a user-friendly 
interface that enables traincrew managers and coaches easily altering the virtual 
reality to simulate different situations. The biggest uncertainty associated with this 
method is what the user agreement for Train Simulator 2016 says about using the 
software for commercial purposes (traincrew training). However, making the custom-
made VR railway systems publicly available (open access) could potentially resolve 
this issue.  
The arrival statistics also shows that drivers spent more than 50% of the arrival time 
looking outside of the AOIs, most likely controls. This is a considerable increase 
compared to the in-field results. The same increase has not been observed in 
departure sequences meaning that controlling train motion might be the cause of it. 
As the drivers rated the train’s physics very high, it can only mean that the controller 
itself was at fault. It is not similar to the real-life master controller in any way. Hence 
tactile memory cannot be initiated and the actions require visual confirmation. In the 
future using a flight simulator controller should be considered if full VR set-ups are 
not available by then.  
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Despite some limitations, the results demonstrate that the simulator is a good tool to 
study relative, if not absolute, effects of changes in physical environment on drivers’ 
performance. Moreover, the simulators allow pro-active assessment and modelling of 
infrastructure can bring significant cost and safety benefits to railways (Aitchinson 
and Davies, 2009). This thesis corroborates views of Simmons (2015) who advocates 
use of simulation and virtual world for “designing out” adverse PSFs. 
8.5.3 Influence of metro driving experience 
With only 10% of arrival variables across all scenarios and 6% of the departure 
variables being influenced by experience level, it is possible to claim that this is not 
an important factor thus not confirming hypothesis 8e. For the arrivals, it is possible 
to see that all the drivers interact with the physical environment in the same way 
when driving in the original scenario. As it was suggested previously, the route 
knowledge of metro drivers is very high even for unexperienced drivers due to the 
size and type of a system. This corroborates the findings from RSSB (2005) report.  
The difference becomes more pronounced in the amended scenarios where almost 
17% of the variables show dependence on driving experience. It is known for less 
experienced participants to utilise different, potentially not as sophisticated, visual 
strategies (Reingold et al., 2001; Savelsbergh et al., 2002; Reingold and Charness, 
2005). As the results show, the drivers might differ in terms of their preparedness for 
unexpected events depending on their driving experience. For example, in scenario 3 
the experienced drivers have longer gazes on mirrors than the inexperienced 
colleagues who potentially get more distracted by increased passenger levels. The 
other trends observed demonstrate better prioritisation by the experienced group. 
These results support earlier results on SPaDs (Section 5.3.5), which demonstrated 
that experience level and presence of a disruption are important PSFs.  
8.5.4 Fixation time on all AOIs 
Even though fixations are distributed differently across the scenarios, total fixation 
time on all AOIs is statistically not different for all stations. Some stations 
demonstrate approximately 13% differences between the scenarios but are deemed 
statistically similar by the selected tests. This controversy is further highlighted when 
individual variables are compared between the scenarios and only 17% found to be 
statistically different. This is however in line with the results from the in-field eye-
tracking experiment so the same factors apply. Even though the simulation study has 
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a sample of better quality (80+% of frames with eye-tracking data in all trials) but the 
size of it is actually smaller than the size of the in-field study sample.  
On arrivals the identical trends are observed for island stations, where the amended 
system causes a minor drop in TFD values. As this drop is also combined with 
increase in cumulative TFC for all elements, it can be suggested that lack of previous 
experience is an important factor driving cumulative TFD down. As the drivers are 
developing new search strategies, they potentially switched their attention more often 
in order to maintain awareness of the updated physical environment. However, it 
would be incorrect to attribute these trends solely to lack of previous exposure to the 
proposed layouts as there is no similar trend at Heworth. The results show that 
spacing of the AOIs can have an important impact on drivers’ gaze behaviour. 
Having the elements located closer in a visual field can bring benefits of reduced 
saccadic movements thus releasing an additional visual attention capacity.  
In scenario 3 cumulative TFD on all AOIs is close to scenario 1 at all stations. 
Stations with confined layouts have higher cumulative TFD when more passengers 
are present. This is in line with Chapter 7 results showing more visual attention 
allocated to platforms in confined environments. As before, it is possible to assume 
that lack of scenery AOIs leads the drivers to focusing more on the platforms. 
Furthermore, it shows that more confined station designs can provide metro drivers 
with a small reserve in visual attention in more demanding situations (high passenger 
loads). For island stations gazes on the immediate scenery on the left side of the 
track can be considered as distractions as there are no safety-critical elements. The 
running signal usually is further ahead. In scenario 3 these distractions remain in 
combination with higher demands imposed by more passengers. Hence the drivers 
tend to use shorter fixations and transfer the gaze between the AOIs more frequently.  
Results at Heworth also demonstrate benefits of putting the safety-critical elements 
close together at a narrow FOW angle for departures. Other stations show a drop in 
cumulative TFD during departures in scenario 2 but it is more pronounced when a 
distance between the AOIs is increased (reducing the FOW angle between those) 
than when the FOW angle is increased (reducing the distance).  
Despite the changes in cumulative TFD on all AOIs between the scenarios, 
magnitudes of change between the individual AOIs are different confirming inter-
dependence of some elements. This inter-dependence was expected from the onset 
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of this thesis. A necessity to look on one element longer is expected to compromise 
drivers’ ability to devote the same amount as before to other elements. However, it is 
drivers’ visual strategies, perception of risks and motivational pressures, which define 
what elements will be compromised. 
8.5.5 Influence of design amendments during arrivals 
In the baseline scenario the drivers prioritised mirrors and stopping position markers 
on arrivals. Similarly to the real-life driving the participants continue to use mirrors to 
determine a stopping position. This behaviour confirms that alteration of the 
monitoring task does not change semantic value of DOO mirrors.  
All of the stations demonstrate increase in TFD accompanied by increase in both 
TFC and AFD values. As mentioned in Section 8.3.5, increase in all three metrics can 
be a sign of lower situational awareness. This is to be expected from physical 
environments with amended layouts. Even though that it is also indicative of 
complexity of information extraction, the trends in the signal-related variables suggest 
that additional workload is manageable (Holmqvist et al., 2011). The trends for signal 
fixations also show a possible decrease in task demand compared to the real-life 
task, where many drivers potentially did not have enough visual capacity to devote to 
this AOI (Section 7.4.1). It is possible to claim that these trends are not directly 
related to specific design changes, as a similar situation is observed in scenario 3. 
The participants stated that they were able to identify the introduced changes. As the 
signals are the most changed AOI in scenario 2, it is possible that this motivates 
drivers’ to check those more in scenario 3 too. Moreover, indirect effects of design 
changes can be still present as difference in scan paths can lead to a situation 
demonstrated in studies on Markov models (Holmqvist et al., 2011). It was found that 
long fixations in previous AOI would often lead to long fixations on the next AOI 
(Hooge et al., 2007; Tatler and Vincent, 2008) but it should not affect TFC metrics.  
Increased attention to Pelaw signal along with spacing the elements further away 
from each other leads to longer and more frequent transitions between AOIs. This 
clearly creates a strain on driver’s visual attention and additional workload when 
monitoring these elements. On the other hand, decrease in the angle between the 
signal and the mirror does not bring expected performance benefits. The results 
indicate that reducing the FOW angle only brings workload-related benefits for 
mirrors and platform indicators when this is accompanied by change in a distance to 
a running signal. This is shown by Heworth and Gateshead Stadium, whereas 
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performance issues are shown by Felling where the angle was increased. One can 
note that the direction of change in signal’s position is irrelevant as long as it causes 
increased visual attention. Unfortunately, the results do not provide an answer on 
ideal signal position for increased attention as all of the proposed layouts are novel 
for the participants and incentivise scan path changes.  
There are inter-dependencies between the stopping position elements (mirrors and 
stopping position indicators) and platforms at island platforms. Reverse 
proportionality can be observed between these elements. Whenever the usability of 
the stopping position AOIs improves, the participants start to demonstrate increased 
stress interacting with the platforms and vice versa. While not being able to simulate 
environmental factors, the effects of the distance to the mirror were checked at 
Pelaw. Increasing this distance even further (to 13.5m) causes higher workload. 
Moreover, the drivers were observed stopping past the platform indicator in scenario 
2, demonstrating a loss of informativeness of this element. Similar trends to the real-
life stopping position indicator at Gateshead are observed with increased stress and 
decrease in TFD. However, this does not cause any positive effect on the mirror due 
to novelty of a situation. Moreover, the drivers still stopped quite far away from it.  
The participants potentially have a range of comfortable viewing distances to a 
mirror, which they do not want to compromise. They are willing to sacrifice the 
platform indication aide if need be. However, this comfortable distance seems to 
differ between the open and built-over stations, being shorter at the latter locations. It 
is possible that lighting conditions and narrower platforms are the reason for that. At 
open stations with wider platforms it is necessary to look on a mirror at a different 
angle to get situational awareness about as much width of a platform as possible. 
Whereas at confined stations it is more beneficial to get closer to the mirror to get 
“zoomed in” view as the wider view does not provide any advantages.  
8.5.6 Influence of design amendments during departures 
The departure results demonstrate same trends as arrival results for running signals, 
where increase is observed for all three metrics in each location. This supports a 
notion about poor situational awareness in the amended physical environment. 
Additional attention and gaze time needed to locate and extract information from a 
signal in such environment creates usability issues for the second AOI in the 
departure sequence. For all locations but Gateshead stadium decrease in mirror TFD 
is rather small and statistically negligible. One can note that spacing between the two 
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elements is decreased everywhere but at Gateshead Stadium. Once again, this 
indicates that spacing of the elements is an important PSF. However, it is the 
unusual layout that creates mirror usability issues as this trend can be observed at all 
stations. It is possible that in long-term the layouts (when drivers are more familiar 
with those) allowing to retain same levels of TFD on mirrors might actually produce 
smaller workloads.  
8.5.7 Influence of increased passenger levels  
For all stations but Gateshead Stadium a notable rise can be noted in total fixation 
time on platforms. Such outcome of increased passenger levels has been expected 
and thus supports simulator validity and adequate motivational pressure claims. The 
results allow studying the drivers’ response in terms of their scanning patterns to 
accommodate for increase in passenger levels.  
Most of the island stations demonstrate decrease in TFD on a stopping position 
indicator in scenario 3. Based on the TFD statistics, the indicator normally is used as 
a secondary tool when selecting a stopping position. Hence the participants might 
decide to re-allocate some of the fixations from it to platforms when there is a need. 
Moreover, in busy environments the marker can become obscured by passengers 
standing close to a platform edge, especially from longer distances. As the chosen 
eye-tracking analysis method uses static AOIs for dynamic environment, it is possible 
that some of the fixations on one of the nearby AOIs can be recorded as fixations on 
another AOI. This is what potentially is causing only a minor TFD increase on 
Gateshead Stadium platform. Similarly, passengers on a busy platform at Heworth 
can substantially obscure a mirror and lead to erroneous fixations being recorded. 
When a mirror is actually obscured, the participants switch their attention to a 
stopping position indicator without no stress-related trends, as it happened at 
Heworth and in the real-life eye-tracking experiment at the confined stations. In a 
sense, this is an example of several defences in a system allowing the drivers to stop 
in a correct position. The participants show that they can easily switch from one to 
another.  
All mirrors on the island platforms demonstrate increase in workload and associated 
stress. This happens in conjunction with considerable drop in mirror TFD at most of 
these locations. Being the primary element for choosing a stopping position any 
distraction from it have a potential to cause increased workload. The drivers confirm 
that they believe the passengers create distractions (Section 6.3.1) and it is known 
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for distractions to increase workload and stress of a main task (Burns et al., 2002; 
Pitsopoulos et al., 2010). Work-related distractions were found to be a contributory 
factor in majority of rail incidents by Madigan et al. (2016). RSSB et al. (2006) claim 
that there is a strong correlation between passenger levels and number of incidents. 
This is further supported by the historic incident analysis where many incidents 
correlate with passenger levels. Such division of drivers’ attention can cause 
additional stress as there is not much additional capacity available. According to 
Naweed and Balakrishnan (2014), operational environment becomes a major factor 
influencing urban rail drivers’ visual and driving strategies.  
8.5.8 Failure to check a signal aspect on departure 
The failures to check a signal are still recorded even though their rate decreased 
significantly compared to the real-life study. Assuming the same motivational 
pressures for the participants, one can note that the considerably better sample 
quality leads to this. This confirms that some of the violations disregarded in Section 
7.4.5 are indeed cases of the eye-tracking set not recording a fixation. Nevertheless, 
it also shows that the remaining failures could have been genuine near misses. This 
is a serious alarm for Tyne & Wear Metro as such events are precursors to 
SaSSPaDs. However, there is a possibility that other factors described in the in-field 
study, e.g. side gazes, are present in the simulator experiment. As the eye-tracking 
equipment is the same for both experiments there are no additional control 
mechanisms against those factors.  
Assuming that all of the cases are genuine violations, one can note that scenarios 
with the baseline layout have the highest rate of such events. Pelaw and Felling are 
the locations where the most incidents happen. These results are similar to the 
findings of the in-field eye-tracking study, confirming that the same factors apply in a 
more controlled environment. Among the design PSF are a distance to a signal and 
the FOW angle. Spacing of the elements is not as important when it comes to the 
signal checking violations. 
Pelaw and Gateshead Stadium are the only stations in scenario 2, where the 
distance between a stopping point and a signal is more than 30 metres. The distance 
at Pelaw is 3 metres higher. Despite the narrower FOW angle, the additional distance 
results in more failure events at Pelaw than at Gateshead Stadium. On the other 
hand, the FOW angle at Pelaw decreases in scenario 2 compared to other scenarios. 
This results in 50% drop in failures to check the signal. The FOW angle increases at 
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Felling but the distance is reduced considerably in scenario 2 so no violations are 
observed. It is possible to conclude that decreasing the distance from a stopping 
point to a running signal below 30 metres can have significant positive effect on the 
drivers’ signal checking behaviour. If such a change is impossible or impractical, 
reducing the FOW angle might provide an additional incentive to check the signal.  
8.6 Conclusions 
The simulation experiment has shown that the use of modern technologies allows 
creating low budget high fidelity simulators. These simulators can re-create the 
immediate physical environment in the VR and provide the practitioners with an 
opportunity to alter scenarios on the go. Moreover, this kind of simulators is easier to 
upgrade given the rapid pace of technical development in the field.  
The novel approach in validation of such simulators, which is used in this experiment, 
also proved to be successful. Using the AOIs in dynamic environment reinforces 
validity results. Previous approaches using static AOIs in the immediate physical 
environment do not provide full picture of drivers’ behaviour and performance due to 
a strong link to between performance and environment outside of a cab. Validity of 
the developed simulator can be primarily improved by using a control device that is 
similar to a metrocar master controller, e.g. a flight simulator joystick. However, these 
controllers have to be first supported by the software. This highlights one of the 
disadvantages of the disadvantages of the explored approach as the end-users do 
not have full control over the software capabilities.  
Many assumptions made after the in-field eye-tracking experiment have been 
supported in a more controlled environment. Drivers behave differently in more 
confined station environments than at open stations. For example, the interaction 
with mirrors and a comfortable distance threshold depends on the station type. Lack 
of scenery-related distractions keeps drivers’ focus on elements of station design in 
more confined locations. The mirrors are used as a primarily mean to select a 
stopping position. Stopping position indicators or platforms are the second most 
fixated at AOI depending on passenger loadings. There is a clear inter-connection 
between platforms and the AOIs used to select stopping position.  
The drivers tend to focus on the signals more in the amended system even when no 
changes are introduced to signals design. It is possible that increased focus on 
SPaDs in the industry forces the participants to check a signal for changes first when 
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they expect amended layouts. It is also possible that task demand in simulator is 
lower subsequently freeing up some visual attention for signals. Even though 
hypothesis 8a is not supported by the test results, visual attention on the signals is 
inter-dependent with the effects introduced by change in the FOW angle. The 
workload-related benefits of the reduced FOW angle on arrivals can only be 
observed in conjunction with an increased focus on a signal. Hence the hypothesis 
8b is supported for arrivals but subject to other factors. Hypothesis 8b is not 
supported by the departure results, where an increased attention to one of the 
elements causes the usability issues for the second element regardless of the layout. 
On the other hand, the closer spacing of a signal and a mirror is found to be a stress-
reducing PSF.  
The spacing is not as important as the FOW angle and the distance to a signal when 
it comes to the violations to check a signal before departure. The departure statistics 
support hypothesis 8c. The combination of a signal located closer than 30m away 
from a stopping point and a narrow FOW angle proved itself as the best layout to 
improve the signal checking behaviour.  
Drivers’ ease of interaction with the stopping position elements suffers when 
passenger levels increase thus supporting hypothesis 8d. More commuters on the 
platforms create a distraction from a stopping task resulting in gaze performance that 
indicated increased workload and stress. However, the results also show that the 
participants are able to switch from a mirror to a stopping position marker for 
choosing a correct stopping point in case the mirror becomes obscured or unusable. 
This switch happens without any additional stresses associated with the markers. 
Hence the designers need to make sure that a secondary stopping position aid is 
present at a station that is informative. Hypothesis 8e is not corroborated as only a 
small number of variables is dependent on drivers’ experience. However, overall 
experience with the system (regardless of driving experience) might play an 
important role in driving. Chapters 5-7, however, show that even unexperienced 
drivers have a good knowledge of the existing system. 
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Chapter 9. Final conclusions 
9.1 Thesis conclusions 
The thesis presents a comprehensive assessment of Tyne & Wear Metro drivers’ 
performance and effects of system design PSFs on it. The assessment approaches 
the research problem from different positions, taking into account different contexts 
affecting metro drivers’ tasks. Using Tyne & Wear Metro as a case study allows 
multiple comparisons with the past research due to a variety of design features 
across the system. Metro-specific research has significant potential for bringing 
safety benefits to such systems. Many of the findings of this thesis are associated 
with design features, which more often feature in urban rail, e.g. DOO, high 
passenger loadings, shorter headways and simpler signalling. Hence there is a high 
transfer potential to other systems for some findings as long as necessary attention is 
given to the spatial context in the process.  
The assumptions made at the onset of the research about metro systems being 
rather unique have been validated and Research Question 1 answered. Many 
concepts and findings from mainline railways or other safety-critical industries are not 
applicable or do not act in the same way in urban railways, particularly in system 
design. In context of Research Question 2, Tyne & Wear Metro as the DOO system 
implies different priorities among the drivers, where station dispatch related 
pressures can be more important than sticking to green signals. One of the 
unexpected findings is related to route knowledge, which is definitely very high. 
However, in certain situations it acts as an adverse PSF due to drivers not being 
ready to non-routine operations. Even though Tyne & Wear Metro drivers do not 
suffer from the task monotony (partially due to DOO), the system itself is monotonous 
and highly repetitive. This allows for quick learning but does not prepare for 
disruptions. When combined with lack of advance warning and decreased situational 
awareness, it becomes one of the main reasons of incidents.  
The research uncovered potentially hazardous behaviour by metro drivers not 
checking the signals before departure from a station. Such violations are precursors 
in SASSPaDs. Even though there are concerns about the equipment used affecting 
these results, these events have to be taken seriously. On the other hand, it shows 
yet another discrepancy with non-DOO systems where the drivers have less 
concurrent tasks. Metro drivers tend to prioritise DOO equipment monitoring over the 
signal checks, potentially due to high route knowledge and the PTI related hazards.  
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The results support theories about importance of exploring everyday behaviour and 
what is considered “normal operations”. Many features have been part of Tyne & 
Wear Metro for a long time hence might be considered safe reactively. For example, 
having a signal near the platform edge is a normal practice. However, it was shown 
that such alignment of track circuits might induce unsafe behaviour. It is unknown 
whether moving the signal further from the platform would create any additional risks 
but it would address the divided attention issue on departure. In fact, the stations 
without running signals in Tyne & Wear Metro, e.g. Cullercoats, have the least 
number of any driver-related incidents.  
Most of the design related PSFs discovered at the latter stages of this research are 
adverse due to the issue of divided attention. It is possible that distractions 
highlighted by the drivers are often a cause of this issue too. At busy stations the 
decrease in visual interaction with mirrors and stopping position markers was 
observed.  
Research Question 3 is successfully addressed in Chapter 8. Station layouts should 
be able to mitigate the issue of divided attention by supporting smaller saccadic 
movements, providing fit for purpose stopping position aide or simply prioritising one 
if the platforms are busy. Among the design interventions are reduction of the FOW 
angle, reduction of the distance to a running signal to less than 30m, closer spacing 
of a mirror and a signal on a longitudinal axis. The first two interventions should also 
improve signal checking behaviour. However, the interventions should be based on a 
local assessment of operational risks, and other PSFs such as openness of the 
stations, lighting conditions, potential for disruptions etc.  
System design features, according to the drivers, do not have a significant effect on 
their performance even though the drivers can differentiate between those in terms of 
usability. More discrepancies were found between the drivers’ opinions and objective 
measures but some can be attributed to more than 6 years long period under 
investigation throughout a number of phases. The historic incident analysis shows 
how incident statistics can drastically change in less than a year due to the operator’s 
initiatives.  
The research in railway industry still underutilises modern technologies, e.g. eye-
tracking, compared to other safety-critical domains. Even though the safety concerns 
exist about experiments in operational environment, the thesis showed that such 
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studies are possible. The new methodologies allow producing rich data samples 
through which train drivers’ cognitive processes and performance can be studied. In 
long-term these technologies should help establishing objective baseline values for 
human performance, which then can be used in assessments of operators and 
infrastructure. One of the achievements of this research is a demonstration of a 
methodology to investigate gaze behaviour on small dynamic elements outside of the 
cab environment. 
The assessments, if safety concerns exist, can be conducted in simulated 
environments. The current technological advancements make the PSF research a 
much more affordable undertaking. The thesis shows that nowadays it is possible to 
build a high fidelity simulator with a budget times smaller than required for 
conventional setups. The user-friendly tools provide safety staff with means of re-
creating specific scenarios, which can be then used for training and assessment. 
Moreover, the combination of the two methods used in this research (eye-tracking 
and simulators) proved to be a good approach for validation of each other, which is 
an important pre-requisite for an industrial implementation.  
9.2 Main contributions 
The author believes that this thesis provides a number of contributions to the existing 
body of knowledge. This section will elaborate on these.  
9.2.1 Transferability of mainline knowledge to metro-specific PSF research.  
The literature review demonstrates that PSF research in metro systems is scarce and 
urban railways are often considered to be the same as mainline railways. The 
following experiments and analysis prove that many of the PSFs described in the 
body of knowledge act differently or are affected by unique factor combinations in 
urban railways. This misalignment had gone almost unnoticed amongst researchers 
until now. 
As the field of rail human factors developed, it has been acknowledged that 
transferability of knowledge from other industries might be limited due to different 
operational contexts (Kyriakidis et al., 2015). However, there might be a need to 
introduce a further division within the railway human factors field to address 
differences in rail systems of various types. This thesis uses the urban railway, 
namely Tyne & Wear Metro, to show that transferability from mainline railways is 
rather limited.  
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The growth in the number of urban rail systems around the world creates additional 
pressures to understand metro-specific incident propagation mechanisms and 
mitigation options. As with mainline railways, PSFs can have an important role in this 
process. However, the current body of knowledge in rail PSFs mostly consists of the 
work focusing on mainline railways. It is often retrospective and generalised to 
achieve a better fit to a wider number of systems. This brings benefits of using bigger 
samples but the complexity of interactions of PSFs in each unique system is 
somewhat overlooked. For example, organisations like RSSB still group metro 
incidents with mainline incidents for the research purposes. Furthermore, the body of 
knowledge is also skewed towards certain incident types which may not be as risk-
bearing in urban rail systems where speeds are lower but station stops are 
significantly more frequent.  
There has been a move towards recognising the need for in-depth PSF research 
focused on urban railways recently (Kyriakidis et al., 2012a; Naweed and 
Balakrishnan, 2014) but the work in this area is still rather fragmented. What is more 
important, it is that it is still unknown whether findings from mainline railways are 
applicable in urban rail and vice versa. Moors et al. (2015) claimed that such 
transferability should consider local characteristics of a system. Hence research 
grouping data from multiple railways does not take into account a holistic notion of a 
system as presented by Dekker (2001) where the environment, tools and tasks are 
all important factors in incident propagation.  
The thesis demonstrated that findings from the mainline railways are not always 
applicable to Tyne & Wear Metro and thus need to be treated with caution for urban 
rail. The already mentioned focus on SPaD incidents does not reflect the risk profiles 
seen in Tyne & Wear Metro where almost 50% of the incidents are related to station 
procedures.  
It has been shown that DOO drivers can have different motivational pressures to 
those of mainline train drivers. Even though it has been acknowledged previously 
that the risks of the SaSSPaDs are higher in DOO systems (Basacik et al., 2009; 
Naweed and Rainbird, 2014; Multer et al., 2015), there was no work done to explore 
what it means to train driving tasks in such systems. Furthermore, it has been 
claimed that drivers are at a higher risk of not checking the PTI due to time pressures 
(Basacik et al., 2009). The thesis shows that Tyne & Wear Metro drivers clearly 
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prioritise the PTI-related tasks over signal checking thus increasing risks of SPaDs, 
not the PTI-incidents.  
Another aspect of the non-transferability found is operation in tunnels, which is one of 
the main features of many urban rail systems. There is very little evidence in the 
literature on how it affects train drivers. Yang et al. (2012) demonstrated that drivers’ 
arousal levels increase as luminance increases. Arousal levels however drop in 
monotonous environments. Tunnels are universally accepted as monotonous 
environments but the analysis in Chapter 5 did not support these assumptions. It is 
known that station stops cause disengagement from a driving task (Naweed and 
Rainbird, 2014) and increase arousal levels (Yang et al., 2012). Hence short 
distances between stations (a key characteristic of urban rail) lead to a situation 
when the adverse effects of monotony in tunnel sections might be balanced out by 
other events, e.g. station stops.  
Although it is known for non-routine events to be the contributory factors in incident 
propagation (Madigan et al., 2016), there is no research to date focusing on the 
relationship between repetitiveness of metro train driving and situational awareness 
in context of such events. Route knowledge is often mentioned as a positive PSF in 
train driving due to its beneficial effects on signal sighting (Naweed, 2013; Gibson, 
2016). The results of this thesis support the initial assumptions of metro drivers 
having very high route knowledge due to operating in a simpler closed system. This 
is a result of the high repetitiveness of a task, and comes at a cost of formed 
expectation biases and lower situational awareness (O'Connell et al., 2015). 
Therefore drivers are more prone to making errors in the non-routine events, as 
demonstrated by this thesis. The findings show that high route knowledge, contrary 
to the assumptions found in the literature related to mainline applications, can be an 
adverse PSF in urban rail.  
Findings from mainline railways indicated significant effect of personal factors, 
namely experience, on visual strategies (Li, 2004; RSSB, 2005). Based on the review 
of findings in other industries it was expected that experienced drivers would have 
more sophisticated and efficient strategies. The experiments conducted in this thesis 
demonstrated only limited effects of previous experience, especially in a familiar 
system. What is more important, the failures to check a signal were found in the in-
field eye-tracking study where only the experienced drivers participated. This 
198 
 
suggests that there might be an inter-dependency between the system design (DOO) 
and the personal factors (experience) which induces propagation of these violations.  
9.2.2 Evidence based identification of system design PSFs and mitigation measures.  
The conducted experiments demonstrate importance of a system design in 
influencing metro drivers’ behaviour. Selected elements of a station design have 
shown their ability to affect drivers in a series of objective tests. Importance of 
exploring PSFs in the infrastructure designs that are used currently is highlighted by 
the fact that all the elements demonstrating adverse effects on drivers’ performance 
currently comply with Railway Group Standards. A number of design interventions 
has been proposed and validated experimentally in order to mitigate these adverse 
effects.  
The previous research showed that physical environment and the associated factors 
are important elements shaping front line staff performance. The detrimental effects 
of system designs were demonstrated in many incident investigations. However, the 
extent of such effects and effective mitigation strategies are still largely unknown with 
studies being fragmented.  
System design factors, although featuring in all reviewed taxonomies, are often 
overlooked in rail research. As the current body of knowledge is skewed towards 
SPaD incidents, many system design factors explored relate to signal sighting. 
Furthermore, task or organisational factors can be similar across a range of 
industries but it is rarely a case for system design factors. Hence it is harder to 
transfer knowledge from other industries compared to knowledge on, for example, 
the safety culture or fatigue management. The findings from mainline railways which 
were corroborated in this thesis are also related to the task factors, e.g. decrease in 
arousal levels after 2 hours of driving. It is also harder to conduct meaningful 
experiments to explore system design PSFs as those require good access to 
infrastructure and are associated with many constraints, as discussed in Section 
9.2.4. 
The thesis explored the system design factors which are common for urban rail 
systems. For example, a confined nature of stations, sharp drops in speed limits and 
a simpler signalling were found to be associated with poorer drivers’ performance. At 
the same time, the Type 1 design station and simplified station layouts demonstrated 
positive effects on the incident statistics.  
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An in-depth investigation of the station layouts standard for Tyne & Wear Metro 
allowed identifying the PSFs associated with individual elements, e.g. DOO mirrors or 
stopping position indicators. Using the non-intrusive techniques helped explore the 
station layouts from a day-to-day operations perspective and uncover important 
relationships. For example, a spacing of a signal and a mirror has been found to 
reduce workload. On the other hand, a FOW angle and a distance to a signal were 
found to affect the signal checking performance on departures. These findings also 
supported a notion of some layouts being worse for drivers’ performance. However, 
the lack of previous research in this area allows these layouts to be a standard 
practice in urban rail systems thus exposing drivers and passengers to an 
unnecessary risk. 
The thesis proposes a set of design improvements which should help create an 
optimum layout for systems like Tyne & Wear Metro. This is even more important as 
some of the design features typical for Tyne & Wear Metro are considered for 
implementation in other types of railways. For example, DOO driving is currently 
becoming a big focus area in mainline railways to cut staff costs. Hence better 
understanding of drivers’ train dispatch routines can inform decision making and 
implementation of DOO elsewhere. Moreover, it is easier to implement the proposed 
design mitigations while a system is being converted to new operational practices.   
The findings of the thesis can be transferred to other railways, especially if those use 
a similar system design. Key areas which need to be compared to Tyne & Wear 
Metro to transfer the findings are the dispatch procedures, the signalling design and 
the station layouts. Train operating companies should start focusing on station 
procedures rather than signal sighting as a large portion of risk to passengers sits 
there. This work clearly demonstrates these risks. The notion of inter-dependency of 
PSFs is reinforced by several experimentally proven examples which can be applied 
in other systems where operational conditions are similar to Tyne & Wear Metro.  
9.2.3 Inter-dependencies of system design PSFs uncovered.  
The thesis has been built around the idea of exploring driver-related incidents from a 
system point of view when a complicated web of factors affecting front line staff 
needs to be considered. The experimental results clearly indicate that drivers’ 
interaction with the physical environment changes along with environment and 
operational conditions. The work done provides insights into the inter-dependencies 
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of PSFs thus highlighting the importance of this largely unexplored area of human 
factors.  
Every system contains a multitude of factors related to a design, a task and 
operational environment. The factors are connected dynamically and the links can 
change depending on the state of these. A human operator is there to create safety 
in a system while interacting with a variety of factors simultaneously (Dekker, 2001). 
Therefore, researching just one factor will not provide a full picture as it can have 
positive effects in specific circumstances but become a negative PSF when 
surrounding conditions change. By understanding the dynamics of how various 
factors affect PSFs, it is possible to build more in-depth models of train drivers’ 
performance. These models would exist for each operational scenario in a system 
and inform system engineers on potential improvements or mitigations.  
The research that acknowledges inter-dependency of PSFs is beginning to appear 
although some links, especially with a system design, are missing. Even though 
environment and a design are the key PSF producing areas (Dekker, 2001), the 
previous work on the inter-dependence of factors in mainline railways (Kyriakidis, 
2013; Kyriakidis et al., 2015) does not account for the connections between the two 
areas. There is very little work available on the inter-dependencies between system 
design PSFs too. However, the notion of inter-connected factors implies that altering 
one element of a system design should affect factors associated with other elements.  
In a sense, the whole eye-tracking methodology in this thesis revolves around inter-
dependency of PSFs because a connection between a system design and a task 
(workload and stress) is assessed. This is one of the few well-known inter-
dependencies and has been explored in many studies previously (Basacik et al., 
2009; Blanchard and Lowel, 2009; Johnson et al., 2009; Hitchcock et al., 2013; 
Kyriakidis et al., 2015). However, this connection is rarely considered within multi-
factor (more than 2) relationships. Going back to the notion of a web of factors in a 
system constantly interacting between each other and dynamically changing, it would 
be incorrect to assume that the 2-factor relationships can exist in isolation.  
The thesis demonstrated the multi-factor inter-connectivity in the assessment of the 
system design PSFs in the series of experiments. Many relationships found include 
the task PSFs (workload, stress, visual strategies) and at least 2 system design 
PSFs. For example, the station “openness” is the PSF affecting the signal layout – 
201 
 
workload PSF relationship. The usability and ease of interaction with stopping aids 
significantly depends on design of mirrors and passenger approaches. Similarly, 
drivers’ priorities in design elements are dependent on these factors.  
The experiments showed that the drivers’ interaction with all tested elements are 
inter-dependent, where some PSFs can act as catalysts in other relationships. 
Existence of such PSFs has been suggested in the beginning (Section 5.4.7) by 
demonstrating that a number of trains calling at a station can induce adverse effects 
of other factors. This has been proven later in the experimental phase. For example, 
a signal attracting more visual attention enhances the positive effects of the 
infrastructure layout with narrower FOW angle. The narrower FOW angle can 
enhance signal checking behaviour but the benefits of this PSF can be improved if it 
is combined with a shorter distance between a stop point and a signal.  
The multi-factor relationships have also been experimentally explored with several 
PSFs not related to a system design. Passenger levels at stations were found to 
interact with system design and task PSFs, where the system design PSFs act 
differently with various passenger loadings. An interaction with stopping elements on 
arrivals suffers (workload increases) due to the need for more monitoring of 
platforms. Drivers’ visual strategies change when there are more passengers on 
platforms due to prioritising stopping elements with better visibility. It is also possible 
to argue that the design of platforms and passenger approaches affects how 
platforms are perceived by drivers, e.g. crowded or not, thus becoming another PSF 
in the multi-factor relationship described above.  
The personal factors (experience) became another PSF involved in the inter-
dependencies although this involvement is rather limited. With drivers utilising 
different visual strategies based on their experience levels, it is possible to see how 
the connections between the task and system design factors can be affected.  
The thesis demonstrated the presence of the inter-dependencies between the PSFs 
and the complex nature of factors affecting drivers in urban railways. Although 
experimentally only a few relationships are shown there is a much wider potential for 
research in this area. Understanding of PSFs outside of the isolated 2-factor 
relationships is a key to the assessment of drivers’ performance from a system 
perspective. Beneficial and adverse effects of some PSFs were proven 
experimentally thus supporting the need for the industry to explore those.   
202 
 
9.2.4 Validated low-cost methodology for system design PSF research in railways.  
The thesis proposes a methodology which allows non-intrusive research in railway 
design PSFs using virtual reality environments.  User-friendly software, with a simple 
setup and a low cost makes this methodology easily adaptable for various research 
projects. Moreover, the thesis validated the proposed method through the 
comparison of a train drivers’ performance in a simulator and real-life driving with the 
90% match achieved.  
An experimental approach into ergonomics of a system usually requires comparisons 
between several options. In the case of railway infrastructure, it can be quite intrusive 
and there is a necessity for an informed executive decision to be made before 
changes are introduced into a system. For example, assessing potential safety 
benefits of introducing a new signal type requires introducing risks associated with a 
number of issues, e.g. system closures for installation, driver training, rule book 
changes. Hence it must be a well-tested signalling product to mitigate against such 
risks. Nowadays this means a series of high fidelity experiments, using test tracks or 
expensive virtual reality setups. This, in turn, leads to significant costs for the 
introduction of new solutions in the industry. According to Simmons (2015), the 
“safety first” approach and budget constraints are two main barriers for the 
introduction of new technologies and solutions in the railway industry.  
The research in design-related PSFs is constrained by the same barriers as it often 
requires a similar comparative experimental approach. The thesis tries to address the 
monetary constraint by proposing a methodology for a low cost high fidelity virtual 
environment which can be developed and altered quickly. Moreover, it is a setup that 
utilises only widely available off-the-shelf products. Until recently it was 
acknowledged that the high fidelity simulators always come with an inflated price tag 
due to the need for a physical shell, moving base etc (Jamson and Jamson, 2010; 
Jolly et al., 2013).  
The literature suggested that the video games industry will be able to contribute to 
the field of railway simulation (Rushby and Seabrook, 2007). The low cost 
alternatives to the full simulator setups have been explored previously (Yates and 
Sharples, 2009; Reed and Green, 2010; Bella, 2014) and even rolled out 
commercially (Rowe, 2013). However, the research in system design rail PSFs has 
not adopted this approach yet and the expensive setups continue to be used 
(Aitchinson and Davies, 2009; Buksh et al., 2013).  
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The thesis shows that the cheaper, more flexible and adaptable approaches can be 
also successful, validating this in the series of experiments. Many rail human factors 
studies use subjective measures due to financial limitations whereas the proposed 
methodology allows collecting the rich objective data. The thesis demonstrated that 
the subjective measures, e.g. questionnaire results, do not always reflect drivers’ 
actions out in the field. Hence collecting the objective data improves the reliability of 
the research. 
As with many other technologies, a decrease in cost usually causes an increase in 
uptake of a certain technology. Therefore, the proposed methodology has the 
potential to boost research in system design rail PSFs. Furthermore, significant 
benefits have been identified for train operators who would like to start using virtual 
reality solutions in their training and assessment process to drive down the costs of 
training. There is a requirement for a minimum number of hours driven by a trainee 
driver before he or she can become fully qualified. These hours come at a significant 
cost to a train operating company. The proposed methodology has a high cost-
benefit ratio addressing this issue.  
9.3 Limitations 
Although a set of contributions to the body of knowledge has been delivered, there 
are limitations to this research.  
9.3.1 Tyne & Wear Metro operational context 
A potential limitation of the findings of this thesis is related to the uniqueness of urban 
rail systems which strongly depend on particular characteristics, e.g. topography, 
patronage. These characteristics might differ across systems. Nevertheless, Tyne & 
Wear Metro is a good example of urban rail systems as it contains features common 
to various types of systems as discussed in Chapter 4 (Table 6). This makes it a 
suitable subject for a case study to explore the design-related PSFs.  
9.3.2 Technical limitations of the eye-tracker used 
The eye-tracker used did not allow for a meaningful investigation of driving in tunnels 
which is one of the main design features of metro systems. Although Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 show no links between driving in tunnels and increase in incidents due to 
monotony, it still can be expected that drivers’ visual strategies might be different in 
underground environments (as partially shown by the confined stations Heworth and 
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Gateshead Stadium in Chapter 8). Hence the design interventions proposed might 
not bring the assumed benefits in such environments.  
There are some limitations on the eye-tracking methodology used. Use of physical 
infrared tags can help increase a sample size quickly. The tags automatically register 
fixations on each AOI thus removing any ambiguities created by a researcher 
specifying the AOIs manually and the 3-second timeframes. For this thesis the 
required number of tags (16) was not available as those have been discontinued for 
Tobii Glasses (Mark 1). More modern devices will have these add-ons widely 
available. However, it is still necessary to check the off-sets and (if needed) repair 
the sample manually as described in Section 7.2.6. 
The accuracy of measurements can also be increased by using eye-trackers with a 
better sampling frequency. As shown by Anderson et al (2010), lower frequency 
increases the probability of a measurement error. There are eye-trackers available 
on the market with the sampling frequencies in excess of 300Hz. This parameter can 
also contribute to an improved data quality and reduce exclusion of trials from a 
sample.  
9.3.3 Metrics used to investigate changes in workload/stress 
Chapter 7.2.4 presents a strong case for a link between the fixation count, fixation 
duration and stress/workload. Many eye-tracking studies focusing on workload and 
stress use measures of blinks and pupil size (Marquart et al., 2015). For example, 
Schulz et al. (2011) concluded, in their comparison of the eye-tracking metrics, that 
the pupil diameter metrics might be the best measure to estimate the workload.  
These metrics are not collected by the equipment used in this thesis but are available 
in other similar devices. It might be beneficial to use the metrics associated with 
blinks and pupil size in similar studies in the future to reduce the ambiguities 
introduced by comparing the numerous fixation metrics.  
9.3.4 Limitations of the simulator used 
The simulator provides good visual stimuli but the simplifications were introduced in 
terms of the fidelity of the train controls. There are no controller devices available 
which resemble a Tyne & Wear Metro train drivers’ desk. However, the results 
obtained are still considered significant with the expected variations in performance 
with different controls being small.  
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9.4 Recommendations for Further work 
Future research should explore effects of the design amendments in the high 
passenger flow situations as the reverse relationship is present between the 
platforms and stopping position elements. The future experiments also need to 
improve drivers’ familiarity with the amended layouts before the tests are conducted 
in order to contain effects of poor situational awareness. Using the more advanced 
eye-trackers would allow investigation of the PSFs present in metro tunnels and at 
underground stations. 
As the thesis progressed through the phases, many promising research areas have 
been taken out of the scope. Effectively, the further research should explore in depth 
the potential of each PSF identified in this thesis, i.e. the effects of metro 
environment on arousal levels, the operations in tunnels in terms of ambient lighting 
and DOO monitors, the presence of disruptions and the areas with ground position 
lights, and other. It is even more important to conduct this research in urban rail as 
the body of knowledge in this domain is comparatively small. 
An alignment of several PSFs is an important pre-condition in the incident causation. 
Although the thesis uncovers some of these relationships at a design elements level, 
the full dependence web is yet to be understood. This research domain promises 
significant gains in understanding of the causal mechanisms and human 
performance.   
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Failure to call incidents by location 
2011/12 2012/13 Total
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Station overruns by location 
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Passenger entrapment incidents by location 
2011/12 2012/13 Total
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Wrong side door activations by location 
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Appendix D. Overspeeding incidents at 4 worst performing locations 
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Appendix E. Station overruns at 4 worst performing locations 
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Appendix F. Passenger entrapment incidents at 4 worst performing 
locations 
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Appendix G. Wrong side door activations at 4 worst performing 
locations 
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Appendix H. Associations between incident types
247 
 
 C
at A
 
S
P
A
D
 
O
ther 
S
P
A
D
 
O
verspeed 
Failure to 
call 
S
tation 
overrun 
P
assenger 
entrapm
en
t Wrong 
side doors 
W
rong 
route 
D
oors 
obstruction 
S
ignal 
faults 
D
ispatch 
equipm
ent 
Trainfault 
A
TP 
Trackfault 
A
TP 
Foliage  
Low
 rail 
adhesion  
P
assenger 
overcarrie
 
Cat A SPAD  -.204 .124 .049 .057 -.398 -.210 -.056 -.230 -.412 -.168 -.299 -.146 .078 .449 -.264 
Other SPAD -.204  -.242 .472 .460 .353 .072 .142 .153 .010 .659* -.001 .416 -.166 .478 .245 
Overspeed .124 -.242  .112 -.231 .023 -.081 .434 -.275 .009 -.072 .251 -.321 .103 -.156 .125 
Failure to call .049 .472 .112  .401 .202 .112 .300 .182 .090 .566* -.090 .600* .046 .300 .185 
Station overrun .057 .460 -.231 .401  .469 .273 -.026 .390 .009 .666* -.466 .397 -.460 .718* .112 
Passenger 
entrap. -.398 .353 .023 .202 .469  .549 .545 .578* -.100 .633* -.255 .079 -.522 .229 -.139 
Wrong side 
doors -.210 .072 -.081 .112 .273 .549  .295 .486 .040 .474 .083 .060 -.387 .090 .240 
Wrong route -.056 .142 .434 .300 -.026 .545 .295  .228 .107 .579* .084 .028 -.229 .228 -.208 
Doors obstr. -.230 .153 -.275 .182 .390 .578* .486 .228  -.157 .475 -.513 .446 -.815** .278 -.470 
Signal faults -.412 .010 .009 .090 .009 -.100 .040 .107 -.157  .034 .635* -.176 .095 -.137 .156 
Dispatch 
equipment -.168 .659* -.072 .566* .666* .633* .474 .579* .475 .034  -.199 .410 -.509 .592* .125 
Trainfault ATP -.299 -.001 .251 -.090 -.466 -.255 .083 .084 -.513 .635* -.199  -.409 .522 -.492 .337 
Trackfault ATP -.146 .416 -.321 .600* .397 .079 .060 .028 .446 -.176 .410 -.409  -.150 .326 -.096 
Foliage .078 -.166 .103 .046 -.460 -.522 -.387 -.229 -.815** .095 -.509 .522 -.150  -.474 .295 
Low rail 
adhesion .449 .478 -.156 .300 .718** .229 .090 .228 .278 -.137 .592* -.492 .326 -.474  -.159 
Passenger 
overc. -.264 .245 .125 .185 .112 -.139 .240 -.208 -.470 .156 .125 .337 -.096 .295 -.159  
Table 38. Association in the period-based sample. * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); **correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 C
at A
 
S
P
A
D
 
O
ther 
S
P
A
D
 
O
verspeed 
Failure to 
call 
S
tation 
overrun 
P
assenger 
entrapm
en
t Wrong 
side doors 
W
rong 
route 
D
oors 
obstruction 
S
ignal 
faults 
Trainfault 
A
TP 
Trackfault 
A
TP 
D
ispatch 
equipm
ent 
Foliage  
Low
 rail 
adhesion  
P
assenger 
overcarrie
 
Cat A SPAD  .035 .431 -.302 .498* .574** .601** .165 .385 .207 .524* .138 -.036 .431 .165 .172 
Other SPAD .035  .179 .347 .111 .232 .350 .204 .190 .024 .057 .095 .271 .412 .105 .190 
Overspeed .431 .179  .104 .248 .772** .453* -.317 .472* .410 .120 .244 -.022 .305 -.200 -.124 
Failure to call -.302 .347 .104  -.163 .074 .303 -.024 .082 .328 -.013 .315 .282 .076 -.077 -.214 
Station overrun .498* .111 .248 -.163  .228 .339 .138 .378 .335 .224 .106 .421 .580** .430 -.209 
Passenger 
entrap. .574** .323 .772** .074 .228  .696** -.226 .606** .326 .261 .109 -.065 .338 -.298 -.022 
Wrong side 
doors .601** .350 .453* .303 .339 .696**  .076 .411 .398 .408 .258 .299 .651** .162 .102 
Wrong route .165 .204 -.317 -.024 .138 -.226 .076  -.135 .042 .235 .397 .164 .184 .450* .441* 
Doors obstr. .385 .190 .472* .082 .378 .606** .411 -.135  -.093 .343 .222 -.024 .528* -.289 -.062 
Signal faults .207 .024 .410 .328 .335 .326 .398 .042 -.093  -0.71 .364 .473* .139 .277 -.356 
Trainfault ATP .524* .057 .203 -.013 .224 .261 .408 .235 .343 -.071  .025 -.047 .468* .010 .523* 
Trackfault ATP .138 .095 .244 .315 .106 .109 .258 .397 .222 .364 .025  .295 .213 .294 -.061 
Dispatch equip. -.036 .271 -.022 .282 .421 -.065 .299 .164 -.024 .473* -.047 .295  .366 .581** -.477* 
Foliage .431 .412 .305 .076 .580** .338 .651** .184 .528* .139 .468* .213 .366  .317 .265 
Low rail 
adhesion .165 .105 -.200 -.077 .430 -.298 .162 .450* -.289 .277 .010 .294 .581** .317  -.102 
Passenger 
overc. .172 .190 -.124 -.214 -.209 -.022 .102 .441* -.062 -.356 .523* -0.61 -.477* .265 -.102  
Table 39. Associations by time of day. * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); **correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
249 
 
 C
at A
 
S
P
A
D
 
O
ther 
S
P
A
D
 
O
verspeed 
Failure to 
call 
S
tation 
overrun 
P
assenger 
entrapm
en
t Wrong 
side doors 
W
rong 
route 
D
oors 
obstruction 
S
ignal 
faults 
D
ispatch 
equipm
ent 
Trainfault 
A
TP 
Trackfault 
A
TP 
Foliage  
Low
 rail 
adhesion  
P
assenger 
overcarrie
 
Cat A SPAD  .082 .256* -.126 -.059 -.051 -.139 .334** -.087 .269* .181 .301* .260* .141 .082 .526** 
Other SPAD .082  .113 .045 -.055 -.159 -.010 .032 -.053 .067 .297* .137 -.039 .255* .104 .263* 
Overspeed .256* .113  -.053 .095 -.240 .042 -.163 -.036 -.093 -.058 .190 .307* -.140 .204 .193 
Failure to call -.126 .045 -.053  .282* -.001 .118 -.120 .081 .131 -.023 -.153 -.153 -.210 -.076 -.090 
Station overrun -.059 -.055 .095 .282*  .273* -.032 -.043 .192 .112 -.158 -.129 .121 -.407** .014 -.174 
Passenger 
entrap. -.051 -.159 -.240 -.001 .273*  .176 -.089 .280* -.031 -.225 .040 .103 
-.377** -.321* -.257* 
Wrong side 
doors -.139 -.010 .042 .118 -.032 .176  -.121 .122 .034 -.064 -.071 .285* -.138 -.150 .080 
Wrong route .334** .032 -.163 -.120 -.043 -.089 -.121  .115 .293* -.080 .205 -.094 .398** .261* .475** 
Doors obstr. -.087 -.053 -.036 .081 .192 .280* .122 .115  -.083 -.431** .140 .129 -.226 -.164 -.164 
Signal faults .269* .067 -.093 .131 .112 -.031 .034 .293* -.083  .233 .221 .099 .202 .000 .408** 
Dispatch equip. .181 .297* -.058 -.023 -.158 -.225 -.064 -.080 -.431** .233  .001 -.078 .301* .147 .236 
Trainfault ATP .301* .137 .190 -.153 -.129 .040 -.071 .205 .140 .221 .001  .283* .148 .164 .502** 
Trackfault ATP .260* -.039 .307* -.153 .121 .103 .285* -.094 .129 .099 -.078 .283*  -.219 -.086 .226 
Foliage .141 .255* -.140 -.210 -.407** -.377** -.138 .398** -.226 .202 .301* .148 -.219  .278* .397** 
Low rail 
adhesion .082 .104 .204 -.076 .014 -.321* -.150 .261* -.164 .000 .147 .164 -.086 .278*  .349** 
Passenger 
overc. .526** .263* .193 -.090 -.174 -.257* .080 .475** -.164 .408** .236 .502** .226 .397** .349**  
Table 40. Associations by location. * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); **correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix I. Questionnaire used for the survey of Tyne & Wear 
Metro drivers 
 251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear driver, 
 
This questionnaire forms part of research aimed at identifying how the design of a metro 
system and its immediate physical environment affect the safety-related performance of 
drivers. Research on mainline railways suggests that changing and improving certain parts of 
the system design can reduce the number of safety-related incidents. This research aims to 
explore whether those findings can be applied to urban rail systems.   The questionnaire 
should take around 10 minutes to complete. 
 
The study is carried out by NewRail – The Centre for Railway Research at Newcastle 
University and is fully funded by the Institute of Sustainability at Newcastle University. We 
can assure you that your answers are completely anonymous and will not be shared with the 
management of DB Regio T&W or Nexus. Also, you can miss any questions you are 
uncomfortable with, although we would like you to fill it all in if possible.  Any scientific 
articles from the data obtained here will not allow any identification of individuals.  
 
The research has the potential to contribute to the reduction of operational risk in the Tyne & 
Wear Metro, and one of its aims is to provide a set of recommendations on design 
improvements. Your answers will help specifying areas of the system design that require 
monitoring and potential intervention.  
 
If you have any questions regarding the questionnaire please do not hesitate to contact Aleks 
Rjabovs at the email address or phone number below. 
 
With many thanks for your cooperation, 
 
Aleks Rjabovs  (a.rjabovs@ncl.ac.uk   07717382070), NewRail, Newcastle University, 
Professor Mark Robinson, NewRail, Newcastle University, 
Roberto Palacin, NewRail, Newcastle University. 
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Q1. Your opinions on several issues: please tick one box on each line to show how much you 
agree or disagree with the statement 
Statement St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e 
A
gr
ee
 
Ju
st
 
ag
re
e 
N
ot
 su
re
 
Ju
st
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
The safety record of the Tyne & Wear Metro in 
the past 3 years has improved 
       
Since I joined the Metro, my safety-related  
performance has changed for the better 
       
My route knowledge of the Metro is good 
 
       
My confidence reduces while driving during 
possessions or engineering works 
       
The training provided for operations in  
degraded mode is adequate 
       
The moment I enter or leave a tunnel, I feel more 
alert  
 
       
Running signals between the stations are easy to 
interact with 
       
Running signals at the stations are easy to  
interact with 
       
I am less alert if the outside physical environment 
is monotonous  
       
I prefer varied outside environment, such as a mix 
of vegetation and buildings 
       
The recent change in door closing procedure from 
2 to 1 button sequence is easier to operate 
       
A 1-button sequence might increase the 
occurrence of passenger entrapment  
       
I like mirrors as station dispatch equipment 
 
       
I like monitors as station dispatch equipment        
 
 
253 
 
 
Statement St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e 
A
gr
ee
 
Ju
st
 
ag
re
e 
N
ot
 su
re
 
Ju
st
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
When coming to a scheduled stop I pay attention 
to a running signal at the platform end 
       
Running signals located far from the platform end 
can make selection of a stopping position difficult 
       
It is difficult to choose which side doors to open 
when station signals and the platform are on 
opposite sides 
       
Signalling at ground level can be confusing  
after driving a train in passenger service 
       
The change of platform side does not affect my 
ability to select correct side to open the doors 
       
The stations differ a lot in terms of driver 
visibility of passengers on a platform.   
       
I prefer the ¾ life refurbished cab to the original  
one 
       
If the time between two stations is more than 2.5 
minutes, this improves my alertness 
       
I feel more alert when the time between stations is 
less than 1 minute  
       
I prefer steep change in speed limits rather than 
gradual change 
       
My familiarity with operational protocols at  
sidings is very good 
       
I have good familiarity with the layout of the 
depot 
 
       
I find it harder to keep within higher speed limit 
than lower speed limit 
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Q2. Please give a mark out of 10 for each of these types of signals in terms of how easy they 
are to interact with and interpret:  10 – for the easiest/best, and 1 – the hardest. 
Signal type Mark/10 
Running signal on Network Rail infrastructure   
Running signal on Tyne & Wear Metro infrastructure  
Repeater  
Advance warning signal  
Flashing aspects  
Ground position lights  
Junction indicators  
 
Q3. Please indicate in the box below the main reason for any low marks allocated above. 
Please mention any particular location where this signal type is hard to interpret. 
 
 
 
Q4. Please give a mark out of 10 for each of these potential causes for wrong side doors activation. 
10 – very important, 1 – not important at all. 
Potential cause Mark/10 
Attention lapse  
Lack of reminders for drivers at stations  
Layout of the door control  
Distractions  
Inadequate training  
Other: (please name here)  
Other: (please name here)  
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Q5. In the box below please name up to 3 stations that you believe have the biggest chance 
of wrong side door activation. Please state any reasons for selecting these stations.  
 
 
Q6. Please give a mark out of 10 for each of these potential causal factors for passenger entrapment 
incidents. 10 – very important, 1 – not important at all. 
Potential causal factor Mark/10 
Night time  
Snow  
Rain  
Mist  
Direct sunlight  
Vegetation overgrowth  
Location of station infrastructure, e.g. CCTV cameras  
Overcrowding at a platform or in a train  
Winter clothing on passengers  
Shopping bags and suitcases  
Layout of the stations   
Design of passenger approaches  
Mobility aid equipment, e.g. walking sticks, crutches  
Station dispatch instructions/procedures used in the Metro  
Low height passengers, e.g. kids  
Other: (please name here)  
Other: (please name here)  
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Q7. In the box below please name up to 3 stations that you believe have the biggest chance 
for a passenger entrapment incident to occur. Please give reasons for selecting these stations.  
Q8. Thinking about the “3/4 life” cab; please state how satisfied you are with its 
components.  
Component St
ro
ng
ly
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
Sa
tis
fie
d 
Ju
st
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
N
ot
 su
re
 
Ju
st
 
di
ss
at
isf
ie
d 
D
is
sa
tis
fie
d 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
ss
at
isf
ie
d 
Driver’s seat        
Driver’s desk        
FASSI        
Driver’s Safety Device (DSD)        
Deadman’s Vigilance Device (DVD)        
Master controller        
Heating, ventilation and air conditioning unit        
Other:        
 
Q9. In your opinion, what season has the highest amount of passenger entrapment incidents? 
Please select one.  Please tick one appropriate answer. 
 Winter             Spring              Summer             Autumn             Don’t know 
Q10. Please assess the following statements and tick one appropriate answer in each row. 
 
From the start of the fixed driving portion, in 
minutes 
Statement 
U
nd
er
 
30
 
31
-6
0 
61
-9
0 
91
-1
20
 
12
1-
15
0 
15
1-
18
0 
O
ve
r 
18
1 
N
ev
er
 
My alertness start to decrease         
My boredom starts         
Most incidents are likely to happen         
Least incidents are likely to happen         
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Q11. In the past 3 years have you ever been involved in any of these types of incidents? Please 
tick all that apply 
 Category A SPaD        
 Category B/C/D SPaD      
 Overspeeding      
 Station overrun      
 Failure to call              
 Passenger entrapment   
 Wrong side doors activation 
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Finally, three questions about you personally: 
Q12. What is your gender? Please tick one appropriate answer. 
         Male      Female 
 
Q13. Please tick your age group  
         18-25      26-35   36-45  46-55  55+ 
 
Q14. How long have you been a metro driver? Please tick one appropriate answer. 
 Less than 3 years        3 to 10 years         10 to 20 years         More than 20 years 
 
Q15. Please use the box below to write any comments you would like to raise about any of 
the questions or issues in the survey; your opinions are appreciated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With many thanks for filling this in.  We will provide a summary of the findings for you all 
when the research is completed.  
 
Aleks Rjabovs, Professor Mark Robinson and Roberto Palacin 
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Appendix J. Screenshots of virtual Tyne & Wear Metro (scenario 1) 
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Appendix K. Screenshots of virtual Tyne & Wear Metro (scenario 3) 
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Appendix L. Simulation assessment questionnaire 
 
1. Please rate the following aspects of the simulation 
 
V
er
y 
go
od
 
G
oo
d 
D
on
’t 
kn
ow
 
P
oo
r 
V
er
y 
po
or
 
Visuals      
Train 
handling 
     
Immersion      
Comfort       
 
2. Was it easy to notice changes introduced to the physical environment?  
□ Yes    □ No    □ Can’t tell 
3. Would you consider this simulation as a good representation of driver’s duties 
in T&W Metro? 
□ Yes    □ No    □ Can’t tell 
 
4. What can be improved in order to make it more realistic? 
 
 
